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Title: Performing Literariness: Literature in the Event in South Africa and the United 
States 
 
Approved:  _______________________________________________ 
Linda Kintz 
 
In this dissertation “literariness” is defined not merely as a quality of form by 
which texts are evaluated as literary, but as an immanent and critical sensibility by which 
reading, writing, speaking, learning, and teaching subjects within the literary humanities 
engage language in its immediate aesthetic (and thus also historical and ethical) aspect. 
This reorientation seeks to address the literary academy’s overwhelming archival focus, 
which risks eliding literary endeavor as an embodied undertaking that inevitably reflects 
the historical contingency of its enactment. Literary endeavor in higher education is thus 
understood as a performance by which subjects enact not only the effect of literary texts 
upon themselves but also the contingencies of their socio-economic, national, cultural, 
and personal contexts. Subjects’ responses to literature are seen as implicit identity 
claims that, inevitably constituted of biases, can be evaluated through the lens of post-
positivist realism in terms of their ethical and pragmatic usefulness.  
 Framing this reoriented literariness in terms of its enactment in higher education 
literature classrooms, this dissertation addresses its pedagogical, methodological, and 
personal implications. The events of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission (TRC) and the literature arising from it serve as a pivotal case study. The 
TRC Hearings, publically broadcast and pervasive in the national discourse of the time, 
enacted a scenario in which South Africans confronted the implications for personal and 
national identities of apartheid’s racial abuses. The dissertation demonstrates through 
close reading and anecdotal evidence how J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Antjie Krog’s 
Country of My Skull formally reactivate this scenario in the subject in the event of 
reading, while surveys of critical responses to these texts show how  readers often 
resisted the texts’ destabilizing effects.  A critical account of the process that resulted in 
Telling, Eugene – a stage production in which U.S. military veterans tell their stories to 
their civilian communities – analyzes the idea of literariness in the U.S. and assesses its 
potential for socially engaged literary praxis.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS LITERARINESS? 
In this dissertation, I undertake a defense of literary scholarship in higher 
education. I do so because I believe that literature and literary studies changes people in 
useful ways. It challenges them to engage the complicated networks with which they live 
with deeper insight and in more ethically self-reflexive ways.  
The conviction that literary scholarship “betters” its practitioners is, of course, 
neither unusual among literary scholars, nor historically un-contentious. It is implicit to 
the nineteenth century beginnings of the formal discipline in both the Commonwealth and 
U.S. Empires. In Professing Literature, Gerald Graff describes this as the uncomfortable 
“union of Arnoldian Humanism and scientific research which gave birth to academic 
literary studies” (Graff 3).  
Summarily, Arnold’s Humanism claimed benevolent secularism (even as Arnold 
deploys evangelical religion as an analogical model), and sought to spread “perfection” 
or “sweetness and light” through the best that had been thought and written in English 
culture. Culture was Arnold’s prescription for staving off anarchy, which he thought the 
inevitable outcome of the pervasive tendency of people to do as they willed. The 
pedagogy of (Western) culture, in other words, sought to create good citizens. As the 
Indian post-colonialist scholar Guari Viswanathan points out, it also coerced colonized 
people into being good subjects of Empire. Insofar as English Literature “appeared as a 
subject in the curriculum of colonies long before it was institutionalized in the home 
country” (Viswanathan 2-3), it rendered the “anarchic” bodies of colonized subjects as 
the testing grounds for formalized literary study. In this way, the purported benevolence 
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of humanism, implicit in the claim that literary scholarship “betters” those who undertake 
it, marked “the effacement of a sordid history of colonialist expropriation, material 
exploitation, and class and race oppression behind European world dominance” (20). 
Vishwanathan’s antipathetic account of traditional humanistic pedagogy is 
unquestionably valuable. It enacts one of the ways in which, as Graff suggests, “much 
contemporary theory amounts to a radical attack on the premises and values of traditional 
literary humanism” (Graff 3). From critical theory, to post-structuralism, to post-
structuralist psychoanalytical theory, to new historicism, from feminist theory, to ethnic 
studies, and so forth and so on, the critical output of the literary academy enacts a 
laudatory distaste for monologic epistemological schemes that impose ideologically 
suspect notions of propriety. Additionally, the academy performs its disaffection 
materially. The supposed birthright of white privileged men-of-letters to speak their 
ground is necessarily challenged through the diversifications of faculty, students, canons 
(if not the refutation of the very idea of canonicity), and through the practice of de-
centered pedagogies.  
However, as Graff understands such conflicts, they enact not a disavowal of 
humanism per se, but a perpetual reactivation of its base premises.1 Thus, in all its 
diversity, without a singular notion of “the good,” un-tethering itself where it can from 
prescriptive essentialisms, the literary academy acts on the theory (perhaps “faith” is a 
better word) that the rigorous engagement of literary and cultural artifacts performs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Professing Literature is an “institutional history” in which Graff traces the development of 
humanism’s critique, not back to the post-1968 proliferation of resistant theory, but to the very 
beginnings of formalized literary studies. In so doing, he convincingly argues that contemporary critics 
of humanism continue to “raise the kinds of questions about the nature and cultural function of 
literature that used to be the concerns of traditional humanists, even as [contemporary critics] reject 
the traditional humanistic answers to those questions as no longer sufficient” (Graff 3 – my italics). 
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important functions, that it potentially “betters” the world within which it operates 
through those that encounter it.  
This is the theory to which I hold, and to which end I write this dissertation. “All 
teachers of literature are ‘theorists,’ and have a stake in theoretical disputes,” Graff 
writes. “For that matter, there is a sense in which a literature department (and curriculum) 
is itself a theory, though it has been largely an incoherent theory, and this incoherence 
strengthens the impression that the department has no theory” (2-3).  
For all its well-meaning, however, it is arguable that the contemporary literary 
academy struggles to enact this incoherent / cohering “theory” in ways that transcend the 
discipline. It battles when asked to justify the value of literary studies to its own 
undergraduate students, never mind the world beyond the university. It cannot simply say 
this is the good that comes from what we do every day, this is the worth of our endlessly 
proliferating archive of criticism and theoretical writing, and this is how we benefit 
society more broadly. In effect, literary theorists, critics and pedagogues often enact a 
curious disciplinary solipsism by which literary studies are ends in themselves, even as 
they believe themselves to be bettering the world through their discipline. The result is a 
bifurcation between the literary academy and the world beyond, suggested by a host of 
pervasive motifs and associations that speak to the idea that literary scholars are 
cloistered idealists. Literary academics live in “an ivory tower.” Intellectualism is elitism. 
Academics wander “hallowed halls.” “What are you going to do with that?” 
undergraduates are frequently asked when it becomes apparent that they are majoring in 
literature. Of course, literary scholars often feel insulted by such iterations, holding, as 
they do, to “the theory,” and respond in kind. But the pervasiveness of these motifs is as 
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much a symptom of literary studies’ failure to cross the divide between itself and the 
world that contains it, as it is of the ignorance or anti-intellectualism of those who wield 
them.   
In this dissertation, I argue that attempts by the literary academy  to cross this 
divide are stymied by its epistemological adherence to the ontological status of its object 
of study, the literary text (notwithstanding the scope and scale of the methodologies, 
canon and media the institution accommodates). This, as will soon become evident, is the 
methodological stake. Crucially, however, the stakes are also personal. My own 
undergraduate and early post-graduate experiences are exemplary of the disjuncture 
between the literary academy and the world. The Rhodes University English department 
in South Africa in which I was “raised” was by many accounts a bastion of white 
English-speaking South African traditionalism. It heavily emphasized close formal 
reading, the English canon, and to a lesser degree the white South African canon, with 
only occasional departures into American, African and Indian post-colonial texts. 
Assiduous historical readings were encouraged, but the histories that made sense of our 
readings were almost invariably metropolitan in origin and imbued with the aura of 
objectivity. Theoretical approaches by which to critique their enlightenment 
underpinnings were cursorily engaged within the curriculum.  
I do not mean to cast aspersion on the curriculum of the Rhodes University 
English department, nor for that matter on its faculty. I too am responsible for the foci I 
chose and the available courses I did not. That said, I find it remarkable that it took me 
until a year into working on my Masters thesis (a close formal analysis of William 
Blake’s and T.S. Eliot’s prophetic works), to grow disaffected, to take a look around and 
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ask, what am I doing, here, in Grahamstown, in South Africa, now, committing vast 
swathes of time to two poets who wrote there and then.  
For all its virtues, my undergraduate English major (and Philosophy – pervasively 
analytical, begrudgingly continental, never African) facilitated insularity. Certainly, my 
literary training did not require me to address my understanding of myself in relation to 
the world. It required me, exclusively, to perform its constitutive skill-sets sufficiently. 
This is all the more remarkable considering the historical backdrop to my undergraduate 
degree. It coincided with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
(1996-1999), a fraught and public negotiation of South African history, and an explicit 
attempt to (re)invent a national identity out of a fractured and traumatized landscape.  
Of course I was aware of the TRC, and was deeply affected by the scenes that 
were remediated to me via television, radio and print. I was not blind, either, to the 
poverty and inequality that pervaded Grahamstown where Rhodes University was 
situated. But such daily negotiations appeared nowhere in my academic work. There were 
no beggars on campus. Every work day I would sit at a desk in a shared office, 
highlighting passages from Jerusalem, or scanning lines from “Burnt Norton,” or chasing 
after Eliot’s and Blake’s allusions in the archive. I read alone. I wrote alone. I facilitated 
small group discussion on poetry, invariably British, to support myself. The simple fact 
of the matter was that there was a stark disjuncture between the complex and conflictive 
experiences that marked South Africa post-apartheid nascence, and the English 
Department and library in which I sat.  
On a personal level, then, I think of this dissertation as an attempt to reconcile my 
professional identity with the world outside it then bypassed. More abstractly, however, I 
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seek to formulate a specifically literary methodology that allows for a dynamic and 
immanent negotiation between rigorous disciplinary requirements and the experiences 
undergone daily by reading/writing/teaching /learning/speaking subjects within their 
contingent social and cultural networks. I do so by reclaiming to the body a term that is 
overwhelmingly understood within the literary academy as an element of the written (that 
is to say abstract) text. That term is “Literariness,” which I think of not merely as an 
aspect of textual form, but, drawing on Performance Studies, as an immanent, relatable, 
analyzable, and changeable sensibility.  
By way of demonstration and subsequent definition, I will soon refer you to an 
experience of mine, standing before a lecture hall in South Africa. Prior, however, it is 
worth noting that, as an anecdote, my account will formally enact the tensions that go to 
the heart of the broader discussion. Joel Fineman argues that,  
[t]he anecdote…as the narration of a singular event, is the literary form or 
genre that uniquely refers to the real. This is not as trivial an observation 
as might at first appear. It reminds us, on the one hand, that the anecdote 
has something literary about it, for there are, of course, other and non-
literary ways to make reference to the real – through direct description, 
ostentation, definition, etc. – that are not anecdotal. On the other hand, it 
reminds us that there is something about the anecdote that exceeds its 
literary status, and this excess is precisely that which gives the anecdote 
its pointed, referential access to the real.   (Fineman 67)2 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 My italics 
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Fineman later writes that the anecdote, “however literary, is nevertheless directly pointed 
towards or rooted in the real.”3 Despite their formal qualities, he suggests, the anecdote 
refers to real events. The point is perhaps more clearly made by Fineman’s use of the 
verb “exceeds”. That “something” about anecdotes that “exceeds” the literary implies at 
once a transgression and / or a surpassing of the bounded territory populated by, one 
assumes, otherwise avowedly literary things. It suggests that “something’s” superiority 
and / or impropriety, its bounty and / or immoderacy in relation to the literary. Carefully 
ambivalent, Fineman vaguely (“something”) defines the meeting point of the literary and 
the real as somewhat antipathetic. Later he calls the point of their meeting “a wound.”  
For me, this “wound,” the site at which “the real” and “the literary” endanger each 
other, is the stage on which the literary academy may most productively exceed its own 
disciplinary bounds. Incidents, events, subjective experience, which the written form of a 
dissertation requires me to convey anecdotally, are thus crucial to my methodology.  
Not coincidentally the event the following anecdote describes was for me the 
clearest and most shocking invocation of the disjuncture between my academic endeavor 
and the history it bypassed. It was the moment that my vague (if often openly lamented) 
dissatisfaction with the disengaged nature of my academic work gave way to the 
recognition that it need not be so, that the stakes of critical literary work need not be 
distinct from those caught up in the experiences of  individual subjects finding their way. 
* * * 
As an English Literature lecturer in the School of Media, Language and 
Communications, I taught a mandatory lower-division class on Apartheid drama in 2003 
at the University of Port Elizabeth (now the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 My italics.  
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One hundred and sixty-odd students – ethnically diverse, economically disparate – sat in 
rows of fixed desks banked upward to the ceiling. The room sloped the students’ 
attentions towards me. I stood behind a large counter on which at center a small dais 
contained my notes. The very architecture and arrangement of the room thus asserted the 
authority with which the institution had charged me, There I stood, with a freshly-minted 
M.A. that evinced (my superiors agreed) my refined understanding of T.S. Eliot and 
William Blake and a curriculum vita that espoused some past experience in the theatre.  
 It was the introductory lecture of a ten-week course: The Ugly Noo-Noo, You 
Strike the Woman You Strike the Rock, Master Harold and the Boys, Woza Albert! Nine 
years after the first fully-inclusive elections in South Africa and fifteen years after the 
release of Nelson Mandela, I was told by a senior colleague to anticipate some resistance 
from the students. Rainbow-fatigue had set in, she suggested. Apartheid and The Struggle 
was to this generation of students, barely a decade younger than me, what Jan van 
Riebeeck, Die Groot Trek, and the South African Wars had been to me. At best they were 
History (the kind you learn because you might get tested), at worst it was Boring.  
 I thus budgeted a fifteen-minute discussion period into my ninety-minute lesson 
(read “lecture”) plan. “Why,” I asked, “are we resistant to talking about Apartheid?”  
Silence.  
Lethargically, a few hands began to rise before an unsolicited voice from the 
middle of the room said, “We should move on.”  
 “Why?” I responded.  
 Silence. The few hands had disappeared.  
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A man in the front row, a black man, slightly older than the average student, older 
than me, with dreadlocks and a Pan-Africanist Congress T-shirt (I don’t remember if he 
wore it that day, but he certainly wore it at other times) spoke, “Who are you to stand 
before us and teach us these things? What did you do?”  
That I did not anticipate. It went against the very architecture of the room. “I have 
an M.A. in English,” I wanted to say. But that was not in question. I spluttered, “Nothing. 
I did nothing.” I was surprised at my honesty. “I watched apartheid on TV. The ANC4 
were terrorists. A black woman made my bed three days of the week. Tuesday, Thursday 
and weekends my bed never got made. I still don’t make my bed. And we had a gardener 
who would pick up the dog shit in the back garden. It was my job, and my sisters’, but 
Goodman had to do it before he mowed the lawn, so we left it for him. And I used racist 
words all the time. And I was terrified of what would happen when “The Blacks” took 
over. So many conspiracy theories were doing the rounds, you know? I mean, we were 
young, I was young, but I knew enough to know…that it wasn’t right. I don’t know how 
to separate all that out. I mean, what part of it is just me being a child and what part 
should I...feel guilty for? And I know I’m not entirely to blame but I’m not okay with it 
all yet…and so I…it still sits with me every day” or some such blather.  
Silence. I was mortified. It was as though I’d accidentally pushed over a piece of 
scenery, or as though the backdrop had been lifted to reveal the nuts and bolts and 
greased pulleys that buttressed the illusion. “Does that answer your question?” I asked, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The African National Congress, the party of Nelson Mandela, was the face of the struggle. It was 
established in 1912 and adopted its freedom charter in 1955. As of the establishment of the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) in the wake of the 1976 Soweto Riots, its largely exiled diplomatic 
front, and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (“The Spear of the Nation”), were bolstered by a broad 
coalition of labor unions. 
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trying to re-gather control of the room. The older student sat back in his chair. I asked 
again, “Why do we not want to talk about Apartheid?” 
Several hands went up. A white student said, “I don’t think we should talk about 
it forever. It has to stop sometime. It can’t keep being an excuse. It’s been almost ten 
years.” 
“Excuse? It didn’t just end. It’s not over yet,” a black student responded, “I see 
apartheid every day. Where I live, people still shit in buckets.” 
“I see it in the faces of my parents,” said a young black woman, “I don’t want to 
see it anymore.”  
“I feel like I am discriminated against. Affirmative action is just reverse 
discrimination,” insisted a white male student from the very back of the room. 
“Do you think we’re that stupid that we would just reverse the system?” 
responded a black student.  
“I don’t discriminate. Don’t assume we do” said another. 
“Don’t assume we assume,” came the retort. 
“Who’s we?” asked a Coloured student, “I was too dark to benefit from apartheid 
and now I’m too light to benefit.” 
 So it went for much longer than my budgeted 15 minutes, until, nearing the 
class’s end, I felt it necessary to suggest some outcome to the discussion. We all had 
baggage, I posited, and we all disagreed on something, and that was good reason to look 
back at how playwrights and performers understood, even if the things we found out 
about ourselves in the process were unpleasant.  
* * * 
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The older student’s challenge of my “authority,” it strikes me retrospectively, was 
profoundly appropriate precisely because it challenged the hierarchy that, to me at least, 
was naturalized by my position behind the dais, by the required attention of the students, 
and the learnedness implied by letters behind my name. His question’s tone was strident 
and cutting. It demanded a response that did not defer to academic register because I was 
not alone in being interpolated. To him, I was more, or less, than myself. I represented 
whiteness, maleness, abstract solipsism, the embodiment of an institution (apartheid and 
the South African literary academy) with a history of segregationist complicity, (the 
University of Port Elizabeth was, under apartheid, a white, Afrikaans institution). 
Benevolent as my pedagogy may have seemed to me, engaging as it did a canon of South 
African drama that resisted apartheid, the student was challenging the residue of 
prescriptive humanism, implicit less in the texts that we were going to read, than it was in 
the arrangement of the room, in the captivity of the audience, and in the embodied color 
and attitude of the lecturer.  
I could not account for what had happened in that classroom, ostensibly a 
literature classroom, in merely literary terms. The affect of his challenge and its effect on 
me was contingent on the embodied relations of the people in that room. He was 
challenging. I was being challenged. We were both being watched. And once it had 
happened, once we walked out of that room, it was over, gone, subject forever to the 
flawed recollections of those who remember it. No text survived it, barring the 
subsequent language with which I attempted to frame it.   
And yet it was also literary. This was true not merely in terms of the disciplinary 
frame within which the course was contained, although that, to me, would be sufficient 
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reason to consider the embodied and immanent nature of the pedagogical transaction as a 
definitional aspect of literary endeavor within the academy (an idea to which I will return 
briefly in the conclusion of this dissertation). The linguistic structure of his question was 
so incisive. “Who are you to stand before us and teach us these things? What did you 
do?” was an identity claim of its own: “I am a black man. I know these things because I 
was there.” It was polemical powerful in its homogeneous interpolation of the class. 
While the “us” of his question may have belied the diversity of students in the class, it 
also had the effect of isolating me as the antagonist-until-proven-wrong, an antagonist 
because he teaches possibly from a position of false authority conferred by a corrupt 
institution. His interpolation of me, the “you” of his question, even with his aggressive 
affect, was also an invitation. “Define yourself,” it demanded. However, he also 
implicitly required that my account did not defer to abstract qualification or lettered-ness 
(which had no bearing on his notion of authority), but in terms of my past actions. “You 
are what you do,” he implied, “and I want to know what you did, so I can know who you 
are.”  
Within the context of the tiered classroom, the embodied presences of the 
students, and with the history of social relations at play, the question, formally and 
functionally, struck me with the force and intensity of a wonderfully conceived caesura at 
the heart of Petrarchan sonnet, or a perfect couplet, or like the moment of a protagonist’s 
most devastating and/or life affirming realization. The text, his language, tore me from 
the naturalized assumptions that sustained my position in front of the class. It was utterly 
dependent on the embodied context within which it operated. It collapsed me into the 
presence of the moment, such that the only stance left was not a defensive iteration of 
13!
!
identity, but an affirmation of non-knowing. It rendered me a stranger in a realm I 
believed prior was mine, and in which, now, the only defensible stance was earnest 
curiosity. The effect, between words and the event, was aesthetic. 
* * * 
“Literariness,”5 as I will use the term in this dissertation, refers to a sensibility that 
allows the reading / writing / teaching / learning / speaking subject to negotiate between 
words in their aesthetic aspect and the embodied event of their encounter. I will engage 
how I understand the term “aesthetic” in due course. Suffice it to say for now that the 
imputation of the body in its immanence onto the literary might seem counter-intuitive. 
The etymology of the word “literature,” whether its derives from the old French letrëure 
or directly from the earlier Latin cognate litter!t"ra (OED), have at their root the “letter,” 
lettre, littera, the orthographic symbol for an elementary sound used in speech. At the 
core of the concept of the literary is the idea that it distances utterances (or parts of 
utterances) from the body, abstracts them, sets them down, records them for prosperity in 
stone, or on vellum, or paper. Implicit to the “literary,” then, is the idea of the separation 
of body and text, and temporally, the salvaging of the originary utterance and its 
significance from the changeable body, from faulty memories undone by the vicissitudes 
of time, context, and experience. It is hardly surprising that “literariness,” in its broadest 
definition, refers to “books or written compositions; in a narrower sense…to [written 
texts that] have the characteristics of that kind of written composition which has value on 
account of its qualities of form” (OED)6. Nor is it a shock that academic endeavor that 
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5 Throughout this dissertation, I capitalize the term “Literariness” in order to distinguish it from its 
formalist fore-bearer.  
 
6 My italics. 
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sought to isolate literary form did so by treating the immanent and embodied experience, 
the event, of a text’s encounter, be it its composition or interpretation, as an unwelcome 
interloper to its critical outcomes. Rather, the text, the language, distinct from the body, 
or the event of its creation / encounter, becomes a pure object of analysis. So some 
Russian formalists7 argued that the term “literariness” should define “what makes a work 
specifically a literary work as opposed to some other kind of work” and that it “requires a 
foregrounding of language in such a way as to make its “background” (the world it 
usually refers to) virtually disappear” (Murfin and Ray 236-7). Wimsatt and Beardsley 
famously saw authorial process and subjective readerly responses, implicit in their mutual 
bugaboos “intentionality” and “affect,” as ultimately inaccessible and all-too-ethereal or 
ephemeral determinants of meaning for a New Criticism methodology that sought to 
impute the work the literary academy with the disciplinary heft of a science.8 !
 Claiming Literariness as an immanent and changeable sensibility, rather than an 
aspect of form implicit only to the written work, is to accommodate the reading / writing / 
teaching / learning / speaking subject within the workings of a literary transaction or 
event. In this way, it might be seen to echo the claims of reader-response approaches. 
However, notwithstanding individualist approaches, reader-response defers all too easily 
to a transcendent reader in its conjecture, or the reader. Efforts to accommodate a 
diversity of different readers still rely too heavily on generalizable subsets of readers or 
interpretive communities. Besides which, reader-response approaches tend exclusively 
towards the reader’s response to written texts, whereas this dissertation seeks to examine 
the ways in which Literariness is the enactive principle of a broader network of endeavor 
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7 Murfin and Ray cite Jan Mukarovsky or Victor Shlovsky. 
 
8 I refer, of course, to their seminal essays “The Intentional Fallacy” and “The Affective Fallacy”. 
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within the literary academy. We also write, teach, learn, and speak within our disciplinary 
confines.   
I want, rather, to think of Literariness in terms of a “performance,” a term which, 
as Shannon Jackson’s genealogy of its development, Professing Performance: Theater in 
the Academy from Philology to Performativity, suggests, has become somewhat over-
determined. It is subject to “intellectual ferment” constituted of “many disciplinary 
strains” (Jackson 4). “P-words of various sorts – couched amongst various prefixes and 
suffixes – circulate in the contemporary academic discourse of various disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences” (3). Indeed, if literary studies has a strain of its own, then 
it is the P-word, “performativity,” which draws on J.L. Austin’s understanding that 
certain utterances, “performatives,” enact, or “do” things, rather than merely 
communicating, reflecting, or describing. His archetype of the performative utterance is 
the marriage vow, the “I do” constitutes more than a mere statement of intent. Rather, it 
enacts a contract. Judith Butler has famously extrapolated “speech-acts” to include 
discourses more broadly. For her, “performativity” – with which she argues that gender 
identity is not essential but constituted – is the “reiterative power of discourse to produce 
the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 2). 
 If literary studies emphasize performativity, then it must be remembered, as 
Jackson points out, that “scholars drawing from anthropology, sociology, art history, 
folklore, and media studies have developed vocabularies of performance to understand 
artifacts and events ranging from parades to television, from story-telling to religious 
ceremonies” (Jackson 4). Or, as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett defines it, Performance 
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studied in terms of medium and culture, nor does it limit the range of approaches that can 
be taken” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 43).  
However, this very disciplinary over-determination of “performance” is also the 
reason it can be difficult to pin down.   
The aspects of performance [that various scholars and disciplines] 
emphasize can be quite different; the theoretical models that they derive 
may be incompatible, and even the reality principles they assume may 
appear to undermine each other. Scholarship looks uninteresting to some 
when there is no abstraction, ungrounded to others when there is no 
description, romantic when there is no consideration of structure, 
incomplete without an account of production, determinist without a theory 
of agency, naïve when it assumes a real historical referent, apolitical when 
too theoretical, apolitical when it is not theoretical enough. (Jackson 4)  
I will return in due course to a “reality principle” that, I will argue, is potentially dynamic 
enough to critically negotiate the vicissitudes of Literariness as I will define it. I will 
suggest a “post-positivist realist” critical frame. For now, however, that the implicit 
heterogeneity of the term “performance” renders both the “the opportunities and hazards 
implicit to interdisciplinarity” and that I recognize my rendering of the term here to be 
limited, so as not to perpetrate “synechdochic fallacies in cross disciplinary inquiry – 
moments when scholars assume that one body of texts adequately represents an entire 
field.” I would add that I recognize this same hazard to be implicit to any rendering of the 
phrase “literary studies.” 
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 That said, I want to imbue Literariness with “performance” as Diana Taylor 
understands the term in The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in 
the Americas, and want, later, to trouble the polemical gesture by which she excludes 
“the literary” from her conception.   
 Taylor’s most rudimentary formulation of performances is as “vital acts of 
transfer, transmitting social knowledge, and a sense of identity through reiterated, or what 
Richard Schechner has called ‘twice-behaved behavior’” (Taylor 2-3)9.  While always 
immanent, and always embodied for the participant/spectator, “performance” is 
nevertheless differentiated from the general course of daily happenings. Performances are 
“usually bracketed of from those [events] around them to constitute discrete foci of 
analysis. Sometimes that framing is part of the event itself – a particular dance or a rally 
has a beginning and an end; it does not run continuously or seamlessly into other forms of 
cultural expression.” Crucially, then, “to say that something is a performance amounts to 
an ontological affirmation, though a thoroughly localized one” (Taylor 3).  
 Additionally, Taylor suggests,  
performance...constitutes a methodological lens that enables scholars to 
analyze events as performance. Civic obedience, resistance, citizenship, 
gender, ethnicity, and sexual identity, for example, are rehearsed and 
performed daily in the public sphere. To understand these as performance 
suggests that performance also functions as an epistemology. Embodied 
practice, along with and bound up with other cultural practices, offers 
ways of knowing. The bracketing of these performances comes from 
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9 Taylor cites Schechner’s Between Theater and Anthropology. Philadelphia: Philadelphia University 
Press, 1985. 
18!
!
outside, from the methodological lens that organizes them in to an 
analyzable whole. Performance and the aesthetics of everyday life vary 
from community to community, reflecting cultural and historical 
specificity as much in the enactment and in the viewing/reception….The is 
/ as underlines the understanding of performance as simultaneously ‘real’ 
and ‘constructed,’ as practices that bring together what have historically 
been kept separate as discrete, supposedly free-standing, ontological and 
epistemological discourse.    
For Taylor, then, performance is at once the object and embodiment of a critical 
methodology, one that, in its epistemological and ontological conflation is constitutively 
self-reflexive. As she performs the analysis of performance, she finds the term’s 
“undefinability and complexity…reassuring. Performance carries the possibility of 
challenge, even self-challenge, within it. As a term simultaneously connoting a process, a 
praxis, an episteme, a mode of transmission…and a means of intervening in the world, it 
far exceeds the possibilities” of terms such as “theatre,” which she claims is “weighed 
down by “centuries of colonial evangelical and normalizing activity” (15).  
 While I, like Taylor, am excited by the multivalent and self-reflexive implications 
of the term “performance” (implications I want to apply to my definition of Literariness 
after all), I am less inclined to throw out the theatrical baby with the polemical bathwater. 
Theatre, in her formulation, is rendered all too cursorily. It merely connotes, for her 
purposes, institutional imposition, and not, as it also might, a dynamic, shifting, hybrid, 
and often resistant mode of cultural production. Rather than a passing moment in The 
Archive and the Repertoire it foreshadows her treatment of “writing,” which she 
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polemically situates as the staid and imperial foil to the liberatory dynamism of 
performance.  
 This is not to suggest that there is no value to the epistemic maneuvering that 
occasions this antagonism. For Taylor, vested as she is in “revalorizing expressive, 
embodied culture” as the transmission of social knowledge, “writing” – which she 
monologically renders in its noun form, implying instead of the activity, or process, the 
abstract “written” product – is the exemplary means by which an archival repository of 
memory and knowledge displaces the embodied repertoire.  
 For Taylor, “writing” represents the displacement of performed utterance in the 
Americas. If, for example, for the Aztecs, Mayas and Incas writing was “highly valued 
[but] primarily a prompt to performance, a mnemonic aid” (17) then the Conquest 
“legitimized writing over other epistemic modes and mnemonic systems” (18) so that 
“[n]on-verbal practices – such as dance, ritual, and cooking, to name a few – that long 
served to preserve a sense of communal identity and memory, were not considered valid 
forms of knowledge.” Taylor highlights the epistemic assumption lies at the heart of this 
displacement, which is that only “enduring materials” (19) – such as the written text – 
can properly sustain cultural memory and knowledge. “The writing = memory/knowledge 
is central to the Western epistemology. ‘The metaphor of memory as a written surface is 
so ancient and so persistent in all Western cultures,’ writes Mary Carruthers, ‘that it must, 
I think, be seen as a governing model or “cognitive archetype”’” (24).    
 The repository of these enduring materials, of writing, as Taylor conceives it, but 
also, for example, of buildings, bones, DNA evidence, and photo IDS, is “the archive,” 
which she traces etymologically to the Greek arkhe – “a public building,” “a place where 
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records are kept,” but also, “a beginning, the first place, the government” (19). [T]he 
archive sustains…power:”  
Archival memory works across distance, over time and space; 
investigators can go back and reexamine an ancient manuscript, letters 
find their addresses through time and place, and computer discs at times 
cough up lost files with the right software….archival memory succeeds in 
separating the source of ‘knowledge’ from the knower – in time and / or 
space….the unchanging text assures a stable signifier. Written texts allow 
scholars to trace literary traditions, sources, and influences. Insofar as it 
constitutes materials that seem to endure, the archive exceeds the live. 
 The epistemological primacy of archives, she argues, is sustained not only by the 
institutions that house them, but also by “myths.” The notion that the archive is 
unmediated, for example, speaks to the purportedly transcendent and universal 
accommodation of Western Enlightenment   epistemological modes. As she points out, 
however, objects are archival because they are “selected, classified, and presented for 
analysis” and as such are susceptible to change, corruption, and political manipulation. 
Taylor argues for the epistemic validity and analyzability of another repository, the 
repertoire, which  
enacts embodied memory: performances, gestures, orality, movement, 
dance, singing – in short all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, 
nonreproducible knowledge. Repertoire, etymologically a ‘a treasury, an 
inventory,’ also allows for individual agency, referring to also to the 
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‘finder, discoverer,’ and meaning ‘to find out.’10 The repertoire requires 
presence: people participate in the production and reproduction of 
knowledge by ‘being there,’ being part of the transmission. As opposed to 
the stable objects of the archive, the archives that are the repertoire do not 
remain the same. 
I will return in due course to her proposed methodology by which the repertoire is 
analyzable – she posits that performances can be isolated and understood in terms of 
“scenarios,” a term I will incorporate into my methodological frame. More immediately, 
however, I want to counter Taylor’s monological account of “writing” as a point of 
departure for the definition of Literariness as I understand it.  
* * * 
I am writing. It is a bracketed and ritualized event. I sit in a coffee shop with 
books, coffee, a glass of water, and my laptop on the table. It is almost always so when I 
write. My body carries the tension of a familiarly hunched posture. I hardly look at the 
keyboard because my fingers remember the spatial arrangement of the keys. Were I to be 
writing by hand, the nib would trace habitual arcs and curlicues. I thus enact a repertoire 
of sorts even as I commit words to an enduring archival object, to my hard drive, or to 
paper. It is via that archive object that those words are transmitted to you. You read them 
now – most likely sitting in a familiar position, at a desk, or in a chair. And while we are 
spatially and temporally separate, you are a determining presence of my performance. 
Your gaze constitutes the raison d’être of my current actions. I enact my understanding 
for you. I court you nervously. I want you to agree with me. I fear that you will not. I 
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10 In footnote Taylor recognizes that she uses OED definitions of “Repertoire” and “Repertory” 
interchangeably.  
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write. I backspace. I pause and think. I structure. I cut. I paste. I produce. I do this now 
because of what you will do later: you are reading. We are joined and separated by the 
archival object, as we are by the immanent process of its production and consumption.  
* * * 
To say that an event or object is “literary” is an ontological affirmation. It is to 
say that it is constitutively imbued with literariness, that is to say, a quality of form which 
renders language, words, with aesthetic effects at the moment that the reader / writer / 
teacher / learner / speaker encounters them. Making this claim, however, implicitly 
assumes the sensibility by which the literary qualities of the event or object are 
experienced and identified. It is to experience and identify these qualities as literary. In 
this regard, literariness is not merely the object of the claim, but also suggests the 
aesthetic lens implicit to the observing subject. It is at this nexus of the is / as that I would 
situate Literariness: it is the simultaneity of effect and affect enacted by and upon the 
observing subject by and upon the literary event and / or object.  
So, just as Taylor understands performance as bringing together practices that 
have been kept separate under discrete ontological and epistemological discourses, I 
would argue the same is true of Literariness. If formalist critical conventions treat the 
literary text as an object of anatomical study unto itself, and in the process elide and 
dehistoricize events of the writing and / or reading, then Literariness enacts literary form 
while accommodating the subject-specific response of the reader / writer / teacher / 
learner / speaker.   
An inevitable charge will be that this accommodation of subject-specificity is 
recipe for relativistic anarchy. Certainly, within this dissertation, the agitation of 
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Literariness, is the definitional starting point of the ontological claim that an object or 
event is literary. But this spreads thin “the literary” as a “discrete locus of analysis.” It is 
arguable, for example, that we perpetually respond to the affects of linguistic utterances – 
whether we read or write criticism, novels, plays, poems, or memoirs, or speak in 
classrooms, or converse next to the water cooler, or struggle to understand languages 
from different cultural or national contexts – no matter how well read, or for that matter 
illiterate, we may be. However, I want to suggest that the very fact that affective 
linguistic events are not exclusive to, say, lettered middle-class subjects, is one of the 
great political boons of this epistemological shift because it necessitates a methodological 
broadening of the purview of critical literary analysis and pedagogy within and around 
the literary academy. As I understand Literariness, its operations are dependent on neither 
access nor understanding of a literary archive. In this regard, Literariness potentially 
constitutes a site of resistance to the literary archive, and its coincident institutions of 
learning, as the only repository of valid understanding. 
That said, in this dissertation I am vested in a methodology for the literary 
academy. I want, in this regard, to offer an account of Literariness as isolatable, 
analyzable, and upon which we can enact change if we deem such change necessary or 
desirable. I seek, in other words, a Critical Literariness (I understand this critical mandate 
to be implicit to my deployment of the term “Literariness” hence).What is required is a 
methodology by which to isolate literary events, and a reality principle by which to hold 
manifestations of Literariness accountable.  
To begin with the latter, as has already been intimated, “post-positivist realism” is 
apposite, an epistemological formulation that draws together the work of such thinkers as 
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Satya P. Mohanty, Linda Martín Alcoff, Michael Hames-Garcia, Paula M.L Moya, and 
Michelle Elam. Post-positivist realists seek to provide an objective critical method that 
nevertheless accommodates the subjective experience of its practitioners. In this regard it 
offers a mode that does not genuflect to the principles of transcendence and 
universalizability by which positivist objectivists exclusively validate knowledge or 
memory (the very principles by which the archive, transposable across time and space, 
attained its epistemological heft). Neither does post-positivist realism defer to the idea 
that subjective experiences and truths should be held above reproach, as evidenced by 
pervasive relativism by which postmodern subjects hold themselves and others immune 
from critical inquiry. Rather, as Satya P. Mohanty and Linda Martín Alcoff suggest in 
their introduction to Identity Politics Reconsidered, post-positivist realists attempt to 
reclaim “subjective experience” as a site of critical inquiry. They do so by countering the 
dismissal of subjective experience under the guise of enlightenment “objectivity”, an 
epistemological requirement that casts subjective experience as “epistemically suspect” 
(Martín Alcoff and Mohanty 4). Subjective experiences, they argue, “are not 
unfathomable inner phenomena but rather disguised explanations of social relations, and 
they can be evaluated as such” (5). However, rather than dismiss objectivity as some 
post-structuralist theorists have (in the process, I must add, enacting crucial gestures 
towards the denaturalization of the transcendent and universalizing assumptions of the 
enlightenment) post-positivist realists seek to base their inquiry in social fact, or social 
phenomena that are “objective enough”. In this way, they counter the deconstructive 
purview of post-structuralist approaches, which have extended themselves beyond the de-
centering of western and hegemonic assumptions with the effect that even marginalized 
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experiences are cast as “arbitrary, and…politically unreliable.” (4). Post-positivist 
realism, rather, enacts a reclaiming of “identity” – the “socially embodied facts about 
ourselves in the world” (6) – and “identity politics,” which is “in itself neither positive 
nor negative. At its minimum, it is a claim that identities are politically relevant, an 
irrefutable fact. Identities are the locus and nodal point by which political structures are 
played out, mobilized, reinforced and sometimes challenged” (7). 
 Pivotal loci of the post-positivist realist critical gaze, then, are cultural, theoretical 
and subjective biases. Biases are understood not as the countermand to epistemological 
validity, but as iterations of identity which can, and should, be held to account in light of 
social facts and phenomena deemed sufficiently objective. The aim of such an accounting 
is not merely the falsifiability of biases, but the establishment of their value within the 
cultural and / or theoretical network within which biased subjects live. The post-positivist 
realist analysis “distinguishes those biases that are limiting or counterproductive from 
those that are in fact necessary for knowledge, that are epistemically productive and 
useful” (Mohanty 804). Paula M.L. Moya extrapolates:  
Realists do not shy away from truth claims, but…they understand those 
claims to be ‘fallibalistic’ – that is, like even the best discoveries of the 
natural sciences, open to revision on the basis of new or relevant 
information. In fact, it is realists’ willingness to admit the (in principle, 
endless) possibility of error in the quest for knowledge that enables them 
to avoid positivist assumptions about certainty and unrevisability that 
inform the (postmodernist) skeptic’s doubts about the possibility at 
arriving at a more accurate account of the world. Just as it is possible to be 
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wrong about one’s experience, post-positivist realists insist, so it is 
possible to arrive at more accurate interpretations of it. (Moya 13) 
 Post-positivist realism, then, is a useful framework on several counts by which to 
guide our critical maneuvering through the simultaneously ontological and 
epistemological claims implicit to the agitations of Literariness. It is attractive primarily 
because it understands truth claims as implicit identity claims, identity claims that it 
nevertheless holds to critical account. So too, I contend that our embodied responses 
within and to literary events constitute implicit identity claims. I contend that the manner 
in which we experience literary events, which bespeak our aesthetic predispositions, arise 
not merely out of subjective desires and needs, but also bespeak our historical, social, and 
cultural situated-ness, and the epistemological assumptions they precipitate in us. It 
enacts, in other words, our biases. Post-positivist realism demands dynamic self-
reflexivity. It demands that we denaturalize the otherwise unquestioned tenets of our 
experiential lenses – be that an untrammeled adherence to a single theoretical frame, 
entitlement to an opinion, or the simple matter-of-factness with which we accept the 
aesthetic effects upon us of literary form or our identification with literary characters. 
Aesthetic effects, in other words, are not merely “done to” the subject in the literary 
event, but the subject also enacts them. Subjective aesthetic responses, in other words, 
become a locus of self-reflexive critical analysis, as Bertolt Brecht, whose example will 
be a recurring one in this dissertation, well understood. But self-reflexivity is not an end 
in itself. The post-positivist realist mandate that we evaluate our biases (literary or 
otherwise) in terms of their productivity and / or usefulness within the historical, cultural, 
and theoretical framework of their operation allows for goal-orientated curiosity, even if 
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the goals are, in principle, perpetually deferred. The outcomes to which we aspire are 
themselves held to the same self-reflexive process. This perpetual deferral, nevertheless 
enacted with purpose, accounts for the productive dynamism that renders post-positive 
realism an attractive critical mode by which to engage the immanence of performance 
and Literariness.    
 Inevitably, of course, this dissertation will examine literary texts. However, 
crucially, I understand literary texts to operate in relation to the broader social, cultural, 
and historical milieus that enact themselves, variously, in the bodies of literary subjects. 
In this regard, the text is not, in and of itself, the only end of my analyses. Rather, and 
here I return to Diana Taylor’s methodology, understanding the “scenario” of the reading 
/ writing / teaching / learning / speaking event is crucial to the end of isolating 
Literariness, and, subsequently, the holding to account of the subject for their implicit 
identity claims.  
 Taylor describes “scenarios” as distinct from text and narrative insofar as they 
frame the embodied rather than merely abstracted relations. Nevertheless, she argues, 
they are “meaning making paradigms that structure social environments, behaviors, and 
potential outcomes” (Taylor 28). Her archetypal example, in keeping with her books 
focus on the Americas, is the “Western discovery scenario,” the arrival of explorers, the 
ritual claiming of soil, their encounters with native people.  This “scenario,” she suggests, 
is transposable. So “at times, people may actually undertake adventures to live the 
glorious fantasy of possession. Others may tune in regularly to television shows along the 
lines of Survivor or Fantasy Island. The scenario structures our understanding.”  
Scenarios operate as “‘a sketch or outline of the plot of a play. Giving particulars of 
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scenes, situations etc.’ [and] like performance, means never for the first time…Its 
portable framework bears the weight of accumulative repeats. The scenario makes 
visible, yet again, what was already there, the ghosts, the images, the stereotypes” (Taylor 
28). This visibility, I contend, allows us to hold to account the manner of our response 
within the literary event. In this dissertation, for example, I will read literary texts not as 
objects of analysis in and of themselves, but as occurring within familiar scenarios: the 
reading / writing / teaching / leaning / speaking events that occur within and in relation to 
literary scholarship. The classroom, the library, the scene of the subject reading, the 
setting of the subject writing, the affected speech patterns of the nervous Ph.D. candidate 
undertaking a defense. In this way, I am allowed to examine literary endeavor, not merely 
in terms of textuality, but also as the nexus of embodied attitudes that are otherwise all-
too-frequently obscured by the fetishization of the literature as object.     
  Taylor continues,  
The scenario includes features well theorized in literary analysis, such as 
narrative and plot, but demands that we also pay attention milieux and 
corporeal behaviors such as gestures, attitudes, and tones not reducible to 
language. Simultaneously setup and action, scenarios frame and activate 
social dramas. The setup  lays out the possibilities; all the elements are 
there: encounter, conflict, resolution, and denouement, for example. These 
elements, of course, are themselves the product of economic, political, and 
social structures that they, in turn, tend to reproduce. All scenarios have 
localized meaning, though many attempt to pass as universally valid. 
Actions and behaviors arising from the setup might be predictable, as 
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seemingly natural consequence of the assumptions, values, goals, power 
relations, presumed audience, and epistemic grids established by the setup 
itself. But they are, ultimately, flexible and open to change.     
The recollection or recounting of scenarios, Taylor suggests, requires attention to specific 
details of the events. First, the physical scene is pivotal (29). To return to my earlier 
anecdote, the tiered classroom in a post-apartheid South Africa invokes implicit but 
intentional power relations through which the (previously racially exclusive) institution 
of higher education interpolates its teachers and learners. Second, the embodiment of the 
social actors is important to note. The embodied attributes of the participants in that 
classroom was crucial to the event’s unfolding. I am white. He was black. The classroom 
demographic bespoke heterogeneous race, class, and gender. Third, we need to invoke 
the established conventions of the scenario, or “the formulaic structures that predispose 
certain outcomes and yet allow for reversal, parody, and change” (31). The form of 
literary pedagogy, as it has traditionally been practiced, enacts a top-down model. The 
older black student’s irruption had its effect precisely because of its implicit reversal of 
conventions. Fourth, in Taylor argues the necessity of noting the “multifaceted systems at 
work in the scenario itself: in passing it on, we can draw from various modes that come 
from the archive and/or repertoire – writing, telling, reenactment, mime, gestus, 
singing…The challenge is not to ‘translate’ from an embodied expression into a linguistic 
one of vice versa but to recognize the strengths and limitations of each system” (31-32). 
In the classroom, my “expertise” in textual analysis, in light of which I was charged with 
teaching students, was forcefully challenged by the student’s insistence on experiential 
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credentials. My thinking fell short of the embodied history my students brought to the 
event.  
The last two principles that Taylor argues are important to the critical recounting 
of scenarios are also key structural determinants of this dissertation. So, fifth, she argues, 
re-invoking scenarios requires us to “situate ourselves in relation to it; as participants, 
spectators, or witnesses, we need to ‘be there,’ part of the act of transfer” (32). As I have 
already intimated, this dissertation is an attempt to reconcile my scholarly endeavor with 
the South African history it then bypassed: a bypassing I want, ethically and 
methodologically, to counter. In this regard, the scenarios I will re-invoke, at least in the 
first three chapters, speak to the contexts that have most directly influenced my literary 
sensibilities. I situate my own responses, and hold them to account, in relation to the 
social, cultural, theoretical and aesthetic networks they enact. South Africa’s nascence 
after Apartheid, in this regard, is a crucial backdrop. I frame and discuss it in the first 
chapter, not merely as a series of historical events, but also as a shift in the practice and 
stakes of literary representation and reception. I argue that the disjuncture between the 
events of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearings and it 
subsequent Report potentially enact a shift in such practices and stakes. In so doing, and 
drawing on, amongst others, Roland Barthes and Derek Attridge, I further define critical 
Literariness.  
Sixth, Taylor argues, we need to recognize that scenarios are changeable even as 
they “allow for a continuation of cultural myths and assumptions.” In this regard, “[they] 
usually work through reactivation rather than duplication.” The TRC Hearings, as I think 
of them, enacted a scenario that is frequently reactivated within a broader South African 
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context, not least, in the endeavor of its literary academy. Publically broadcast TRC 
survivor and perpetrator hearings – markedly different in their tone and outcomes – 
enacted a deep dissonance in the language and embodiment of being South African, be 
that on the level of national debate, or in the day to day experiences of South African 
subjects. More than throw up the heterogeneity of South Africa, the TRC Hearings also 
enacted the difficult process of holding subjects immanently in relation to their historical 
and material context. It is my contention that the literary texts I engage in the second and 
third chapters, J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull 
potentially reactivate this immanent process. That said, recognizing this reactivation 
requires that we think beyond their mere textuality. It requires us to think of them as 
events, and to recognize the immanent experience of their encounter as enacting, not just 
literary form, but the scenario of an individual confronted by and confronting their 
subjection to and / or complicity in history. This negotiation of the subject and form, 
immanence and history, is enacted by Literariness. In each of these chapters, I examine 
how critical responses have broadly elided this scenario. 
In the fourth chapter, Literariness will be situated in relation to an analog, 
Theatricality. Structurally it will enact my own temporal, spatial and methodological 
displacement from the events and literature arising from the TRC. My experience as a 
facilitator of The Telling Project Process, in which transcribed interviews with U.S. 
Military veterans  were shaped into a play-script that the veterans performed themselves, 
forms the basis, at once, of a discussion of the subject as Literary (facilitated by my own 
contingency as a South African in the United States, whose ethical, epistemological and 
aesthetic lens draws on the formative experience of bearing witness to the TRC – if I did 
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not witness it directly, I certainly experienced it within its national context or as a 
participant in the zeitgeist it precipitated), and a further iteration of the stakes vested in 
the aesthetic of subjective iterations into literary forms. The contingency of my 
foreignness within the U.S. will be enacted (and assuaged) by situating The Telling 
Project process in relation to the so-called TRC-plays, Ubu and the Truth Commission 
and the Story I am about to Tell, and U.S. and British notions of documentary and 
verbatim theatre. 
Finally, to conclude, I return briefly to the stage of pedagogical transactions in the 
literature classroom, which I will argue is a largely overlooked but key stage for literary 
performances within the academy. Addressing Elaine Showalter’s Teaching Literature, I 
will suggest that ethically geared and embodied self-reflection in students is dependent on 
the willingness of their teachers to hold their discipline and themselves accountable, not 
only to the texts and cultural, social, and historical phenomena they determine and by 
which they are determined, but also to the difficult immanence of that process.  
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CHAPTER II 
BETWEEN BRICOLEURS AND BATTERED BODIES:  
LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH  
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
Plurality, Singularity, and Criticism 
In the introduction, “Literariness” (distinguished from more traditional and 
restrictive variations on the term by its capitalization) was defined not merely as a quality 
of form by which a text is evaluated, but also as the sensibility by which the subject 
apprehends language in its aesthetic aspect. This chapter examines Literariness as a 
readerly sensibility, making the crucial claim that the experience of reading cannot be 
properly understood as a mere consumption of the text, but that it must be seen to include 
the means of the text’s production, or the writerly sensibility that negotiates the seam 
between the embodied and the abstract, between history as material process and its 
aesthetic linguistic abstraction. This, it is crucial to recognize, does not implicate the 
reader (critical or otherwise) in an intentional fallacy, as Wimsatt and Beardlsey’s famous 
essay suggests. Nor should the Author, as Barthes suggests in “Death of The Author”, be 
conceived of as the transcendent guarantor of the text’s significance. Rather, as Barthes 
points out in the opening divagation of S/Z, it is necessary to negotiate beyond the 
“pitiless divorce which the literary institution maintains between the producer of the text 
and its user, between its owner and its customer, between its author and its 
reader.…[b]ecause the goal of literary work (of literature as work) is to make the reader 
no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text” (Barthes 4). By Barthes’s account, 
overcoming the pitiless divorce is a matter of shifting the evaluation of literary texts, and 
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by extension, the sensibilities of readers from mere “readerly” seriousness: “[I]nstead of 
functioning himself, instead of gaining access to the magic of the signifier, to the pleasure 
of writing, he is left with no more than the poor freedom to either accept or reject the 
text: reading is nothing more than a referendum.” Barthes view of reading, on the other 
hand, has to do with practice. “Our evaluation,” he argues, “can be linked only to a 
practice, and this practice is writing.”  
Barthes is most certainly not arguing for reading practice that situates the 
significance of the text within the genius of the author.  As his own lexical close-reading 
of Sarrasine demonstrates, he is invested in exploding the text: each lexia is the cross-
referential punctum of analysis, presenting various interpretive possibilities through 
which the reader, ideologically, historically and aesthetically situated and situating, 
negotiates their passage. In this regard, the writerly text is difficult, as is anything 
immanent, to situate. For Barthes, “[i]t is not a thing” (4). It is a process of production, of 
iteration, rather than a fixed representative abstraction or archivable text. Indeed, “[t]he 
writerly text is a perpetual present” that cannot be reiterated through criticism because “to 
rewrite the writerly text would consist only of disseminating it, in dispersing it within the 
field of infinite difference” (5), rather than to fix its significance.  
Of course, any dissertation chapter, by dint of its sheer thing-ness, necessitates 
“reading,” “interpretation” and “criticism,” which purports but cannot but fail to 
superimpose “consequent language” upon the writerly texts it addresses. The risk is that, 
even with the kind of sustained and explosive lexical reading Barthes undertakes in 
relation to Sarrasine (perhaps especially then, because he “breaks” the text in order to 
show its plurality (14)), the immanence of reading is precluded from the criticism. The 
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immediate effect on the embodied identity that iterates itself in the moment of the literary 
text’s engagement cannot be (re)presented. This disembodiment of the reading process in 
criticism, more than the structuralist insistence on the sovereignty of the text, or the post-
structuralist insistence on its contingency, is responsible for the dehistoricization of the 
text, not in the historiographical, but the material and embodied sense. Literary texts can 
be said to enact or participate in history because, well, they do so in the moment of the 
writerly reading, and interpretation of a writerly text. As Barthes sees it, is “not to give it 
a…meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it” (5). Literature 
changes people. People change literature. The question is, How? 
 In Barthes’s conception, the iterative moment of writerly reading, the writely text 
in process, “is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as 
function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system 
(Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of 
networks, the infinity of languages” (5). We see in this conception not merely an allusion 
to the pyschoanalytic thesis of the subject’s emergence, the mirror phase, but also, a 
conception of the writerly reading that is not unlike the Kristevan thetic: the semiotic (the 
“before,” the embodied,) intruding upon the symbolic in the iterative present, and the 
symbolic (some single system – law, ideology, genus) straining to control (reduce, 
traverse, stop, plasticize) the interloper that threatens to explode it.  
This, then, is the chapter’s broad theoretical claim. Echoing Barthes, it holds that 
the writerly reading constitutes the emergence of the subject into an extant order, into 
existing codes, which at once constitute and are constituted by the text. This writerly 
reading, then, is a displacement of literariness as a mere quality of textual form, and 
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marks it as a literary event, literarily constituted, between the text and the subject, 
facilitated by Literariness. 
* * * 
I am the reading subject. I take the events of my readings to be valuable 
evidentiary sources as much as the texts themselves. These events irrupt. They exist in 
addendum and opposition to the form and function of theory within this chapter. I do not, 
cannot, re-invoke these events. The language I use to describe them is, at worst, merely a 
consequence of the reading event. At best it constitutes and is constituted by new literary 
events, facilitated by the Literariness of the subject who reads these words. 
 I want to understand the reading subject – not merely in the moment of the textual 
encounter, but also as a subject of history, and as an ethical subject. I want, in other 
words, to hold the reading subject accountable. For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
will contextualize encounters with J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, Antjie Krog’s Country of My 
Skull, and my own involvement with The Telling Project, against the backdrop of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Hearings and its Report.  
The Hearings, televised through the most formative of my young adult years, 
constitute more than memories. They provide more than content. They were greatly 
influential in constituting the form of my literary sensibilities, or Literariness. The 
intensity and urgency and stakes vested in those hearings, the act of story-telling, 
multiple stories, told from and to multiple perspectives, not merely after the fact but in 
the momentary encounter; that, to me, is also the intensity and urgency and stakes vested 
in the greatest literary encounters.  
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 I am a white South African. I will write about Disgrace and Country of My Skull 
knowing full well that they do not, in their collocation, represent an oeuvre of “South 
African writing.” Indeed, my own involvement, as a South African, or a representative of 
the South African white Diaspora, with The Telling Project, might arguably render the 
text that emerged, Telling, Eugene, as representative of a South African national literature 
– an argument that flies in the face of its every theme. Leon de Kock writes persuasively 
in “South Africa in the Global Imaginary” (and essay we will encounter again in this 
work) the very idea of a South African literature presupposes principles of commonality 
– language, geography, history, genre etc. – that are very difficult to argue in relation to a 
South African context. The authors, and the majority of critics I will site, are white. To 
suggest that they are representative of a genre, say “TRC Literature” is to elide a host of 
other literatures, recalcitrant and emergent, that thrived from that event. I do not mean to 
exclude these literatures so much as I hope to argue that Literariness, in its ideal 
manifestation, constitutes an ethical and epistemological imperative to be open to them.  
 I will write about Disgrace and Country of My Skull, because they, more than any 
others, seem to knuckle into my literary pressure points. If, as I will show, the time of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) marked the moment when South Africa 
was most explicitly and publically re-negotiating national identity/ies, Disgrace and 
Country of My Skull instilled and continue to arouse in me the uncertainty and discomfort 
that drive my critical, ethical and creative undertakings. 
* * * 
 To subject the literary event to an ethical imperative would seem to be at odds 
with Barthes’s notion of the writerly text. An ethic constitutes, arguably by definition, the 
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kind of “singular system” that “traverse[s], intersect[s], stop[s], plasticize[s]…the 
plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages” that constitutes 
the writerly text. However, Derek Attridge, himself not coincidentally a preeminent J.M. 
Coetzee critic, provides a useful alternative formulation in The Singularity of 
Literature11. The value of Attridge’s account is that it offers a pragmatic ethical 
imperative to the event of reading that Barthes, in his uncompromising insistence on the 
plurality of entrances that facilitate the subject’s engagement with the text, resists. 
Attridge is invested in what he calls the singularity of the literary event. Like Barthes, he 
begins with the premise that the literary work is “an act, an event, of reading, never 
entirely separable from the act-event (or acts-events) of writing that brought it into being 
as a potentially readable text, never entirely insulated from the contingencies of history 
into which it is projected and within which it is read” (Attridge 59). The singularity of a 
literary encounter, may be thought of as the “demand that [the] specific collocation of 
words, allusions, and cultural references make on [the reader] in the event of the reading, 
here and now, as a member of the culture to whom these codes are familiar” (76). 
Accordingly,   
[s]ingularity exists, or rather occurs, in the experience of the reader 
(including the writer-as-reader), understood not as a psychological subject 
(though singularity has its psychological effects), but as the repository 
of…an idioculture, an individual version of the cultural ensemble by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Indeed, Attridge conceived of The Singularity of Literature in conjunction with another book, J.M. 
Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. He cites his experience of reading Coetzee novels as crucial to the 
genesis of the former text. He describes Coetzee’s as “an oeuvre which explores and exemplifies with 
particular intensity and urgency the theoretical  issues I wanted to follow up” (Attridge, Singularity: 
xii)  
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which he or she has been fashioned as a subject with assumptions, 
predispositions, and expectations.   
Singularity, in other words, is an experience which, in its irreducibility, “involves an 
apprehension of otherness”: it is “perceived as resisting or exceeding all pre-existing 
general determinations” (63). It is not a property of the archival text, the material object, 
but “the event of singularizing that takes place in reception” which “does not occur 
outside the responses of those who encounter and thereby constitute it. It is produced, not 
given in advance; and its emergence is also the beginning of its erosion, as it brings about 
the cultural changes necessary to accommodate it.” (64) 
 A crucial intervention that accompanies Attridge’s singularity is the idea that 
readers have an ethical responsibility towards it. Attridge likens the reader to a judge who 
must “dissipate” the uniqueness of a “particular case by relating it to the general field of 
the law” but who also has a responsibility to “move beyond any calculation which could 
be made in terms of codes of legal practice, and to act with a decisiveness that no 
machine could emulate. Only in so doing is the act truly responsible, truly responsive to 
the singularity of the case” (128).  Extending the metaphor, he argues that 
[i]t is this singularity [or otherness] that makes a demand on the judge, as 
judge. No justice is possible without the singularity of the case – and of 
the individual standing trial – being so affirmed (and only, it might be 
added, in similar acts of affirmation throughout daily existence can just or 
ethical social life prevail). To act morally towards other persons entails, it 
hardly needs saying, as full an attempt at understanding them and their 
situation as one is capable of. Yet both the primary claim of another 
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person upon one and the final measure of one’s behavior lies in the 
response to and affirmation of the otherness which resists that 
understanding.  (129) 
 In light of Attridge’s intervention, then, we may add an ethical component to the 
notion of Literariness, one that draws on his understanding of the “alterity” or 
“otherness” of the literary encounter and the necessity of “a trust in the unpredictability 
of reading, and an openness to the future” (130). It is arguable that Attridge is, at times, 
somewhat blithe in his suggestion that the singularity of the literary encounter requires a 
suspension of preconceptions and biases. As this dissertation’s introduction makes clear 
in its underpinning of the broader argument in a post-positivist realist understanding, the 
suspension of biases is neither entirely possible nor necessarily desirable. What is 
desirable, however, is that biases and presuppositions are challenged or endangered. And 
where the evidence is sufficiently objective (as opposed to transcendentally, universally 
objective) to suggest the necessity, such biases and presuppositions must be altered to 
facilitate more productive encounters with text and the world.  
The purpose of the literary text, as Attridge’s association of the singular text with 
“alterity” suggests, is precisely to provide the circumstances for the possibility of such 
challenges and endangerment. To exercise Literariness is to be open to the work that the 
singular text might facilitate. It is that sensibility whereby the subject conceives of and is 
reconceived by the textual encounter.  It is to give the text its due at the expense of 
certainty and comfort. Literariness is to live, as Attridge describes it, in the event of the 
creative reading:  
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To read creatively in an attempt to respond fully and responsibly to the 
alterity and singularity of the text is to work against the mind’s tendency 
to assimilate the other to the same, attending to that which can barely be 
heard, registering what is unique about the shaping of language, thought, 
and feeling in this particular work. It involves a suspension of habits, a 
willingness to rethink old positions, in order to apprehend the work’s 
inaugural power. (It is this rethinking that will continue to have effects as 
one reads other works). In its encounter with the other, an encounter in 
which existing modes of thought and evaluation falter, creative reading 
allows the work to take the mind (understood in the broadest sense) to the 
borders of its accustomed terrain. And there is no single “correct” reading, 
just as there is no single “correct” way for an artist, in creating a new 
work, to respond to the world in which he or she lives.  (81) 
 Like Barthes, Attridge recognizes that the immanence of a singular literary 
encounter represents a fatal challenge to the critic, insofar as it cannot be assimilated. As, 
for Barthes, criticism is merely consequent language, so Attridge recognizes that he can 
bear only “imperfect witness to [the] singularity [of a literary work] – its singularity for 
me, here, now – by describing a little of what happens when I read it on the occasion of 
writing…although any such description has to take its chances with readers in the same 
way that a literary work does” (68). 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearings and its Report will be used 
here to set up the particular effectivities of the subsequent and consequent texts 
(Disgrace, Country of My Skull, and contingently, Telling, Eugene) which will be 
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addressed in subsequent chapters. To draw again on Attridge, “if I succeed in conveying 
[their singularity] it will be because my description[s] read in conjunction with the 
[texts], generates, in turn, singularit[ies] for the reader. This is how much successful 
criticism works” (68). 
“New South African-ness” 
No disrespect is intended to any group or political perspective. 
It is simply impossible to write a history of South Africa 
without erring on one side or the other of the argument.   
- Archbishop Desmond Tutu, TRC Report, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 1 Sec. 13 
Benedict Anderson, writing about the ways in which nationalisms come into 
being and the frustration experienced by theorists at the political power of nationalisms in 
light of their “philosophical poverty and even incoherence,” (Anderson 5) has argued that 
the idea that nationalism is invented, risks “assimilating the ‘constructedness’ of 
nationalism with ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity,’ rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creating’” (5). 
For Anderson, national communities are to be “distinguished, not by their falsity 
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”12  
 Whether for good or for bad – “South African-ness” has been deployed in both 
prolific and destructive ways since the fall of apartheid – the style of South Africa’s 
emergence as a “new” entity was telling, not least because of its irreducibility. The New 
South Africa did not come into being at the moment of F.W. De Klerk’s speech to 
parliament on January 2, 1990, or Nelson Mandela’s release 9 days later. The New South 
Africa was not born with the ratification of the interim constitution in November of 1993, 
nor with the adoption of a new national flag, nor national anthem, nor even with the first 
fully inclusive elections on April 27, 1994. South Africa did not become itself as Invictus 
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12 My italics. 
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would have us believe, between the moment that Joel Stransky’s dropkick sailed between 
the uprights at Ellis Park, and the final whistle of the final match of the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup.  Nor are the vuvuzela drones of the 2010 Soccer World Cup the final natal 
cries of a nation emerging into itself.13  
 “New,” in this regard, could do with the kind of “flexible yet critical usage” that 
Ella Shohat demands of the prefix “post-” of postcolonialism (Shohat 111). As with post-
, new might usefully be seen as subject to the different “referential emphases” of at least 
two “genres” of the prefix (Shohat 101): the historical and the philosophical. In its 
historical mode, “new” implies the finitude of South Africa’s racist policy’s past and 
“underlines a passage into a new period and the closure of a certain historical event or 
age, officially stamped with dates” (Shohat 101). It does this in much the same way as 
does “post-war”, “post-coldwar”, or “post-independence”. In its philosophical mode, 
“new” marks a contemporary “state, situation, condition, or epoch”, in much the same 
way as the post of “post-modernism,” “post-feminism,” and “post-structuralism” does. 
Here, the emphasis falls not as heavily on linear demarcation, as it does on a complicated 
and many-stranded “movement beyond” “outmoded philosophical, aesthetic and political 
theories”. 
However, more than demarcating mere temporalized abstractions or theoretical 
movements, the “new” also signifies the materiality of a South African identity. “South 
African” has an ontological status that is at once complicatedly pluralistic and singular. It 
is a category that circumscribes at once the newly recognized heterogeneity and hybridity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Vuvuzelas are the long plastic horns ubiquitously blown by supporters at soccer matches during the 
2010 FIFA world cup hosted by South Africa. They were repeatedly identified with South African 
soccer culture and as such, much to the frequent annoyance of international teams and broadcast 
audiences, were defended on relativistic grounds as local custom.  
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of its prolific cultural expressions, and the singular evil of, for example, its dangerously 
facile xenophobias (exemplified by the May 2008 attacks and continuing xenophobic 
tensions that simmer between many South Africans against foreign and undocumented 
African laborers). And while it is understandable to throw up ones hands at the over-
determination of what appears to be ontological, it is nevertheless crucial to recognize the 
manner in which it operates as a social fact: it is an assignation that determines behaviors, 
practices and perceptions, and in this regard accommodates, rather than excludes 
opposing and incommensurate positionalities – an undertaking which should well serve 
theorists of South African national identities. As Julian David Jonker has argued, “[t]o 
live in a plural society is to live with very different conceptions of the human self; to take 
such plurality seriously, as a theorist, is to take these different conceptions seriously, yet 
to try to understand how and why these meanings come to circulate in the way that they 
do” (Jonker 216). 
 No description of a New South African identity that excludes or precludes any 
one group of people over another will emerge from this discussion, nor even an argument 
for the ontology of a “New South African-ness.” That said, it is also understood that 
“New South African-ness,” insofar as the assignation is ideologically deployed to affect a 
national zeitgeist, must contend with a temporal tension. On the one hand, the linear 
account, in which South Africa’s “rainbow moment” is past – that speech, that walk to 
freedom from Victor Verster prison, that election, that presidency, filled a nation with 
now erstwhile pride and hope. “New,” here, might be ironically inflected, suggesting a 
failed project. On the other hand, a more general progressivist movement: the zeitgeist 
cycles, invariably accompanied by some political, cultural, or sporting achievement, from 
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one “rainbow moment” to the next. “New,” here, suggests perpetual renewal, seemingly 
at the expense of broader historical awareness. Neither of these accounts are satisfactory 
in and of themselves. The cynicism of the former and the naiveté of the latter militate 
against them.  
Insofar, however, as “New South African-ness” is an assignation worth 
understanding in general terms (and its ideological deployment means it should be taken 
seriously), it is worth examining not as a moment – less as a demarcation on a linear 
progressivist’s account of history, and more as a complicated process.  It is worth 
understanding not merely as a slow and multiply layered set of theoretical and 
philosophical shifts, and more as the dramatic (perhaps even dramatized) emergences of a 
new set of identity formations.  
Crucially, this chapter seeks to deploy what the introduction has defined as 
“Literariness” as a way of understanding this emergence, Literariness being not merely a 
quality of form by which the value (or even ontology) of a literary text is defined, but 
also the sensibility that apprehends and understands language in its aesthetic aspect 
(aesthetic having been broadly defined to accommodate the historical and ethical contexts 
out of which the texts arise). In this way, Literariness is cast not merely as a way of 
reading literary texts, referring not merely to literature in the restrictive sense that might 
be applied to, for example, novels, memoirs, and plays – Disgrace, Country of My Skull, 
Telling: Eugene  – but also as a way to characterize the ways in which such literature – 
both in the moment of its production and reception – participates in history, not as 
archival remnants of a past moment (in this case the South African Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission), not in the merely historiographical sense, but as rendering 
anew history itself.  
The Report 
Mandated as a function of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) by 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act Number 34 of 1995 (henceforth, 
The Act), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (TRCR) was to be “as 
comprehensive an account as possible”14 of the Commission’s undertakings (Republic of 
South Africa 1995). The TRCR’s primary purpose, in this sense is archival. Its aim is 
threefold: 1) to provide an historical record of the Commissions other functions – which 
the Act describes as the provision of “as complete a picture as possible15 of the causes, 
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights” between 1 March 1960 and 10 
May 1994; 2) to facilitate amnesty for perpetrators of such abuses who make “full 
disclosure16 of all the relevant facts;” and 3) to ascertain the “fate and whereabouts” of 
victims and restoring their “human and civil dignity…by granting…opportunity to relate 
their own accounts…and recommending reparation measures.” 
 The Act demands much – “comprehensiveness,” “completeness,” “fullness” – but 
only within the measure of possibility. Despite this qualification, however, the 
chairperson of the Committee, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, adds a caveat in the 
foreword to the TRCR. The TRCR is not a definitive history, he suggests, because of the 
various constraints imposed upon the Commission’s findings, from the “legal provisions” 
contained in the Act (TRC, Vol. 1 Sec. 7), to the enormity of the undertaking with which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 My italics. 
 
15 My italics. 
 
16 My italics. 
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the Commission was tasked, to the time limitations that were imposed upon it: 
“Ultimately, this report is no more than it claims to be. It is the report of a commission 
appointed by Parliament to complete an enormous task in a limited period.” He 
continues, “Everyone involved in producing this report would have loved to have had the 
time to capture the many nuances and unspoken truths encapsulated in the evidence that 
came before us. This, however, is a task that others must take up and pursue” (TRCR Vol 
1. Ch. 1. Sec 15). Remarkable, especially within the foreword of an official, government-
mandated record of historical events, is Tutu’s seeming sanction of the play of meaning 
or textuality. The Archbishop not only anticipates play – as it will come to be defined – 
but tasks readers and writers with it. The possibilities implicit in his use of the word 
“capture” are tantalizing, especially in relation to the “encapsulated” nature of the 
“nuances” and “unspoken truths.” Capturing, in this relation, suggests not merely a fixing 
in place of nuances and unspoken truths, but their freeing from the stricture: “capturing” 
is not merely a matter of archiving, but also of the embodied and immediate processes of 
interpretation, representation and re-evocation – of reading, writing, and performance. 
What shortcomings there are to the TRCR, therefore, are not merely historiographical, but 
are also, in Tutu’s conception, literary. 
Tutu’s caveat functions, therefore, not so much as an apology, as a signal of an 
investment in impelling (perhaps on the strength of its author’s peculiar moral authority) 
the memory of the TRC into a prolific, engaged and perpetual present. The pivotal 
passage (in which Catherine Cole has suggested, the archbishop sounds 
“uncharacteristically postmodern”(Cole 122)) is worth quoting at length:  
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16. A Dutch visitor to the Commission observed that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission must fail. Its task is simply too 
demanding. Yet, she argued, ‘even as it fails, it has already succeeded 
beyond any rational expectations’. She quoted Emily Dickinson: ‘the 
truth must dazzle gradually…or all the world would be blind’. 
However, The Commission has not been prepared to allow the present 
generation of South Africans to grow gently into the harsh realities of 
the past and, indeed, many of us have wept as we were confronted 
with its ugly truths. However painful the experience has been, we 
remain convinced that there can be no healing without truth. My 
appeal to South Africans as they read this report is not to use it to 
attack others, but to add to it, correct it and ultimately share in the 
process that will lead to national unity through truth and reconciliation.  
17.  The past, it has been said, is another country. The way its stories are 
told and the way they are heard change as the years go by. The 
spotlight gyrates, exposing old lies and illuminating new truths. As a 
fuller picture emerges, a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle of our past 
settles into place.  
18. Inevitably, evidence and information about our past will continue to 
emerge, as indeed they must. The report of the Commission will now 
take its place in the historical landscape of which future generations  
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will try to make sense – searching for the clues that lead, endlessly, to 
a truth that will, in the very nature of things, never be fully revealed.  
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission 4) 
 With regard to this passage, it is necessary to make a crucial distinction – one that 
will be taken up in more detail in the next section of this chapter, on “The Hearing” – 
between the undertakings of TRC, and the significance of the TRCR in relation to them. It 
is difficult to avoid in Section 16 the fact that the experiences of South Africans (at least 
those espoused during the hearings) are part of a painful and harsh “reality” or “truth.”  A 
deep and methodical engagement with that reality is the necessary forerunner of the 
TRC’s nationalist projects of “unity” and “reconciliation.” The “truths” of this past are 
established, undeniable, and stark. They weigh heavily, perhaps by virtue of their 
reification. There is, however, a distinct shift in tone in Section 17 and 18 which deal 
with the TRCR as a discursive construct more than they do the embodied reality of South 
Africa’s history.  
With metaphorical flourish, and an insistence that the telling / writing / hearing / 
reading of stories have “ways,” – aesthetic, methodological, formal, stylistic, contextual – 
that change with time, and that will affect the manner of the TRCR’s future reception and 
treatment, Tutu seems to situate it as an event: the now taking its place in a historical 
landscape, a key find in a perpetual (and thus not eschatological) archeological project. 
That project is the written history of Apartheid, the totality of which is forever to be 
deferred. The hypothetical “event” of the TRCR is not, in a crucial sense, the telos of the 
project. It is not, as a less considered account might have characterized it, the beginning / 
origin, nor the center / middle, nor the outcome / end of a structured project to provide a 
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definitive written history. The TRCR does not transcend this project, claiming a 
constitutionally immunity as, say, the Word of God, from the activities of those who 
would seek to amend, addend, appropriate, or restructure it. One might characterize 
Tutu’s understanding by drawing on Derrida’s “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse 
of the Human Sciences.” Accordingly, Tutu does not fall prey to “[t]he concept of a 
centered structure [which] is in fact the concept of a freeplay upon a fundamental 
immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the range of freeplay” 
(Derrida 279)17.  
Tutu’s conception of the TRCR breaks from this theological idea – if only to a 
degree, which will come under scrutiny soon. Rather, the TRCR is specifically situated 
within the realm of signs: “Ultimately, this report is no more than it claims to be. It is the 
report of a commission.” At the risk of overstating Tutu’s position:, the TRC might be 
seen as a sign, even as a system of signs, the “stuff” for bricoleurs¸ whom Derrida, re-
conceiving Levi-Strauss’s opposition in The Savage Mind, places in causal relation to 
“engineers.” The engineer is a “theological idea” (Derrida 282): a constructor of totalities 
– language, syntax, lexicon – and “the absolute origin of his own discourse…supposedly 
construct[ed] out of nothing” (281). For Derrida, the bricoleur uses the   
instruments he finds in at his disposition around him, those which are 
already there, which have not been especially conceived with an eye to the 
operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and 
error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears 
necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their 
origin are heterogeneous – and so forth.  
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17 My italics. 
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“[E]very discourse,” Derrida argues, “is bricoleur,” and in this regard “the odds are that 
the engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur” (282). Tutu’s foreword caveat, it may 
be argued, frees the TRCR up from the myth of engineers – the strictures of totality and 
officialdom – to the play of future bricoleurs. It is also, however, a qualified freedom. 
Hence, Tutu breaks from the theological idea of the engineer only to a degree. 
Accordingly, the bricoleur is subject to a fundamental “truth” that exists outside, if in 
devastating relation to, the system of signs with which she plays. 
The Hearings 
According to Catherine Cole, “theatrical metaphors surrounding the TRC were 
ubiquitous” (Cole 17). This is evident in the subsequent literature. In A Country 
Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Alex Boraine, 
the vice-chairperson of the TRC describes the first hearing, held on 16 April1996 in East 
London, a coastal town of the Eastern Cape Province and a center of struggle activity 
during apartheid: 
 At last the curtain was raised; the drama which was to unfold during the  
next two and a half years had witnessed its first scene. The ritual, which 
was what the public hearings were, which promised truth, healing and 
reconciliation to a deeply divided and traumatised people, began with a 
story. This was the secret of the Commission – no stern-faced officials 
sitting in a private chamber, but a stage, a handful of black and white men 
and women listening to the stories of horror, of deep sorrow, amazing 
fortitude, and heroism. The audience was there too, and a much wider 
audience watched and listened through television and radio. It was a ritual, 
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deeply needed to cleanse a nation. It was a drama. The actors were in the 
main ordinary people with a powerful story. But this was no brilliantly 
written play; it was the unvarnished truth in all its starkness.  
(Boraine 98-99) 
The passage characterizes the event of the first TRC Hearing much as Tutu’s 
caveat does the “event” of the TRCR. Remarkably, however, the tone of the passage 
seems to move in an opposing direction. Tutu’s caveat is invested in denying the 
teleological status of the TRCR and does so by reducing the status of the report from 
totalizing official record to a piece of a larger bricolage, the completion of which is to be 
perpetually deferred. Boraine, on the other hand, begins with an extended theatrical 
metaphor. The Hearings, he suggests, were constructed with a view to affect. It was a 
consciously staged ritual, replete with carefully-wrought manipulations – “[t]his was the 
secret of the Commission” – of participants, as well as local and global audiences. Going 
to some length to establish the theatricality of the event, belaboring the point even, 
Boraine disavows it suddenly. The Hearings, he asserts, were not fake. There was nothing 
aestheticized about the testimonies. This “powerful story” – the singular nature of which 
is worth noting – was not “written.” Rather, its (singular) truth was “unvarnished” and 
“stark”.18 
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18 Catherine Cole also addresses the simultaneous invocation and denial of the TRC Hearings’ 
“theatricality,” in Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission: Stages of Transition. One wonderful 
find derives from the transcripts of the Port Elizabeth Hearings, in which Tutu, admonishing an unruly 
audience, is quoted as saying “We have been given a very important task: this is not a show that we are 
doing. We are trying to get medicines to heal up our wounds” (Cole 16). Cole argues that the 
substitution “of a medical metaphor (the healing of wounds) for a theatrical one (a ‘show’)” sought to 
invoke the process as an “evenhanded and effective” rather than subject to “spontaneous expressions of 
emotion from the audience [that] would undermine the legitimacy of the commission.” The imposition 
of a scientific metaphor, in this account, suggests the regulatory force of epistemic modes that defer to 
objectivity, and thus countermand the irruptive danger of the subject. Interestingly, Cole continues to 
illustrate the Archbishop’s own ambivalent status within this dialectic:  
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* * * 
It is a matter of contingency that I have worked with US veterans – a process the 
fourth chapter of this dissertation will engage. Trying to understand these experiences, I 
read Anthony Kubiak’s brilliant Agitated States: Performance in the American Theater of 
Cruelty, which charges American Theatre with the responsibility of revealing the material 
historical violence that is belied by highly theatricalized and idealized “real” American 
identity. Kubiak argues that the broad abhorrence of theatricality – from that of the 
puritan “founders” to that of contemporary Neo-conservative posturing – strategically 
and ideologically allows claims to an “authentic” American-ness. “What is American 
history…but a continuous staging of desire?” he asks. 
America…generating within…ever-expanding limits its own endless play 
of desire (more markets, more capital) and significance (still the city on a 
hill, even now believing in its manifest destiny recontextualized as 
historically inevitable, unlimited, market growth). America, that in staging 
its desire still deeply believes in the purity of its authentic identity. 
America onstage rejecting its own theater. (Kubiak 12) 
 I read Boraine after Kubiak. Coming to the moment of Boraine’s disavowal, and 
notwithstanding seemingly insurmountable contextual differences, I was suddenly struck 
anew by Kubiak’s formulation. Theatricality sacrificed on authenticity’s altar in the name 
of nationalist / nationalizing ideology: here was an abstract idea, generalizable enough, 
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He was, after all, the unquestioned master of ceremonies, a brilliant showman. 
Without his talents, it could be argued, the commission would surely have broken 
down at several particularly fraught junctures.  His ability to stage-manage, to 
orchestrate contending forces, to shift abruptly the tone, style, language and mood of 
the proceedings kept the audience and all participants slightly off guard. This proved 
efficacious for moving the ritual forward, for keeping the show on the road, for 
better or worse. (Cole 16-17) 
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that in terms of disciplinary mores requires a complex comparative methodology.  I 
wonder if you will let it be enough that I, a South African in the U.S., accidentally and in 
a moment of intuitive recognition, encountered these (con)texts. We will encounter both 
Boraine and  Kubiak again. 
* * * 
As with the American repudiation of theatricality, a perpetual gesture necessary to 
sustain the “purity of authentic identity,” there is an ontological claim at the heart of 
Boraine’s sudden disavowal. The TRC hearings staged something, a single thing, a story, 
one truth – South African identity – the theatricality of which needed to be repudiated in 
order to sustain, or claim for the first time, its authenticity.  
This was the nationalist mandate of the TRC hearings. As Ivor Chipkin has 
argued in Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy, and the Identity of ‘The 
People’, “the TRC sought to provide a principle of commonality that would ground South 
Africans, despite their differences of culture, religion, language and race, as a people” 
(Chipkin 175). His analysis fails, however, in so far as it misapprehends the “principle of 
commonality” targeted by the hearings in fulfillment of its nationalist mandate. To 
Chipkin, this principle is a “common history,” of “apartheid.” His critique of the TRC is 
that a “national history – a history that defines the limits of the people – …begs the 
question. It must know, even before it begins, who the people are. How else could it write 
their story? This is why the project of nation-building is paradoxical. It is driven to 
suppose that the nation already exists in itself” (181).  
While Chipkin is correct in highlighting the fallaciousness of an a priori 
supposition of “a people” as the basis for a national history, his implication that that the 
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TRC’s nationalizing mandate was fulfilled by a purely historiographical mandate is less 
assured: The TRCR did not “write the people.” Written histories, as Tutu’s caveat points 
out, are all too unstable, subject to the gyrating spotlight of future bricoleurs: readers, 
writers and critics. The hearing sought to situate South Africa’s “common history” not as 
something that was written, but within the evidence upon which any writing would, by 
necessity, be based – or at least one aspects of that evidence. The speaking bodies that 
appeared before the Commission in hearings and depositions, especially the speaking 
bodies of apartheid victims took on a particular immobility within the TRC’s re-
conception of South African identity. South Africa’s common history was undergirded by 
the authentic victim subject. In victim hearings, publically broadcast, particular stories 
became national allegories, and personal emotional utterances defined a nation’s heart.  
In order that the authentic victim subject’s story be capable of sustaining such a 
burden, however, it had to be situated as an immobility – the guarantor of history, the 
center of its system of signs – of a stature Tutu refused the TRCR with his caveat. Hence, 
Alex Boraine’s repudiation of theatricality, the constructedness of which implies a 
freeplay that besmirches the authenticity of the victim subject in the very moment of his 
or her iteration. 
Between The Hearings and The Report 
Mark Sanders, in Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a 
Truth Commission, most clearly formulates the relationship between the TRC Hearings 
and the TRCR. He does so by identifying the juridico-legal, therapeutic, and literary 
codes and practices at work. For him, these “codes and practices are unstable,” and he 
frequently finds himself “adding the prefix ‘quasi’: quasi-literary, quasi-juridical, and so 
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on” (Sanders 16-17), a qualification he finds necessary in light of the “differential” (17) 
accounts of “truth” that inform the practices of the Commission.  
The TRCR distinguishes between four kinds of “truth,” that fall under the ambit of 
the TRC’s operation: 1) “factual and forensic truth” (TRCR Vol. 1, Ch 5, Secs. 30-34); 2) 
“personal and narrative truth” (Sect. 35-38); 3) “social truth” (Sect. 39-42); and 4) 
“healing and restorative truth” (Sect. 43-45). For the purposes of Sanders’ argument, 
“forensic” and “narrative” truths are the most important. Narrative truths, the subjective 
narration or witness testimonies of events germane to the Commission’s ambit, are 
crucial in the fulfillment of The Act’s mandate that TRC “restore the human and civil 
dignity of victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the 
violations of which they were victims” (Republic of South Africa 1995). This was the 
purpose of the public hearings.  
Sanders suggests that it is in its facilitation of narrative truths, or “the weight it 
gave to individual testimonies,” that the TRC and the TRCR “bear most on literature” 
(Sanders 151)19, particularly insofar as to do so required a careful negotiation of juridico-
legal codes and practices. Whereas in a juridical setting, the personal narratives of an 
event or series of events would be subject to forensic and factual analysis, this was not 
true in the TRC victim hearings. Rather, as Sanders points out, although an official body, 
the Commission could not approach the personal testimony of victims with an a priori 
juridical skepticism. The commission had a “reparative quasi-therapeutic mandate,” and 
the “healed wholeness of personhood” could not be restored to victims “unless the 
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19 However, neither the TRC nor the TRCR are “literary” in the “restricted sense” (Sanders 149) of, for 
example, the Emily Dickinson poem cited in the chairperson’s foreword – although such literary 
intrusions occur infrequently throughout the TRCR. Sanders cites, for example, the Brecht poem that is 
deployed as an epigraph to the conclusion of the TRCR chapter dealing with the complicity of the 
health sector in apartheid (149).  
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‘personal’ and ‘subjective’ truth of [their] accounts was accepted….[and] officially 
sanctioned” (Sanders 17).  
The restoration of dignity is certainly and rightfully meant to benefit victims. 
However, the TRCR, in its definition of narrative or subjective truth, is not above the 
unwitting or disingenuous conflation of victim and perpetrator, “[b]y telling their stories, 
both victims and perpetrators gave meaning to the multi-layered experiences of the South 
African story…. The stories told to the Commission were not presented as arguments or 
claims in a court of law. Rather, they provided unique insights into the pain of South 
Africa’s past, often touching the hearts of all that heard them” (TRCR, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, sect. 
36). In point of fact, the TRC did not treat victims and perpetrators equally during the 
hearings:  
Perpetrators can be cross-examined, their integrity put in doubt…[there is] 
a necessarily asymmetrical openness…in its weaving of what it 
enigmatically calls ‘the South African story’…to stories not of 
perpetrators but of victims. The commission reserves its hospitality for 
victims. It does not greet perpetrators with the words ‘we welcome you 
here today’ – such words typically being the greeting made at hearings to 
victim witnesses. (Sanders 17)20 
Within the context of the hearing, then, victims’ narrative truths were 
transcendent. They were above forensic and factual cross-examination. As much as this 
fulfilled what Sanders calls the quasi-therapeutic and reparative mandate of the 
Commission, it also served a particular post-apartheid nationalizing function. Victim and 
perpetrator testimonies were ubiquitously and nationally broadcast. The differing 
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20 My italics.  
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attitudes of the Commission towards victims and perpetrators translated into public 
attitudes. Perpetrators (black and white) represented the old, corrupt order, and were 
treated with cold, hard, juridical skepticism in the form of cross-examination. Victims 
(black and white) represented the longsuffering and victorious new order; validation of 
their narratives and emotions were encoded in the commission’s patient silence and 
empathetic utterances.  
However, if the Hearings could sustain this asymmetrical openness in its live, 
quasi-therapeutic and reparative capacity, then the TRCR could not: “In spite of its 
declared openness to ‘narrative truth,’ for the commission the stories of victims were, like 
any other statements made before a legal or quasi-legal body, subject to verification and 
or falsification…This happened…when the commission drew up victims’ testimony in its 
report in order to illustrate a pattern of human rights violations.” In the TRCR then, unlike 
in The Hearings, victim testimonies were not treated as the transcendent iterations of 
authentic victim subjects.  
In the larger scheme, however, this hardly matters. The TRCR’s subjection of 
victims’ testimonies to cross-examination was at once all-but-invisible and substantially 
after the fact of the publically broadcast hearings. A crucial disequilibrium results, one 
that Teresa Godwin Phelps manages at once to characterize and overlook:  
[W]ithin [the TRCR’s] covers a different story emerges from that which 
resulted from the daily inundation of victims and perpetrator stories that 
had rained down on the people of South Africa for nearly two years. The 
hearings, despite their highly ritualized nature, had let loose a riot of 
emotion. The hearings had been carnival, temporarily releasing the people 
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from the strictures of the state. The report, on the other hand, is a 
monumental effort to control the chaos, to reintroduce the state with its 
orderliness and discipline; this time, to be sure, a new state that values 
equality and compassion. Nonetheless, the tone of the report is largely 
formal and bureaucratic, a startling contrast to the hearings.  
(Godwin Phelps 113) 
No formal and bureaucratic document, no matter its grandeur (5 volumes) or that of the 
occasion of its publication (Archbishop Tutu handed over the TRCR’s bound volumes to 
then-President Nelson Mandela in a nationally broadcast ceremony), can compete in 
terms of access or public interest with memories of the riot of loosed emotions, carnival, 
and daily inundations.  In this sense, what Mark Sanders characterizes as the TRC 
Hearings’ asymmetrical openness towards the stories of victims in the re-conception of 
the “South African Story” is aided and abetted by another de facto asymmetrical 
openness, that of the public towards live mediation, towards the embodied and imminent 
iteration of the authentic victim subject.  
In the last chapter of Ambiguities of Witnessing Sanders points out that “the 
commission, situated between the hearings and its report, between listening and 
watching, and reading is…a bifurcated event” and asks  
how [the TRCR] deal[s] with this bifurcation, and the resulting 
disequilibrium between official record and common memory? Does this 
bifurcation and disequilibrium, and the response of the report to it, have 
any bearing on literature after apartheid: not simply, in a restricted sense, 
in terms of the production of literary and quasi-literary works, but also, in 
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a broader sense in terms of thinking of literature, or of the literary, and its 
relation to the law? (Sanders 148)  
Less interested in the juridical implications of the literary, I share Sanders’s concern with 
the ways literature arising out of the time of the TRC negotiates between the hearings 
and the TRCR. It will show how J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Antjie Krog’s semi-
fictional autobiography Country of My Skull situate their concerns their readers in the 
event of the reading between the embodied iteration of victim / perpetrator subjectivity, 
and the appropriation of such iterations into a transcribed and carefully formulated 
historical objects. If the TRCR is circumscribed by its supposed officialdom (its mandate 
and time) the same is not true of Coetzee’s and Krog’s texts. The writing of the TRCR, so 
Tutu points out, enacts a merely archival function, in contrast to the “truths” and nuances 
“encapsulated” in the moment of the authentic subject’s embodied iteration, in the time of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Coetzee and Krog’s texts intervene in this 
apparent disparity by engaging the reader’s Literariness in the event of the reading. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SERPENT’S TONGUE: LETTERED SOLIPSISM  
AND DISGRACE 
J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace is a beautifully written novel. Its literariness, in so far as 
the term suggests a quality of form by which the text is evaluated, is often remarked 
upon. The opening of Michael Holland’s astute analysis in “‘Plink-Plunk’: Unforgetting 
the Present in Coetzee’s Disgrace” moves towards just such an observation: 
“Disgrace…fulfils its aesthetic obligation. Like Cape Town, ‘a city prodigal of beauty, of 
beauties’ (Coetzee 12), it flamboyantly obeys an imperative which states that novels are 
primarily works of literature and ought to be readable, and read, as such” (Holland 396). 
Holland argues persuasively that the novel also simultaneously destabilizes this 
imperative, asking what the aesthetic assumptions are that underlie the notion of 
readability, or, for our purposes, what constitutes the event of reading. For him, this 
destabilization is epitomized by the response of David Lurie, the novel’s libidinal 
protagonist, a middle-aged, white, Romantics scholar and an academic, to the 
performance of Melanie Isaacs, his Coloured21 student and the young woman he is later 
accused of assaulting, in a comedic stage production, Sunset at the Globe Salon. As 
Holland describes the scene, Melanie, playing the part of Gloria, is  
all tarted up and brassy….[Lurie] slips unnoticed into a rehearsal. The 
climax of the scene – ‘a flash, followed by a screaming and a scurrying 
around’ (Coetzee 24) fails to happen because of synchronization problems, 
and this leads to a significant breakdown in the synchronization of Lurie’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In South African English the word “Coloured,” although it has been contested in the past, does not 
carry the pejorative implications that it does in American English. It refers to people of mixed 
ethnicity, a category that, while established under Apartheid taxonomies, is generally accepted.   
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response. He becomes uneasy, feeling he ‘ought to be gone’: ‘unbidden 
the word letching comes to him’ (Coetzee 24). The flash eventually occurs 
and, to the sound of Melanie’s ‘squawks’, he leaves. The next day, 
however, he barges into her digs and ravishes her more or less against her 
will. (Holland 396) 
In this reading Lurie is unsettled by a garish version of Melanie – Gloria, tarted, brassy, 
squawking, partaking in a failed slapstick scene the “presiding principle” of which seems 
to be catharsis: “all the old prejudices brought into the light of day and washed away in 
gales of laughter.” However, as he watches the piece in rehearsal, there is little hope of 
such catharsis for Lurie because in the cast’s stern efforts to create a seamless comedy, 
the process of its construction is laid bare. The moment calls to mind Brechtian 
Verfemdungseffekte, even as it is in no way the cast’s intention. The actor’s 
performances, in the manner of gest, are obviously (albeit artlessly) stylized: Melanie is 
not skilled enough in her portrayal of Gloria to be “wholly transformed into the character 
played,” for her “feelings [be] at bottom those of the character,” as Brecht might argue 
(Brecht 515), and so resorts to an obvious type, “her accent is glaringly Kaaps.22 The 
director demands a snappier “Marx Brothers atmosphere;” the technical failure disrupts 
any (even if already scant) pretense of realism. The disruption puts paid to Lurie’s 
illusions, and in a moment of atypical clear-sightedness he perceives his own gaze upon 
the young woman as unseemly, and himself as “on the point of joining the company” of 
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22 “Kaaps” is Afrikaans for “of the Cape,” a reference to the geographical location historically 
occupied by “Cape Coloureds:” people of mixed ethnicity (Khoi, San, White, Malay), whose dialect, 
both in English and Afrikaans is very distinctive, and frequently deployed to satirical ends. Gloria, in 
other words, is an expression of a stereotype.   
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dirty old men: “tramps and drifters with their stained raincoats and cracked false teeth 
and hairy earholes” (Coetzee 24).  
Just as Brecht’s theatre demands critical distance of its audience by signaling its own 
artifice, or theatricality, so Disgrace demands that its audience pays attention to literature 
as literature. And just as Brecht aimed to facilitate a critically engaged distance between 
a bourgeois audience and their otherwise naturalized self-iteration, so Disgrace, literary 
though it undoubtedly is, estranges readers from an unquestioning appreciation of “the 
literary” through Lurie’s gauche deployment of it. Lurie fails to seduce Melanie with his 
grandiloquent declarations, and, in the process, levels the literary against itself. His 
pretentious lettered flirtation is painfully obvious. Earlier, having invited Melanie into his 
home, he entreats her with garishly instrumentalist pith, “a woman’s beauty does not 
belong to her alone….She has a duty to share it.” A little later, he says with allusive 
pretentiousness “From fairest creatures we desire increase…that thereby beauty’s rose 
might never die” (Coetzee 16). Just as Lurie feels the desire to leave the auditorium the 
moment that the rehearsal’s theatricality grates against itself, so Melanie excuses herself 
the moment Lurie quotes Shakespeare’s first sonnet, an outcome he places squarely on 
the shoulders of literary form: “Her smile loses its playful, mobile quality. The 
pentameter, whose cadence once served so well to oil the serpent’s words, now only 
estranges. He has become a teacher again, man of the book, guardian of the culture hoard. 
She puts down her cup. ‘I must leave, I’m expected’” (Coetzee 16). 
 The danger of the serpent’s words, however, lie not merely in their potential 
seduction of Melanie and the audience, but also, more importantly, in the way they 
facilitate Lurie’s amoral solipsism . There is something profoundly masturbatory about 
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Lurie’s relationship with the literary, as though, in attempting to coerce or seduce others 
he is blind to the failure of his lettered admonitions to affect his desire in others, and 
manages to seduce only himself. So, hardly a beat passes in the auditorium between 
Lurie’s momentary clear-sightedness and his self-indulgent prevarication: the old men he 
is in danger of joining were “once upon a time children of God, with straight limbs and 
clear eyes. Can they be blamed for clinging to the last to their place at the sweet banquet 
of the senses?” The sense that he is letching is all too easily sublimated by such 
sentiments. Indeed, by the next afternoon, it has been incorporated into his justification 
for barging into Melanie’s flat and ravishing her. The feelings she invoked when he sat in 
the audience, “[s]omething to do with the apparition on the stage; the wig, the wiggling 
bottom, the crude talk,” have become “Strange love! Yet from the quiver of Aphrodite, 
goddess of the foaming waves, no doubt about that” (25).  
* * * 
Disgrace has been particularly resonant for me, although it stole upon me slowly 
rather than by some disruptive flash of sudden insight. I first read it late in the year of its 
initial publication. If I remember correctly, I bought it at a national book-selling franchise 
in Benoni’s fresh new Lakeside Mall complex with a gift certificate I had received for 
Christmas from my parents. I shot through the novel, Coetzee’s sparse prose compelling 
me forward and nothing in the plot, as far as I can remember, giving me pause.  
My tone-deafness in that first reading still surprises me. I was 24. The millennium 
beckoned. The 1990s, momentous as they were, were behind us. I, like so many in the 
white middle-class for whom very little had really changed and for whom “news” 
happened in newspapers and on television, was under the carefully sustained illusion that 
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my existence was “apolitical.” I had read the news and I had watched the television. I had 
read Age of Iron, Life and Times of Michael K and Waiting for the Barbarians as well as 
critical works regarding these texts. But these novels’ unflinching gaze on the dangerous 
texts that constitute identity and power relations remained, in my experience, sedimented 
in the realm of ideas. They did not speak to the circumstances of my life, or at least, I was 
looking the other way.  
So, after the New Year, having finished the novel, I packed up my bags, and 
travelled south from Johannesburg, through the Karoo, to Grahamstown’s Rhodes 
University. Grahamstown is a short drive from Salem, where, in the novel’s world, Lucy 
is raped and Lurie is attacked. Grahamstown is where Lucy sells flowers and vegetables 
and where Bev Shaw has her animal clinic.  
The town enacts the frontier; I lived in British settler houses a few streets up from 
the start of rolling valleys of townships and shanty towns – Rhini, Eluxolweni, Makana, 
Kings Flats, Sun City Informal. Grahamstown is where, the year before, I had read 
Wordsworth and Byron under the pedantic direction of an immaculately attired white 
academic. It is where I would, over the next two years, write a master’s thesis on form 
and metaphysics in William Blake and T.S. Eliot. 
* * * 
 To read Disgrace as a roman à clef is to do it a disservice. The literary academy 
in South Africa can be an echo-chamber, and so it is tempting to read Lurie as based on 
someone – probably a colleague of Coetzee’s at The University of Cape Town, probably 
the University of Cape Town, probably Cape Town. However, reading for direct referents 
impoverishes the event of the reading. As Derek Attridge suggests of The Life and Times 
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of Michael K and Waiting for the Barbarians in his essay “Against Allegory,” the 
meaning of a text should be understood not as a “noun” but a “verb” (Attridge  67). That 
said, as undergraduate students are constantly reminded: complete sentences require both 
verbs and nouns. What the novel does, in other words, it does in relation to the world to 
which it refers – be it directly, objectively, or in the singular estimation of the reading 
subject. Potentially, the TRC is one such worldly referent, one to which this analysis will 
soon return. Even more clearly, however, the novel situates its concerns within the 
literary academy. It implicates a literary professor, and by extension, the literary 
humanities, in a dangerous anachronism that, even though it might not apply directly to 
all literary academics or institutions, needs nevertheless to be taken seriously as a direct 
or cautionary institutional and / or personal critique. This, at least, would seem to be the 
ethical imperative with which Literariness, the facility by which the reading subject 
engages the text in its aesthetic aspect in the event of the reading, charges readers.   
 Indeed, Lurie lacks precisely this self-reflexivity. The post-apartheid 
rationalization of the academy is thus not a reflection of its anachronism, but, to his mind, 
its emasculation (Coetzee 4). Immuning himself to the new dispensation’s critique of the 
old, and in the face of the overwhelming historical necessity of the academy’s 
reconfiguration, Lurie doggedly sustains the idea of the literary humanities. He finds 
succor for his solipsism in this idea, not merely by virtue of the “official” authority 
granted him by the University at which he teaches, but also insofar as the literary 
humanities provide him with the hermeneutic and epistemological justification for his 
understanding of himself. This is not to suggest that the literary humanities represent the 
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telos of Lurie’s solipsism, but rather that Lurie’s solipsism and his profession are 
functions of each other, one the chicken to the other’s egg.  
The novel begins with Lurie stubbornly constituting himself as a white, privileged 
Enlightenment subject – the very first sentence suggests the solipsism that sustains his 
own primacy: “For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the 
problem of sex rather well”(Coetzee 1)23. With this implicit comparison, this token 
rhetorical gesture, Lurie indicates an awareness of a world outside himself. And yet 
Lurie’s evaluation of his success relates only to men like him. He constitutes his 
conception of himself using himself as a starting point; the presumed linearity of the telos 
turns upon itself. Lurie constitutes himself as teleological tautology. The opening chapter 
suggests the ultimate circularity of this logic in key ways, from his solutions to the 
“problem of sex” to his temperament, which “is not going to change, he is too old for 
that. His temperament is fixed, set. The skull, followed by the temperament: the two 
hardest parts of the body….He lives within his income, within his temperament, within 
his emotional means” (2).  
Crucially, this solipsism extends to his profession. As a function of the post-
apartheid restructuring of the South African education system, he is “rationalized 
personnel:” “[o]nce a professor of modern languages, he has been, since Classics and 
Modern Languages were closed down…adjunct professor of communications” (3). He 
finds the instrumentalist account of language that serves as the opening premise of the 
Communications 101 handbook “presposterous: ‘Human society has created language in 
order that we may communicate our thoughts, feelings and intentions to each other.’ His 
own opinion, which he does not air, is that the origins of speech lie in song, and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 My italics.  
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origins of song in the need to fill with sound the overlarge and rather empty human soul” 
(3-4).24 Whereas otherness is implicit in the handbook’s instrumentalist account of 
language’s origins – language exists for the sake of inter-subjective relation (“to each 
other”) – it is absent from Lurie’s account of language’s origins as primarily facilitating 
affect. In Lurie’s account, there is no place for alterity. Language exists for the sake of 
the monadic soul’s fulfillment. 
Coetzee elaborates this conception into something like an ethos through the 
lessons Lurie teaches, which the protagonist smarmily asserts benefits nobody but 
himself; “humbled” by his students’ indifference, teaching “brings…home to him who he 
is in the world….the one who comes to teach learns the keenest lessons, while those who 
come to learn learn nothing” (5).  
Readers are privy to two lessons Lurie teaches as part of the one special-field 
course he, as rationalized personnel, is allowed to offer yearly for the sake of morale. 
Both lessons are inflected by his encounter with Melanie. The first lesson takes place on 
the Wednesday after Lurie has sex with her the Sunday prior. In it, his reading of William 
Wordsworth’s encounter with Mont Blanc in Book Six of The Prelude is deeply strained: 
the reading he espouses “is hardly in Wordsworth” (22).25 Regardless, what emerges is 
the kind of monad-sustaining phenomenology that Lurie subsequently extrapolates into 
“covert intimacies” (23) meant for Melanie, who is present in his class.  
He quotes lines 524-528 of the 1850 Edition:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 My italics. We will return to Coetzee’s pointed use of the word “preposterous” later. 
 
25 For a more detailed account of Disgrace’s allusion to Wordsworth, read Margot Beard’s “Lessons 
from the Dead Masters: Wordsworth and Byron in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace.” English in Africa 34 No. 
1 (May 2007): 59-77.  
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  From a bare ridge we also first beheld  
  Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved 
To have the soulless image on the eye 
That had usurped upon a living thought 
That never more could be. (Coetzee 21, Wordsworth 213) 
Lurie’s fixation on the phrase, “usurp upon” is resonant on several levels: “Usurp, the 
perfective of usurp upon; usurping completes the act of usurping upon” (Coetzee 21). 
Most broadly, there is an implicit phenomenological notion at work. The living thought is 
sustained in the absence of the corporeal experience. What is imagined supersedes that 
which is experienced. Hence, Wordsworth and his companions grieved, “Because, he 
says, a soulless image, a mere image on a retina, has encroached upon a living 
thought….The great archetypes of the mind, pure ideas, find themselves usurped by mere 
sense-images” (22). But, Lurie suggests that pure ideas cannot sustain us on a day-to-day 
basis as they leave us “cocooned from sense-experience.” Wordsworth, he argues, “seems 
to be feeling his way toward a balance: not a pure idea, wreathed in clouds, nor the visual 
image burned on the retina, overwhelming and disappointing us with its matter-of-fact 
clarity, but the sense image, kept as fleeting as possible, as a means towards stirring or 
activating the ideas that lie buried more deeply in the soil of memory.” 
The implication of Lurie’s reading is clear. Heightened sense-impression, the 
overwhelming experience of the world, usurps the imagination. Reality is an affront to 
memory and the work of the intellect. Encounters with reality should be kept fleeting so 
as to stimulate the mind. As much as Lurie gestures at the balance Wordsworth is 
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“feeling” his way towards, the same cannot be said of his own account, which privileges 
the intellect above all and is threatened with usurpation by sense-impressions.  
In light of Lurie’s own personal, historical and geographical situation, his 
identification with Wordsworth implicates him in what, to the reader, could be an ironic 
reversal. He identifies with Wordsworth and his encounters with beauty in nature, but, a 
white academic in South Africa, his identification reads more like blameless entitlement. 
His fixation on the word “usurp upon” and its perfective, situates the observing mind as 
lacking in agency, and, replete with colonial resonances, a victim of conquest. This is 
evident on two counts. First, when Lurie is met with “[b]lank incomprehension,” he 
proffers an example for the benefit of the students: “Like being in love….If you were 
blind you would hardly have fallen in love in the first place. But now, do you truly wish 
to see the beloved in the cold clarity of the visual apparatus? It may be in your better 
interest to throw a veil over the gaze, so as to keep her alive in her archetypal, 
goddesslike form.” Such “covert intimacies” (23) are directed at Melanie and would seem 
to implicate her in his seduction. She usurped upon him. She needs to be veiled, made 
modest, goddesslike, just as for Wordsworth, the “wondrous Vale / of Chamouny,” in 
obscuring Mont Blanc, “made rich amends, / And reconciled us to [more everyday] 
realities” (Wordsworth 213, lines 528-533).  
The second recontextualization of Wordsworth is perhaps more directly 
referential of colonial expansion: “Wordsworth is writing about the Alps….We don’t 
have Alps in this country, but we do have the Drakensburg, or, on a smaller scale, Table 
mountain, which we climb in the wake of the poets” (23). To Lurie, the South African 
mountain-scapes represent proxies for those that Wordsworth walked.  Nevertheless, the 
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implications are the same.  The colonized landscape now usurps upon the intellect: Table 
Mountain, visible from all over False Bay, calls to mind the initial settlement by the 
Dutch East India Company at its foot; The Drakensburg holds particular resonance as the 
nigh-unconquerable monolith across which the Boers trekked at great peril in their 
Northward expansion into the interior in the 1830s. These landscapes constitute a threat, 
at once in terms of its overwhelming grandeur, and, perhaps, in terms of its geographical 
alterity to “the great [western] archetypes of imagination we carry within us.”  
 Between the first and second lesson, Lurie has other sexual encounters with 
Melanie, including one about which he equivocates: “Not rape, not quite that, but 
undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she has decided to go slack, die 
within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So 
that everything done to her might be done, as it were, far away” (25). He is confronted by 
Melanie’s boyfriend after this encounter and his car is vandalized (30-31). 
 Melanie returns to class and her boyfriend joins her, sitting next to her with 
“cocky ease” (31). Under this judgmental gaze, Lurie finds himself uncomfortable 
teaching Byron’s “Lara,” especially insofar as “notoriety and scandal affected not only 
Byron’s life but the way in which his poems were received by the public. Byron the man 
found himself conflated with his own poetic creations – with Harold, Manfred, even Don 
Juan” (31). Lurie refers to Verse 18 of the first Canto, in which Lara returns home and 
finds himself utterly out of step with his surroundings and is compared to Lucifer: “He 
stood a stranger in the breathing world, / An erring spirit from another hurled” (Coetzee 
32). Lurie reads on: 
        
72!
!
He could 
   At times resign his own for others good,  
   But not in pity, not because he ought,  
But in some strange perversity of thought, 
That swayed him onward with a secret pride 
To do what few or none would do beside; 
And this same impulse would in tempting time 
Mislead his spirit equally in crime.  (33) 
 For all intents and purposes, Lucifer is described as a sociopath, one incapable of 
distinguishing between virtue and vice. Melanie’s boyfriend picks up on this, and, 
speaking up pointedly, implicates Lurie in the same amorality: “He just does what he 
feels like. He doesn’t care if it is good or bad. He just does it.” The rest of the lesson 
constitutes a defense of Byron / Lucifer / Lara / Lurie: 
Read a few lines further: His madness was not of the head, but 
heart….Note that we are not asked to condemn this being with whom 
there is something constitutionally wrong. On the contrary, we are invited 
to understand and sympathize. But there is a limit to sympathy. For though 
he lives among us, he is not one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: 
a thing, that is, a monster. Finally, Byron will suggest, it will not be 
possible to love him, not in the deeper, more human sense of the word. He 
will be condemned to solitude. (33-34) 
We see in Lurie’s defense of Byron / Lucifer / Lara / Lurie, the same assumptions seen in 
his defense of Wordsworth’s phenomenology. Lurie identifies with the protagonist, and 
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in so doing, blinds himself to the ethical implications once those self-same behaviors are 
re-contextualized within post-apartheid South Africa. He carefully constructs the 
amorality that removes Byron / Lucifer / Lara / Lurie from blame. Thus, his claims to the 
constitutional nature of Lara’s pathology reeks of an ad hoc rationalization of his own 
actions. His claims to Lucifer’s alterity in the “breathing world,” his monstrosity or thing-
ness, are suggestive of his own sense of persecution.  
 Summarily, while disguising the lessons as “readings” of the text, situating 
himself as the Enlightenment authority on the Classic, Lurie, in point of fact enacts a very 
particular and vested performance. Lurie iterates himself in the classroom, and through 
his blithe suturing of himself to Wordsworth and Byron / Lara / Lucifer, he emerges as a 
dangerously un-conflicted representative of an ethos out-of-step with his world.  
* * * 
 Three incidents come to mind.  
First, I taught Disgrace in a class on the contemporary novel at the University of 
Port Elizabeth. It was 2003. My blithe initial reading notwithstanding, the novel’s profile 
was such by this stage, that it could not be ignored. I read the novel again and found it 
much more engaging and confusing. I remember, specifically, not knowing what to do 
with Lurie, with whom I had come somewhat uneasily to identify. He certainly was not 
someone I could hate unequivocally. I had settled on his rape with Melanie Isaacs as a 
point of close analysis for the students. “Is it rape?” I asked my class, having read aloud 
how Melanie goes limp like a rabbit in a fox’s jaws.  
“Yes,” was the unequivocal answer. I was surprised that there was no 
controversy. 
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“But it says it’s not quite rape.” 
“Lurie thinks that. Of course Lurie thinks that. He’s not going to call himself a 
rapist.”  
“But…” I continued, “we don’t think Lurie is a bad man, do we?” 
“Ja, he is,” came the answer, again.  
It was a shock. I read the novel again that night.  
Second: years later, 2008, as a graduate student at the University of Oregon, I 
gave a short paper on Lurie’s pedagogy in Disgrace, arguing the epistemic nostalgia 
implicit in Lurie’s teaching. I can be tersely generalizing of the literary humanities and, 
given the short confines of the paper, was overly aggressive in drawing the conclusion 
that Lurie represents an outmoded and imperial ideology which is nevertheless still 
endemic to the literature classroom. I was approached by a faculty member, a woman of 
color. She gave me a thorough telling off. Lurie as a figuration of an outmoded imperial 
ideology is a virtual truism, she argued, suggesting that it was a lazy assertion. I 
responded that, while her claim may have been valid, my broader argument was that 
rather than dismiss Lurie because he is wrong, we could learn things from him by asking 
if there is an implicit critique of the academy at work and, if so, engaging it self-
reflexively.  
“I don’t know if it’s different where you come from,” she responded, “but I feel 
absolutely no sympathy for Lurie. I taught the novel and asked the class, and not one 
person identified with that rapist.” 
Third: In 2009, I taught Disgrace again as part of an African Literature survey 
course. Again, I asked the class to read passages that described the sexual encounters 
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between Lurie and Melanie and asked them to place the scenes within the broader power 
dynamics and shifts of the novel. As an example, I read the “Not rape, not quite rape” 
scene, wanting to suggest that Lurie, like the fox holding the rabbit, is repeatedly figured 
as predatory. The room fell to stillness as I read. It was a heavy silence. My voice 
wavered over the scene. I looked up and saw a student looking at me with an enormous 
grin on his face. “Is something funny?” I accused.  
He kept grinning, his expression unchanged but for my reading of it. He was, it 
suddenly became horribly obviously to me, utterly embarrassed. “Talking about all this 
stuff…” he said, “I haven’t ever.” 
After class, I called him aside to apologize and he was gracious enough. It did 
little to assuage my guilt.  
* * * 
Obviously, it is theoretically untenable to associate the protagonist of a novel with 
its author. J.M. Coetzee is not David Lurie, despite some biographical similarities. 
Disgrace is not a memoir even if there are few writers seemingly more reflexively 
engaged in muddying the line between memoir and fiction than Coetzee. Boyhood 
(1997), Youth (2002) and his most recent publication, Summertime (2010) are 
fictionalized autobiographies that recount phases in the life of “John Coetzee.” “Elizabeth 
Costello,” is Coetzee’s “uncanny performance of his fictional alter ego” who, in Lives of 
Animals (1999) and the eponymous Elizabeth Costello (2003), “left critics bewildered in 
their attempts to untangle Coetzee’s and Costello’s points of view” (Poyner 2). David 
Atwell describes Costello as a “sui generis” innovation who is a “compromise and a 
surrogate: a compromise because through her Coetzee goes some way towards meeting 
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the demands placed on him to step into the public limelight, and a surrogate because she 
does, to some degree, speak for him – when called on to speak publically, Coetzee [can] 
stand back and observe the ironies and the play of positions” (Atwell 33-4).  
Insofar then, as it is impossible to parse Coetzee’s “real” positions from those of 
his alter egos – and we might include the typically terse and elusive subject of interviews, 
“Author J.M. Coetzee,” in their number – his answer to Jayne Poyner’s question 
regarding how “one negotiates one’s roles as intellectual, academic, and novelist” should 
be read as a point of interest rather than a statement of thematic intent germane to the 
novel. Author J.M. Coetzee answers, “I try to avoid the term role, which implies that one 
is giving oneself to a part that is already written. Of course, there is a larger scheme in 
which we may all be said to be playing roles. But that scheme is invisible to us” 
(Coetzee, “Interview,” 23).  
The response resonates with theatrical and literary metaphors. “Role,” in the way 
Author J.M. Coetzee would seem to assume Poyner means it, implies “acting,” not with a 
Brechtian refusal of the actor’s trance, but by complete self-sacrificing immersion: a 
“giving [of] oneself to a part.” That such parts are “already written” implies at once their 
artifice and the loss of critical agency that results from the actor’s immersion. He takes it 
as a responsibility, Author J.M. Coetzee implies, to resist entrancement within the roles 
he sees as roles, notwithstanding the roles within “the larger scheme” – perhaps, in the 
Althusserian sense, material ideology or, in the post-structuralist’s sense, textuality – that 
are invisible to him. It stands to reason that a subject who avoids such entrancement 
must, as part of that commitment, develop a keen critical eye for “roles” that might 
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otherwise impose themselves from within and without, howsoever they might be 
constructed.   
Crucially, this larger scheme is an escape clause that separates Author J.M 
Coetzee’s resistance of theatricality and/or artificiality from, for example, Alex Boraine’s 
claims to the stark, unvarnished truth of authentic victim testimony at TRC hearings. 
Coetzee does not claim “authenticity” for the proverbial “self” that is given over to the 
pre-written part. Rather, the “larger scheme” suggests the “authentic” subject’s “as-yet-
invisible constructedness.” It is an idea that straddles two crucial theoretical positions. On 
the one hand, the idea that “larger scheme” by which the subject is constructed is 
invisible accounts for the material fact and political necessity of essentialist identity 
claims. On the other hand, insofar as said constructedness is “as-yet-invisible,” it implies 
the necessity of a critical project by which to make visible the texts and forms by which 
the otherwise essentialized subject is constructed.  
That said, readers need not necessarily be aware of the nuance Author J.M. 
Coetzee brings to such questions to observe David Lurie flail between, on the one hand, 
his self-reflexive awareness of and insistent autonomic control over language as 
constituting the social, professional, and seductive “roles” he “plays” and, on the other, 
his deferral to an essential libidinal imperative over which he claims to have no control. 
This tension fuels his encounter with the university’s committee of inquiry, which is 
established to make recommendations to the registrar regarding charges of 
misadministration on Lurie’s part (he marked Melanie present and gave her a grade for a 
test in which she did not sit), as well as harassment charges brought against Lurie by 
Melanie or her proxies.  
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The Committee echoes the TRC Hearings in obvious ways. There is the broader 
zeitgeist into which the hearing feeds: just as Apartheid’s end gave voice to historically 
oppressed South Africans, uncomfortably shifting the tenor for those who had been 
historically empowered, so the hearing takes place on the heels of Rape Awareness Week 
in which Women Against Rape hold solidarity vigils for “recent victims:” “YOUR 
DAYS ARE OVER, CASANOVA,” (Coetzee, Disgrace 43) says a scrawled note slipped 
under Lurie’s office door, suggesting not only Lurie’s figuration as an exploiter of 
women, but also his anachronism. The hearing is similar in function to that of the TRC: 
“it has no powers. All it can do is to make recommendations;” it is carefully constituted 
from a broad cross-section of the university community so as not discriminate against 
Lurie (46-47). Its chair is the Professor of Religious Studies, Manas Mathabane, 
suggestive of the theological tenor and moral compass brought to the TRC by Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu,26 a tenor the novel addresses more explicitly later when Lurie prostrates 
himself before Melanie Isaacs’s religious and evangelizing father.    
 Regardless of the historical specificity that readers may or may not be capable of 
bringing to the novel’s possible referents, the back and forth between the committee and 
Lurie is formally suggestive of a broader ontological question: In whose eyes, by whose 
words, by what words, does the subject exist?  
To Lurie, this is more than an academic point of contention. Institutionally, it is a 
discomfort with the gray areas that constitute the Committee’s mandate. Although in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Author J.M. Coetzee sees this theological tenor and moral compass as a sticking point in his 
evaluation of the TRC. He answers to Poyner’s question whether or not he believes “the conception of 
confession” is “misplaced in the public sphere,” by positing that in “a state with no official religion, 
the TRC is somewhat anomalous: a court if a certain kind based to a large degree on Christian teaching 
accepted in their hearts by only a tiny portion of the citizenry. Only the future will tell what the TRC 
managed to achieve” (Coetzee “Interview,” 21-2).    
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name of independence it has no “power,” the recommendations it is charged with making 
nevertheless require it to stand in judgment. Like the TRC Hearings, its ambit is quasi-
juridical, a source of cold comfort insofar as it subjects the process to the unsteady play 
of the letter and spirit of the law. Indeed, this is the tension Lurie invokes with his 
opening statement. Asked if he objects to any member of the committee as being 
potentially prejudicial to him, he replies, “I have no challenge in the legal sense….I have 
reservations of the philosophical kind, but I suppose they are out of bounds” (47). Lurie’s 
philosophical reservations initially manifest themselves in a defeatist’s insistence on 
procedural efficiency: “I’m sure the members of this committee have better things to do 
with their time than rehash a story over which there will be no dispute. I plead guilty to 
both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get on with our lives” (48). His tone so alienates 
the committee that it is suggested he finds legal representation. In a telling pun, Lurie’s 
reply speaks to the uncomfortably correlative nature of juridical and aesthetic concerns in 
the event of the hearing: “I don’t need representation. I can represent myself perfectly 
well” (49). 
Unfortunately for Lurie, self-representation is not a strong-suit. He is a man of 
failed performances and lettered solipsism, a fatal weakness in front of a quasi-juridical 
committee that will make its recommendations based not based on the letter of the law, 
but also, inevitably, with regard to the extent of their identification with the perpetrator. 
Lurie’s fate, then, becomes a matter of the effectiveness of his performance.27 In this 
regard, Lurie cannot represent himself “perfectly well” by simple virtue of his autonomic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Indeed, books by two leading TRC commissioners present in many Hearings, Tutu’s No Future 
Without Forgiveness and Boraine’s A Country Unmasked, are littered with examples of sympathetic 
perpetrators – forgiveness being a crucial aspect of the nation-building ambit of the TRC. More 
cynically, however, “sympathetic perpetrators” might be cast as believably contrite: a matter of 
effective performance rather than fact.  
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entitlement. His insistence on self-representation reads as an unwillingness to 
compromise, a refusal to negotiate the significance of the charges and, most glaringly, for 
Committee member Farodia Rassool, an unforgivable deflection of himself as subject to 
history. Pressed to defend himself, Lurie exhibits his customary tone-deafness: “Eros 
entered” (52). Rassool responds, “Yes, he says, he is guilty; but when we try to get 
specificity, all of a sudden it is not abuse of a young woman he is confessing to, just an 
impulse he could not resist, with no mention of the pain he has caused, no mention of the 
long history of exploitation of which this is a part” (53). To Lurie, Rassool’s insistence 
that he situate himself in relation to history is an affront. It identifies him with historical 
perpetrators, and, in so doing, constitutes an appropriation of the self-image over which 
he has stubbornly maintained autonomic control. For Rassool, Lurie’s case is allegorical, 
but Lurie refuses to be representative. In response to what he perceives to be his 
appropriation by the committee, he constitutes himself as particularly and essentially 
unfathomable. When the committee suggests that a sincere expression of regret might 
mitigate the severity of their recommendations, he takes issue with the idea that the 
committee “trusts [it]self to divine, from the words I use – to divine whether it comes 
from my heart?” (54). He continues: “I have said the words for you, now you want more, 
you want me to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous28. That is beyond the 
scope of the law. I have had enough. Let us go back to playing it by the book. I plead 
guilty. That is as far as I am prepared to go” (55). For Lurie, the “preposterousness” of 
the committee’s divination echoes the “preposterousness” of the Communication’s 
handbook’s opening premise. Language, Lurie believes, by its very nature, dissimilates. It 
precisely fails to communicate thoughts, feelings and intentions. Only the autonomic 
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28 My italics 
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individual knows what s/he truly, authentically, means – what belies the overlarge and 
empty human soul. Lurie, in other words, might broadly be understood to be what 
Derrida would refer to as the engineer, that “theological idea”: a constructor of totalities – 
language, syntax, lexicon – and “the absolute origin of his own discourse… supposedly 
construct[ed] out of nothing” (Derrida 281). He self-immunizes with his refusal to be 
stuff for bricoleurs, disdaining his imbrications in historical narratives not of his own 
invention, refusing to be an element in a palimpsest the parts of which he does not 
himself control. The only ethical system that can incorporate his extreme individualism is 
a radical relativism, so much so, that any claim regarding his complicity in established 
historical abuses (“abuses,” is a word at which he balks), is also, without a hint of irony 
in his own understanding, to render him a victim of moralistic imposition.   
* * * 
In the late 1980s I ran around in a little gang on the playgrounds of my primary 
school. Often we adopted the characters of the A-Team. I fancied myself a babbling 
Howling Mad Murdoch. Incapable of sustaining nuanced narratives (although no more or 
less than the series creators, it now seems), our breaks [recesses] inevitably devolved into 
(mostly) play fight, mimed fist-swinging and head jolting and the rat-tat-tat of imaginary 
AK-47s. I remember screaming “Fucking kafirs!” and mowing down my white 
schoolmates with my assault rifle. “Take that, coons!” biting the pin out of a hand-
grenade and lobbing it into their midst.  
 I’m often told that I should not let these moments, and many others like it that I 
can recount, reflect on me too strongly. Such advice has become a refrain of my time in 
the United States where discomfort, I believe, is more often pathologized than utilized. I 
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say the United States, when, perhaps more accurately, it has been a refrain of the middle-
class in which I will spend my life, regardless of national context. You were a child, we 
were children, nobody chose to be raised (t)here, no one chose (y)our whiteness, let it go, 
get over it, get on with (y)our lives. I am by no means obsessive about my racism, but it 
has taken a long time for me not to feel defensive about it. I feel less guilty about that 
reprehensible language than I feel it necessary to be a responsible witness for the young 
boy who wielded it. It would be a betrayal of that boy and that wrongdoing to suggest 
that I was not my 12-year-old self in those moments. That child was the father of this 
man.   
* * * 
Of course, David Lurie’s expulsion from the University and his self-exiling to 
Lucy’s farm near Salem is the first in a series of events that, typical of Coetzee’s novels, 
mark the protagonist’s disintegration. The danger is to think of such processes as 
devolutions, as though the silent, asocial wisp of a human, Michael K, of whom the 
Medical Officer cannot make sense, or the strung-up, emasculated Magistrate of Waiting 
for the Barbarians, somehow reflect lesser versions of their former, more robust selves. 
Coetzee is a master of confronting and endangering the illusions that sustain his 
protagonists, be it K’s quiet sense of responsibility to others and their rules, the 
taxonomic certainty of the Medical Officer, the Magistrate’s sense of purpose and 
humaneness at the edge of Empire, or the lettered solipsism by which Lurie iterates his 
Enlightened, autonomic individualism.  
In Disgrace, Lurie exiles himself to Eastern Cape frontier country, Salem, to the 
small-holding his daughter Lucy shares with Petrus, amaXhosa man who buys portions of 
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the land with land grants provided by the new governmental dispensation as part of their 
economic redress program. Petrus, initially a farmhand, still helps Lucy with the dogs she 
kennels and the flowers she grows.  Not long after Lurie’s arrival, Lucy is brutally gang-
raped by three black men, as Lurie is beaten, locked in the bathroom and has his scalp 
burnt with the application of a match to metholated spirits. Lucy decides against reporting 
the event to the police, much to Lurie’s mystification: “Is it some private salvation you 
are trying to work? Do you hope to expiate the crimes of the past by suffering in the 
present?” he asks hers. “No. You keep misreading me,” she replies, “Guilt and salvation 
are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions. Until you make an effort to see that, I 
can’t help you” (112).  
Lucy becomes pregnant, and when it is revealed that one of her attackers, Pollux 
(himself, it is difficult to avoid the mythical allusion, born of rape), is known to Petrus, 
Lucy enters into a marriage with her former farmhand, describing it as an “alliance” or 
“deal:” “I contribute the land, in return for which I am allowed to creep in under his 
wing. Otherwise, he wants to remind me, I am without protection, I am fair game” (203). 
It would seem to be a reversal of contrapasso-like proportions: a man whose entitlements 
know no bounds, who exploits women of color without regard, who immunizes himself 
against criticism with practiced lettered-ness, is disfigured by fire and assault, and “loses” 
his own daughter to an inability to communicate with her, and (at least in his mind) to an 
historically oppressed denizen of Empire’s frontier. A man who refuses to hold himself 
accountable to history must watch as his daughter insists on doing so despite his pleas 
that she is on the brink of a “dangerous error. You wish to humble yourself before 
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history. But the road you follow is the wrong one. It will strip you of all honour; you will 
not be able to live with yourself” (160).  
Petrus is thus figured as the inheritor of Lurie’s privilege, and Lurie, in turn, as 
the inheritor of Petrus’ marginality. Spending time with Bev Shaw in the animal clinic 
ushering animals to their death and disposing of their remains, Lurie comes to inhabit the 
status Petrus does at their initial meeting. Lurie is now “the dog-man” (64, 146), a 
statement as much of caste or class –Lurie perceives of himself as “a harijan” – as it is of 
his growing sympathy and care for animals – “a dog psychopomp.” 
 His own language, held so dear as the medium of his prior performance of 
himself, becomes by his own recognition, inadequate to the task of representing his 
world. In the moments of the assault, it is the failed instrumentalism of the languages he 
knows that comes to mind: “He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French 
will not save him here in darkest Africa” (94) Later, Lurie muses:    
He would not mind hearing Petrus’s story one day, but preferably not 
reduced to English. More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit 
medium for the truth in South Africa. Stretches of English code whole 
sentences long have thickened, lost their articulations, their ariculateness, 
their articulatedness. Like a dinosaur expiring and settling in the mud, the 
language has stiffened. Pressed into the mould of English, Petrus’s story 
would come out arthritic, bygone. (117) 
So too must the other means by which Lurie sought to iterate himself, the chamber opera 
about Byron in Italy come to reflect his new reality. Neither elegiac, nor erotic, it has 
become comic, reduced to “cracked monotones” and the “plink-plunk-plonk” of the 
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banjos strings. “So this is art, he thinks,” in a momentary revelation, “and this is how it 
does its work! How strange! How fascinating!” (184-5). 
The novel focalizes Lurie as he shifts around the fulcrums of the assaults (his own 
of Melanie, that of Lucy), signaling the shift in his apprehension through various 
imbricated figurations: from his relationship with women (his seduction by/of Bev Shaw 
marks another reorientation, in which he, “without passion but without distaste...does his 
duty…[s]o that [she] can be pleased with herself” (150)), to his attitude towards animals, 
to his understanding of victimhood, to his appreciation of language, Romantic poets, art, 
and ultimately, himself. The complex negotiation of the protagonist with alterity is 
charted by the novel in a violently shifting historical context.   
Readers willing to concede that they identify with Lurie in any way – be it the go-
to “eloquence” of his “literary” or “critical” language, or the monadic solipsism sustained 
by it – are similarly confronted by the novels deconstruction of the protagonist through 
his encounters with alterity. Ideally this deconstruction does not merely strike such 
readers on an identificatory or emotional level. In its insistence on signaling its own 
literariness (literariness as a quality of form inherent to the text), the deconstruction also 
holds as part of a broader abstract critique. Literariness, the literary sensibility in the 
event of the reading, when responsibly exercised, accommodates this dialectical effect. 
 The ideal, of course, is not always the case. Indeed, Disgrace is a famously 
contentious novel in no small part because of the irresponsibility of many of its readers, 
and I include my own unaffected consumption of the novel as a Christmas gift as a prime 
if unremarkable example. More remarkable than such a facile reading, are those that 
appropriate Disgrace to the critic’s a priori stance, rather than allowing an encounter 
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with the text to endanger or challenge the positions and assumptions by which the critic 
habitually iterates him or herself. The novel, slippery and elusive though it is, has all-too-
frequently been appropriated as a means by which to reify particular historical, political, 
disciplinary, and ethical stances. Famously, in 2002, it was cited in the ANC’s oral 
submission to the South African Human Rights Commission Hearing on the Media cited 
Disgrace as representing white stereotypes of black men. “In this novel,” presented Jeff 
Radebe, Minister of Public Enterprises, “J.M. Coetzee represents as brutally as he can the 
white people’s perception of the post-apartheid black man” (cited in Lucy Valerie 
Graham 435). Graham astutely argues that as far as a theory of the novel is concerned, 
the ANC’s insistence on the direct referentiality and verisimilitude of the novel’s white 
characters in relation to real white people in South Africa is flawed, if for no other reason 
than that this theory renders “black rapists in Disgrace a[s] representative of most black 
people in South Africa, which is exactly what the ANC would like to refute” (Graham 
435).  
The novel has also been become imbricated in various discussions of animal 
rights. In such readings, Lurie’s growing sympathy with animals is indicative of the 
novel’s broader concern with the humane treatment of animals, a claim frequently 
bolstered by Coetzee’s famous essay, Lives of Animals. It is difficult to contend that 
Author J.M. Coetzee would disagree with such a reading. Regardless, it is profoundly 
reductive to claim the novel to this ethical purpose, as, for example, Cary Wolfe does in 
his introduction to Philosophy and Animal Life. Wolfe interprets the scene in which 
Lurie, having worked alongside Beth in the clinic, must pull over and weep, “his whole 
being gripped by what happens in the [surgical] theatre” (Wolfe 2, Coetzee 143), as an 
87!
!
amplification of Costello’s concerns in Lives of Animals. In his reading, Coetzee’s novel 
constitutes an intervention in “one of the central ethical issues of our time: our moral 
responsibility towards nonhuman animals” (Wolfe 3). Of course, certain aspects of the 
novel do lend themselves to a critique of animal treatment. Certainly, animals and Lurie’s 
growing identification with them constitute one of the novel’s central motifs. However, 
Wolfe’s reading elides the broader context within which Lurie breaks down, and, indeed, 
rests on the idea that Lurie really is gripped only by that which happens in the theatre. It 
assumes that the animals that are ushered to their death there, only represent animals. It 
might instead be argued that the signifier “animal” is so over-determined in the novel as 
to make impossible any such direct and easy referential gestures.  
The tendency among critics who wish to implicate the novel in such ethical 
arguments is, almost certainly out of rhetorical expediency, to highlight the manner in 
which animals are victims. Indeed, there is a litany of animal victims in the novel: sheep, 
dogs, goats “suffer from distempers, from broken limbs, from infected bites from mange, 
from neglect, benign or malign, from old age, from malnutrition, from intestinal 
parasites, but most of all from their own fertility. There are simply too many of them” 
(142). But these animals, the novel makes clear, are not merely animals. They are 
representative. Four pages later this is made clear: “[B]ecause we are too menny” is at 
once the scrawled justification for the death of children in Jude the Obscure and, without 
such literary allusiveness, perhaps the phonetic spelling of the phrase in a Kaaps dialect. 
Nor are the animals mere victims. Dogs have torn at the testicles of the goat in the Bev’s 
clinic, the goat itself seems the hobbled figuration of David Lurie, at once emasculated 
and a victim, even as it is representative of unfettered lust, elsewhere, as we have seen, 
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associated with the predatory. Indeed, Lurie has a tendency towards what Tom Herron 
calls “auto-zoomorphism:” (Herron 477) he is a fox holding a rabbit, “the worm in an 
apple” (Coetzee 37), and in a disdainful comment regarding the committee’s suggestion 
of his abuse, “a shark among the helpless little fishies” (53).  
We see, also, the novel appropriated to disciplinary causes. The clearest example 
of this is its appropriation to anti- and pro-Romantics Studies within the South African 
context. Margot Beard’s otherwise useful analysis is a response to claims of critics, such 
as Zoë Wicomb, that “Lurie may be rejected since he ‘looks to Europe as the center of 
reference,’” asserting that “‘our feelings and experiences of nature need not be structured 
by poetic discourses from the metropolis’” (Beard 59).29 Demonstrating the interplay and 
development of the Romantic Poets Wordsworth and Byron in the novel, she concludes 
that Disgrace “argues that Romanticism is not simply a Eurocentric throwback, 
something to be rejected out of hand in post-colonial South Africa” but that it “addresses 
the major proposition of Romanticism – the essential nature of the creative imagination 
which is our only way to enter the experience of another” (74)30.  
Clearly, however, the novel does constitute a disciplinary critique. It expressly 
implicates the Eurocentricity and anachronism of a literature professor, a Romantics 
scholar who works in a post-colonial South African context, in a dangerous 
instrumentalism. However, this critique precisely fails to take the form, as Beard claims, 
of an argument. The novel does not argue for or against a literary or disciplinary 
tradition. Rather, Beard constitutes an argument through the novel for a literary tradition 
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29 Beard quotes Wicomb, “Translations in the Yard of Africa.” Journal in literary Studies, 18. 3-4: 
209-33.  
 
30 My italics. 
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in which she is vested: she writes “[as] one whose research interests lie in the field of 
Romanticism” (Beard 59). And yet her vehement defense of her a priori situated-ness 
does little to convince that her discipline cannot, or for that matter, is not frequently 
coerced to immunize lettered solipsists from engaging their contexts with the ethical 
complexity they deserve. Instead, she claims Lurie’s artistic nascence in defense of 
Romanticism, even as the scene she describes, one of the novel’s last – Lurie, in the yard 
of the animals clinic, “plink-plunk squawk[ing]” (219) on the odd little banjo bought on 
the streets of KwaMashu (184) – occurs after Lurie is exiled from the academy, after 
Lucy’s rape, after his growing empathy with animals. We might agree with Beard that by 
this stage Lurie’ longing is no longer for a “triumphant return to society as the author of 
an eccentric little chamber opera,” (214) but that, echoing Keats’s nightingale, he hopes 
only to strike “a single authentic note of immortal longing.” But that single authentic note 
does not fall under the proprietorship of Romanticism as a field of study, or any single 
discipline, field, epoch, or genre. This proprietorship is an academic game,31 but not the 
game the novel plays.  
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31 Indeed, it is a game we see Beard play, which is nowhere more explicit than her pointedly italicized 
evisceration of Colleen M. Sheil’s 2003 article, “Opera, Byron and a South African Psyche in J.M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace” in a footnote:  
There are some disturbing errors in Sheil’s paper. The French Revolution was not 
‘proletariat-driven’ (2003, 41); Byron did not favour political and social 
egalitarianism” (2003, 41); Don Juan cannot be read as “a narrative of love” (2003, 
44). Sheil reads the lines from Lara as about Lucifer rather than about Lara seen 
briefly as comparable with Lucifer (2003, 42-3). Most disturbing is her complete 
misreading of the implications of the term cavaliere servente. This term is not 
equivalent to any modern sense of “servant” and to compare Byron’s status as a 
cavaliere servente to Teresa Guiccioli with Lurie’s role as “servant to the dogs” just 
does not make sense (2003,42). (Beard 75n) 
Clearer than Beard’s disagreement with Sheil’s representation of various political, historical and 
definitional assumptions is the relative claim she stakes to authority and control over the terms of the 
discussion. The tone constitutes an ontological claim: that she is a proper Romantics scholar, whereas 
Sheil is a peripheral dilettante.           
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Instead, the novel renders its critique, not conceptually, but in effect, should the 
reader be open to it. It requires a willingness to undergo the difficult and self-endangering 
process of identifying with and differentiating oneself from the protagonist – like Dr. 
Beard, a white, South African, Romantics scholar. It requires, also, the recognition that 
practitioners within the literary humanities constitute themselves through their 
professions, at least in part. The practitioners simultaneously constitute the field. To 
claim that the novel argues for Romanticism as a field of study is to deny that Lurie 
constitutes himself through the field (as has been shown), and that that field is susceptible 
to ethically suspect appropriations in contemporary post-colonial contexts. To argue, as 
Dr. Beard also does, that such unethical appropriation rests on systemic misreading is to 
suggest that the field itself it is beyond reproach and that its practitioners fail it. Clearly, 
her claim rests on a dualist conception of the relationship between the literary humanities 
and its practitioners. This is the very depersonalization that holds literary texts and 
disciplines separate from the lived experience of their readers and practitioners. Simply 
put, Disgrace is not vested in nor should its “message” be reduced to a particular 
disciplinary tradition. Indeed, to do so is to deflect the aesthetic effect of the novel onto 
merely disciplinary concerns. It is to avoid the work that literature also does upon the 
reader. It is to disengage Literariness. 
Here, in concluding our discussion of Disgrace, we might usefully return to what 
it is that literature, in Attridge’s and Barthes’s estimation achieves. Our evaluative 
engagement with the text, the moment in which literariness is activated in the event, is 
facilitated, at once by the plural points of access provided by the text and the singularity 
of the subject who encounters it.  The particular influence of the novel, the intensity and 
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urgency it invokes when I read it, bears this out. Whatever I think I come to know about 
its conceits and metaphors, its allegorical referent, the material reality to which it 
seemingly bears witness, is undone if not in the moment of the reading, then in 
subsequent readings. There is no comfort in fixity to be found in Disgrace. Then again, it 
is precisely this lack of fixity that is the comfort in Disgrace. No longer merely a 
perpetrator, but also a victim, Lurie responds to Melanie’s father’s admonition that God 
can lift him from his fallen stature, Lurie refuses the terms of this potential forgiveness:  
I will have to translate what you call God into my own terms. In my own 
terms, I am being punished for what happened between myself and your 
daughter. I am sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy 
to lift myself. It is not a punishment I have refused. I do not murmur 
against it. On the contrary, I am living it out from day to day, trying to 
accept disgrace as my state of being. Is it enough for God, do you think, 
that I live in disgrace without term? (172) 
Crucially, here, Lurie appeals to the present. Disgrace is a “state of being.” It constitutes 
an ontological claim as much as it does an admission on his part. Disgrace, it would 
seem, is to live without the comfort of a final word, the Logos. It is, in this regard, a 
denial of the Engineer’s myth. Disgrace, then, is a state of play, flux, of uncertainty in 
which the subject is accountable, first and foremost, to the present. Disgrace is to refuse 
simple categorical logic – as much that of the post-revolutionary order as before. In 
Lurie’s coming to terms with his disgrace, he seems also to come into his Literariness. 
Indeed, this is the state into which the novel formally invites the reader. From its 
narrator’s seemingly omniscient, third person, yet tightly focalized rendering of Lurie – 
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which plays that characters interiority off against his external representation – to its 
refusal of easy referents.32  
And yet it is difficult to render a critical account of this invitation. Take, for 
example, Michael Marais’s clear formal description of the affective nature of Coetzee’s 
prose in Foe: 
In precluding the possibility of a determinate reading, and thereby 
rendering the text’s meaning ateleological, the novel’s technique of 
misidentification attempts to fuel the reader’s desire to know. By divesting 
reading of an identificatory end, it seeks to stimulate an ateleological form 
of knowledge.  
My contention, then, is that the distance installed between reading 
subject and literary object by the latter’s divestiture of reading of an 
identificatory end may induce a form of proximity between reader and 
work that overcomes language’s conceptual separation of subject from 
object. In encountering an “appearance” of “distance,” that is, the absence 
of something determinate, the reader should sense the presence of  
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32 Subsequent to my completion of this chapter, I remembered reading David Attridge’s chapter, “Age 
of Bronze, State of Grace” in J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event. My 
reading of “Disgrace,” I realized, had been influenced by Attridge’s, even as, in the event of writing, 
his did not come explicitly to mind. The occasion of this footnote’s writing enacts yet another such a 
realization. The subtitle of this dissertation “Literature in the Event in South Africa and the United 
States” was derived, again without explicit recollection, nor any conscious attempt at allusion, from the 
subtitle of Attridge’s critical volume, The Singularity of Literature. Arguably, my debt to Attridge 
deserves more than a footnote. Certainly, my intention is not to sell him short by relegating him to 10-
point font. However, my oversight strikes me as a key example of the hold the myth of the Engineer 
has over me. It was a flawed memory rather than ill-intention, that had me believe I was the source of 
such insights and turns of phrase and this footnote is occasioned by the clear awareness that I am a 
bricoleur, even though I, perhaps driven by ego, frequently forget that I am. 
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something indeterminate, something which, in exceeding conceptuality, 
overcomes the separation between reading subject and literary object. 
       (Marais 242) 
As formally astute as Marais is, and as much as we might agree with his abstract 
understanding of the way the text affects its readership (and its readership the text), the 
very tone of the passage seems also to suggests a crucial deflection. A formal 
understanding of the text’s workings does not constitute Literariness. It does not imply 
openness to the work that the novel does upon its readers and its readers upon the novel.   
  The challenge of writing about Disgrace, as with others of Coetzee’s novels, is 
that it clearly implicates those who undertake literary criticism in historically and 
politically situated performances. The critic’s voice is a performance: our tones are 
practiced, our language and arguments are all-too-often conventional in obeisance to an 
audience that demands respect for methodological parameters. Disgrace, by asking us to 
identify and estrange ourselves from its academic protagonist, asks us to examine these 
performances. Who are we to write about literature? Why do we write about it? What do 
we hope to achieve with our observations and our opining? How do we situate ourselves 
in relation to the texts we read, the academy within which we operate, the worlds within 
which we have our being? What is our personal investment in the arguments we make?  
I contend that it is a disservice to the workings of Literariness, to the idea of 
literature, and to the value of literary endeavor to claim to answer these questions while 
simultaneously denying – explicitly or implicitly – that they are deeply and profoundly 
personal.  
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CHAPTER IV 
IN DEFENSE OF LITERARINESS:  
COUNTRY OF MY SKULL AND WHAT THE ACADEMICS SAY 
 
The greatest challenge of the South African revolution is in 
the search for new ways of thinking, ways of perception, that 
will help to break down the closed epistemological structures 
of South African oppression. The challenge is to free the entire 
social imagination of the oppressed from the laws of 
perception that have characterized apartheid society. For 
writers this means freeing the creative process itself from 
those very laws….The operative principle in post-protest 
literature is that it should…reveal new world where it was 
thought they did not exist, and reveal process and movement 
where they were hidden. 
 
- Njabulo Ndebele, “Beyond ‘Protest’” 
 
I have told many lies in this book about the truth. I have 
exploited many lives and many texts….I hope you will all 
understand.  
 
- Krog “Acknowledgments”  (SA294/US388) 
 
If Disgrace deploys Literariness against itself, takes Literariness as its object, it is 
also immunized against charges of misrepresentation because it is fiction. Disgrace is an 
allegory; certainly more directly referential of a specific history and context than many of 
Coetzee’s more explicitly abstruse endeavors, but an allegory nonetheless. Critics defend 
the novel as literary – as Lucy Graham does against the charges leveled by Jeff Radebe in 
the sitting of the South African Human Rights Commission Hearing. Holding any part of 
the text accountable as generally true to reality (as Radebe does the “racist white”), she 
suggests, means that all of its representations must be held to the same standard of 
verisimilitude (by which logic, young black men are rapists).  
For Antjie Krog’s semi-fictionalized memoir, Country of My Skull, however, the 
critical fault-lines run differently. It does, qualifiedly, claim to represent historical events 
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in rough chronological order. Krog’s text is based on her experiences as a radio reporter 
who follows the TRC’s various hearings between 1996 and 1998. In an effort to capture 
the jarring heterogeneity of voices that constituted the TRC, as well as the complexity of 
a white Afrikaans woman’s interpolation by survivors and perpetrators (Krog admits 
kinship with both), Country affects a tenuous stylistic (in)coherence. As Laura Moss 
writes, Krog destabilizes “generic expectations” so that it is “difficult to pinpoint Country 
of My Skull as mémoire, reportage, historiographic metafiction, autobiography, biofiction, 
or historical document” and, in so doing,  illustrates “the…fragmented subject[s]” 
precipitated by “forced separation of people and communities” (Moss 92). Indeed, Krog 
self-reflexively invokes this heterogeneous clamor of voices and genres through a literary 
praxis she refers to as “quilting.” In response to a fellow reporter’s charge that her 
account of a TRC journalism workshop is not true to the events, Krog responds, “I am 
busy with the truth…my truth. Of course it’s quilted together from hundreds of stories 
that we’ve experienced or heard about in the past two years. Seen from my perspective, 
shaped by my state of mind at the time and now also by the audience I’m telling the story 
to” (Krog SA170-171/US225). As a metaphor, “quilting” preempts Leon De Kock’s 2001 
argument for “seams” as an apposite concept for the irresolvable if entangled 
heterogeneities of South Africa’s socio-cultural and literary composition. Even if minute, 
the sutures of the quilt’s seam remain visible, scarring as they constitute the point of 
contact between the separate and the different.33  
What is at stake in the text and the TRC is not merely a metaphor that rives and 
coheres a nascent national discourse and/or identity, but also the aesthetic lens that rives 
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33 I differ from Ashley Harris with regard to the visibility of the seams upon the “quilt.” For her, 
quilting is an inappropriate methodology precisely because it obscures the seam. I will engage her 
argument in more detail in both this chapter and its addendum. 
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and coheres the Literary subject, Antjie Krog and her various figurations (which we will 
engage further) in the text. It is her truth, her state of mind. Notably, the quilted “truths” 
are not complete, finished, or intransigent in her conception. It is subject not only to the 
“at the time” of the past, but also to the present, to the “now.” Quilting, in other words, 
suggests the present participle. It is an immanent undertaking, an editorializing, 
responsive sensibility. It suggests Literariness: the aesthetic and linguistic negotiation 
between the subject and the world in which they have their being.   
Critical responses to Country of My Skull, however, often circumvent the 
immanence of the processes that abstractly engages and affects in its readers – those to 
whom the “quilted truth” is being told, and who thus enter into a reciprocal relationship 
with it. Indeed, many critical readings of the memoir take issue with the its 
historiographical shortcomings, claiming that it fails as a record of events, that it 
appropriates, exploits, decontextualizes, and editorializes the events of the TRC, with 
particular spleen directed at its use of victim testimonies. The problem for such critics, 
invariably, is the way in which Krog redirects the live events of the TRC into an archival 
document that ultimately defers to the white, privileged subject, Antjie Krog. Taiwo 
Adetunji Osinubi neatly summarizes these charges: “As critics run up a list of Krog’s 
failures, they repeatedly point to her use of victims’ testimonies as building blocks for a 
postmodern collage in which she shuns factual analyses of the moment and afterlives of 
human rights violations for the sake of impressionistic vignettes that convey her pained 
reactions to narratives of physical and psychological violence” (Osinubi 109). Perhaps 
the most measured and convincing of these arguments is rendered by Laura Moss in 
“‘Nice Audible Cryings’: Editions, Testimonies, and Country of My Skull.” Moss does 
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not center the brunt of her critique on the original South African edition of Country, 
which she nevertheless “gently criticize[s] for both privileging the narrator’s responses 
over the stories told in the testimonies themselves and for turning individual’s stories into 
allegories of the nation” (Moss 99). Rather, she focuses on the excised U.S. Edition, 
Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South 
Africa, which she argues backgrounds the literary conceits of the text in favor of a more 
historiographical or critical affect. In so doing, Moss somewhat backhandedly infers that 
Krog is complicit in the neo-liberal exploitation of the apartheid survivor testimonies:  
In excising some of the ambiguity of the narrators’ voices, in further decontextualizing 
the evidence, and in its textual reconfiguration for a global audience, the revised edition 
loses too much. If, as Krog claims, as a reporter it is necessary to distill and compress 
testimonies in order to be heard and absorbed by a South African public that is either 
passively uninterested or actively disbelieving, it is even more important to extend and 
situate both testimonies and personal responses to testimonies beyond the “essence of the 
Commission” for a global audience that has proved itself eager, in turning Country of My 
Skull into a runaway success, to engage in the consumption of the history-making process 
of the TRC. 
 Moss’s disaffection with the revised edition would seem a confirmation of Sarah 
Ruden’s fears, expressed in her 1999 review article, regarding the inaccessibility of the 
South African edition to foreign readers, who, she claims, “cannot know what is going 
on” as decontextualized voices, “quoted at lengths far beyond the scope of [Krog’s] 
commentary….communicate less the more space they occupy” (Ruden 172). By Moss’s 
logic, Ruden’s hopes for a “more forthcoming” North American revision (then still in the 
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works), have not been fulfilled. Ruden’s is a fierce evisceration of the South African 
edition of Country which (in ways merely echoed by Moss) accuses Krog of exploiting 
illiterate survivors and skimping over detailed research and analysis in order “to get a 
book out while the TRC was still in open session and public opinion was still 
engaged…Krog did not take the necessary time” (168). In what Ruden perceives as the 
text’s insistence on temporal exigency, it repeats egregious short cuts perpetrated by the 
TRC in its endeavor to constitute a post-apartheid national narrative.  
Krog will find defenders to argue that the mimetic nature of her work is 
appropriate: what is fragmented and uncertain in life should be similar in 
literature. The ideological premise is that structure is hegemonic and 
oppresses. As the TRC shed structures from the judicial process in order to 
open it to more people, Krog’s book has loose structures that do not imply 
authoritative judgment about meaning. The doing away with boundaries – 
of convention, of law, of taste – has for unmysterious reasons become a 
crusade in post-apartheid South Africa. But rather than opening up justice 
for the poor and illiterate and disenfranchised, the TRC may have 
trivialized their plights by opening what was in effect a judicial discount 
store. Krog in her rendering may have reduced the victims (and perhaps 
even the perpetrators) to literary figurines purchases in that store.  
(Ruden 171) 
The crux of Ruden’s argument, then, is that Krog treats survivor’s accounts as “literary 
work[s] rather than as a public document so no journalistic license is likely to apply.” 
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Country lacks method, structure, consistency, and “nearly always shrinks away from 
exposition and conclusion” (169).  
 Ruden thus reveals distaste for “autobiographical literature of human rights” that 
reveals the writer in process. This is nowhere more evident than in her ambivalent 
relationship with temporal contingency, or “immediacy.” Krog fails because she does not 
properly synthesize the “unprocessed material” (168) presented before and by the TRC. If 
Ruden was herself “stunned by the [TRC’s] succession of short summaries alone, and 
unable to say what they might mean for the nation or myself as a resident,” then this 
immediate response has a limited place in subsequent accounts. On the one hand, she 
suggests, the “freshness” and “boldness” of some scenes would be lost in “more worked-
over prose” which would have “emptied Krog’s observation[s] of [their] 
immediacy….immediacy is the great strength of the book” (168-9). On the other hand, 
and herein lies the crux of her dislike for Krog’s memoir, “in a book on this subject, such 
immediacy can be disturbing” because it refuses “synthesis”. This refusal, in turn, renders 
stories told before the Commission as less than true “because they have no background or 
beginnings or endings, which we hold, consciously or unconsciously, as markers of real 
experience: our individual lives are real to us because we know them in a sort of 
wholeness” (169). Synthesis, Ruden claims, derives from “years of research and writing” 
(168) citing Riaan Malan’s My Traitor’s Heart as the unsentimental and not over-
simplified autobiographical foil to Krog’s in which there is “too little that is shaped, too 
little of a story.”  
 The purpose of this discussion is not to be, as Ruden would interpolate me, a 
defender of Antjie Krog, although I readily concede being an admirer of Country and 
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other of her works. Rather, I want to defend Literariness as an immanent principle, one 
that perpetually fragments and reconstitutes the reading / writing / speaking / learning / 
teaching subject. And while we can appreciate the carefully shaped and storied 
literariness of the archival text, we need not fetishize “synthesis” as the inevitable 
experiential outcome of our readings. I would argue that it is, ironically, critics like Moss 
and Ruden who implicate themselves in a bourgeois fantasy in which the literary, 
autobiographical, journalistic or historiographical product is always to be privileged over 
the immediacy of its production. If Country is unfinished, and this is an arguable 
assertion, then its value lies precisely in its jarring against the expectation that it be 
otherwise, especially with regard to its subject matter. Perforce, it breaks apart the 
categorical logic by which the engineer privileges her universalizing vision, and 
perpetuates the myth that the edifice she has built can easily accommodate the whole 
gamut of human experience.     
 In taking Literariness as its partial object, Country does not so much privilege the 
writer-narrator, as fragment her. In refusing synthesis, even as it evinces what Ashleigh 
Harris calls the “urge towards coherence,” Country enacts that dialectic within the reader. 
In it, embodiment, immanence, violently irrupts through the narrative and argumentative 
forms from which readers might otherwise derive comfort. It fractures the stability of 
interpretive stances. In this way it is viscerally at odds with the epistemological 
assumptions that engender much literary criticism. It is hardly surprising, as I shall argue 
in the addendum to this chapter, that the critical firestorm that engulfed Krog and 
Country in South Africa in 2006, eight years after its initial publication, centered on a 
defense of academic integrity. It is not my intention to suggest that Literariness is a 
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counter to academic practice, but that it is an aspect of literary encounters that such 
practices often deflect, circumvent, or openly revile.  
* * * 
Researching, I look online for footage of Nomonde Calata’s testimony on the 
opening day of the Human Rights Violation Hearings in East London on April 16, 1996. 
Calata famously broke down while telling the story of her husband’s abduction and 
murder on the Oliphant’s Pass between Port Elizabeth and Cradock. Fort Calata was a 
member of the Cradock Four, anti-apartheid activists, all of whom were assassinated by 
apartheid security police. She was one of the four widows whose testimonies where 
“showcased” on that first day – I agree with Moss regarding the spectacular nature of the 
event. Matthews Goniwe’s widow, Nyameka Goniwe, recounted the events surrounding 
her husband’s death. Sindiswe Mkhonto represented her husband, Sparrow.  
Numbuyiselo Mhlauli and her daughter Babalwa spoke of the death of Cicelo Mhlauli.  
I remember only Nomonde Calata’s scream. Or maybe I don’t. I was twenty at the 
time and would have watched the live hearings in the common room of my dorm at 
Rhodes University, eighty miles away from the Hearings. Nevertheless, it is a moment of 
which I must remind myself, for research purposes.  
It is frequently cited as a pivotal moment in the TRC’s emergence into the South 
African national consciousness. In his memoir, No Peace Without Forgiveness, Desmond 
Tutu calls it “the defining sound of the TRC – as a place where people could come to cry, 
to open their hearts, to expose the anguish that remained locked up for so long, 
unacknowledged, ignored, and denied” (Tutu 148). In A Country Unmasked, Alex 
Boraine, the TRC’s deputy chairperson refers to it as a  
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primeval and spontaneous wail from the depths of her soul….that 
transformed the hearings from a litany of suffering and pain to an even 
deeper level. It caught up in a single howl all the darkness and horror of 
the apartheid years. It was as if she enshrined in the throwing back of her 
body and letting out the cry the collective horror of the thousands of 
people who had been trapped in racism and oppression for so long.  
        (Boraine 102) 
Boraine defers to Country of My Skull’s rendering, suggesting it conveys Krog’s 
sentiments, even though she puts the words in the mouth of Professor Kondlo, a 
composite character, an academic, a Xhosa intellectual from Grahamstown, who wants to 
write a graphic novel, “a comic,” about “the tale of Nomonde Calata” called “The 
Contestation of Spaces” (Krog SA37/US51). Krog interweaves excerpts from Calata’s 
testimony with Nkondlo’s appropriative, analytical responses, rendered in the informal 
setting of drinks “in the sultry eastern Cape Midnight.”  
According to her testimony, Nomonde Calata saw the photograph of the Cradock 
Four’s burnt-out vehicle on the front page of the Herald and, only twenty at the time, 
“couldn’t handle this.” She sought solace with Nyameka Goniwe, or Nyami, who “was 
crying terribly…it affected me also…” Calata breaks down before the Commission. 
Professor Kondlo says:  “For me, this crying is the beginning of the Truth Commission – 
the signature tune, the definitive moment, the ultimate sound of what the process is about. 
She was wearing this vivid orange-red dress, and she threw herself backward and that 
sound…that sound…it will haunt me for ever and ever”(Krog SA42/US57).  Boraine’s 
quotation ends here, but in Country of My Skull, Professor Kondlo continues:  
103!
!
It’s significant that she began to cry when she remembered how Nyameka 
Goniwe was crying when she arrived at the Goniwe’s house. The 
academics say pain destroys language and that this brings about an 
immediate reversion to a prelinguistic state – and to witness that cry was 
to witness the destruction of language…was to realize that to remember 
the past of this country is to be thrown back into a time before language. 
And to get that memory, to fix it in words, to capture it with the precise 
image, is to be present at the birth of language itself. But more practically, 
this particular memory at last captured in words can no longer haunt you, 
push you around, bewilder you, because you have taken control of it – you 
can move it wherever you want to. So maybe that is what the commission 
is about – finding words for that cry of Nomonde Calata.  
(SA 42-3/US57)34  
I will return in due course to the significance of Professor Kondlo and his invocation of 
“the academics.” The crux of Lauren Moss’s “gentle criticism” of Country of My Skull is 
focused on its deployment of Nomonde Calata’s testimony. Already decontextualized, 
she argues, Krog’s excisions of Calata’s words renders them as “sound bites” that 
undermine “the ordinariness of the victim’s story” (Moss 97). Even if self-reflexive, she 
suggests, the appropriation of the testimony into an extended metaphor of mourning 
implicates Krog in the simplification or objectification of Calata. In an effort to assert the 
multivalent nature of Calata’s testimony, Moss refers readers to HRVR and Calata’s quiet 
and pragmatic determination in worrying about the financial strain her husband’s death 
put on her family, worries about eviction, about shoes for her children (96). According to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 My italics. 
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Moss, Krog fails (or at least errs) in her representation of Nomonde Calata’s testimony 
insofar as she did not invoke it literally, true to the event itself, with all due respect to the 
meaning behind Nomonde Calata’s original words.35 Literariness, in this scheme, is akin 
to inappropriately frivolous falsehood. 
 Nevertheless, Moss’s argument takes hold. I have to concede that if I remember 
Nomonde Calata’s testimony at all, I remember only her scream. I want to know what she 
said, how she said it, how the Commission responded, just then, at that moment. I find 
the transcripts and read them, but the archival footage is exclusively held by the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation and the National Archives (and then in disarray by 
Catherine Cole’s report) (Cole 189-190n). No such archive exists in the United States. I 
do, however, find snippets of the opening HRVH embedded in the first episode of Truth 
Commission Special Report, a news program directed by journalist Max Du Preez, that 
sought to compact the weekly events of the TRC into one hour Sunday evening.36  
 Within the TRC Special Report, the murders of the Cradock Four are situated 
within the broader narrative of the crimes against humanity committed under the Eastern 
Cape reign of terror by Security Police Officer Colonel Gideon Nieuwoudt, who also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Moss again echoes Ruden’s more strident criticism of Country, in particular, the latter’s critique of 
Chapter 18, in which Krog renders the testimony of Lekotse, the shepherd, verbatim, but arranged as 
verse (SA 210-216/US 278-285). Ruden berates Krog for her attribution practices, “Why only one 
name? I never met a South African who didn’t have a surname; the only thing apartheid reliably 
supplied to the poor was bureaucracy” (Ruden 171).  She takes issue with Krog’s “textual and critical 
highjinks,” foreshadowed by the testimony’s “rather precious Chaucerian title.” She takes great offense 
on Lekotse’s behalf that Krog subjects his testimony to “the worst application of forty-year-old 
[Jungian and Structuralist] literary theory” (175). “It’s hard to imagine such frivolous treatment of a 
European survivor of a pogrom” (173), she injudiciously and unqualifiedly charges. “What would 
Lekotse say if he could read the passage? He might try angry assertion: ‘I say I was a shepherd because 
I was one. The door existed and exists. I call the police jackals because they destroy life and 
livelihood. I mention dogs because there were dogs there.’” 
 
36 The digitized collection is accessible via streaming video, as digitized by the Yale Law School 
Lillian Goldman Library at http://trc.law.yale.edu/view_all_requests.asp. The segment to do with the 
murder of the Cradock Four and the testimony of their relatives is in the episode aired on 21 April 
1996 (15.00 – 20.34). 
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took part in the assassination of Steve Biko and the Pepco Three. Du Preez, against the 
backdrop of a television studio control room, provides this context as the segment begins. 
A jump cut to Nyamake Goniwe’s testimony. She faces the camera against the backdrop 
of an audience. Or, she faces the commission behind whom the camera is set, certainly 
not an accidental point of view. The audience at home is asked to watch, listen, and 
empathize with the commissioners. The hand of a counselor rests on Goniwe’s shoulder. 
She reads with methodical restraint through a carefully prepared factual account in 
English. This is followed by a jump cut to archival footage of 1986 funeral of the 
Cradock Four, itself contained within a 1992 episode of the journalistic program Agenda, 
in which the revelation of the Security Police involvement of the Cradock Four’s 
assassination is covered. Max Du Preez’s voiceover contextualizes these events, detailing 
high-level governmental sanctions of the crime, panning down the front page City Press 
headline that exposed the regime’s machinations. Another jump cut.  Nomonde Calata 
gesticulates with a Kleenex in her hand, overwrought before the commission. She is 
speaking in amaXhosa which is heard only faintly – so too the beginning of her cry – 
beneath the English translation of her words and Max Du Preez’s voiceover (“The 
Commission had to adjourn for a while when Mrs. Calata broke down during her 
testimony”). She throws herself back, both hands to her face. Two counselors on either 
side rise to her aid. The translator, one sentence behind, finishes the last one, “and this 
affected me also…” before the full-throated weight of Nomonde Calata’s grief is heard. 
Its pitch overwhelms the sound settings of the microphone. A jump cut to Sindiswe 
Mkhonto’s testimony, which is translated as a determined call for the exposition, 
prosecution, and accountability of her husband’s murderers. More archival footage, 
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narrated by Du Preez (“And this was when Colonel Gideon Nieuwoudt’s name came up 
again”), of Nieuwoudt leaving a magistrate’s office. Numbuyiselo Mhlauli then speaks 
about burying her husband’s body without his hand, which was cut off by the assassins. 
“We want that hand,” the Afrikaans accented female translator renders her words, as 
Mhlauli recounts hearing that that it was being kept at the Louis La Grange Police Station 
in Port Elizabeth. A cut to Fezile Madoda Jacobs’ testimony, translated, in which he 
recounts seeing the hand in a jar with a  watery substance, in the presence of police 
operatives Hattingh and Niewoudt. A jump cut to Max Du Preez. “Torture,” he says, as 
an irruptive segue, “How many times have you heard stories of South Africans who said 
they were tortured? And did you believe them? Well, this week, the truth commissioners 
and the public had no doubts as they sat in silent anguish listening to testimonies of 
horror.” A new segment begins.   
 For better or worse, Truth Commission Special Report does not linger on 
Nomonde Calata’s testimony. It is, if anything reduced to that scream, and, in the 
process, so is she. And yet her effect is hardly minimized. She jars against the journalistic 
editorial narrativization of the Nieuwoudt arc. She is the countermand to synthesis, 
forcing an adjournment on the HRVH’s carefully wrought process, irrupting, ever so 
slightly after the fact, the interpreter’s attempts to translate her words from amaXhosa to 
English. “The academics say,” so Professor Khondlo suggests, “that pain destroys 
language and that this brings about an immediate reversion to a prelinguistic state.” And 
indeed, even without reference to the particularities of Calata’s testimony, it is evident in 
the Truth Commission Special Report’s handling of the scream. Semianalysis comes to 
mind: the body’s chaotic fluctuations, associated in Kristeva’s scheme with the mother 
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and as-yet-undifferentiated infant, endangers and thus requires the strictures of the 
patriarchal symbolic order, the realm of grammar, syntax, logic, law. The woman, the 
mother, and the consoling hands of the female counselors behind her, stop the signifying 
process. Calata can no longer speak. Du Preez is silenced. So is the interpreter. So is the 
HRVH. I too am stunned. I replay and replay the segment.   
But even the “order” that surrounds Calata’s scream cannot be synthesized, 
especially after the fact. The broadcast preempts and continues after the moment, so do 
the HRVHs. That said, between the journalistic editorializing, the voiceovers, the 
archival footage, the invocation of print journalism, the assiduous reading in English of 
Goniwe, the translations, the scream of Calata, the determined righteousness of Mkhonto, 
the image of Nieuwoudt, the wronged bereavement of Mhlauli, the corroborative 
testimony of Jacobs, the Truth Commission Special Report invokes nothing so much as a 
complex rhizome of irresolvable discourses and performances. After the fact, there is no 
single shape or story. There is only remediation. 
But another fact remains: bodies remediate, and do so immanently. In this sense, I 
differ from Taiwo Adetunji Osinubi, who, more sympathetic than Moss or Ruden, 
addresses the influence on Country of radio reportage, and particularly the deployment of 
non-verbal sounds. He points out that Krog’s rendering of Calata’s testimony mimics the 
complex rhizome (even if his rendering of Professor Kondlo as “a friend” is strictly 
inaccurate):  
In reproducing the conversation with the friend, complete with the crude 
attempts at analyzing the meaning of the scream, Krog certainly runs the 
risk of objectifying victims. Yet that scream was already commodified the 
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moment it passed into public imagination through the technologies of 
radio and television transmission. As Krog shows, the exigencies of radio 
journalism required that sounds be treated as raw material for a 
transmission loop. In the midst of such journalistic practices, the 
testimonies matter less as individual transmissions. Rather, their iterations 
create a “web of infinite sorrow” [(Krog SA32/US45)].  
(Osinubi 119) 
Osinubi defends Krog by justifying her “objectification” of victims as a requirement of 
journalistic exigencies. I resist the suggestion that public remediation necessarily renders 
individual transmissions such as survivor testimonies as “commodities,” or as “raw 
materials” that, technologically extracted from the privileged site of initial immanent 
iteration, matter less.  
This evaluative logic defers to the idea that remediated events are merely archival 
objects – as radio recordings, or transcriptions, or mere texts. In this regard, Osinubi errs 
too far in countering Moss and Ruden’s insistence on the privileged literalness of the 
original event.    
As a practice, Literariness requires reading / speaking / writing / teaching / 
learning subjects to negotiate between the “individual transmission” and the “web of 
infinite sorrow.” The ethical responsibility of the practitioners resides in the idea that 
their own responses (subjective iterations in and of themselves) are incorporated into that 
larger web. In this regard, the literalness of the original iteration (the event of the 
testimony) is insufficient as a gauge of the effectiveness of its remediation because it 
holds the reader / writer / speaker / teacher / learner to an unattainable and cold standard 
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of objectivity. It is also problematic to hold to the idea that remediations are untethered 
from the original event (that they are merely archival objects) because it runs counter to 
the crucial status of immediacy and thus history) as an aspect of encounters with texts 
and performances. Though we may not have been present in East London on April 16, 
1996, Nomonde Calata’s testimony, or parts of it, still happens to us.      
* * * 
Only in the context of a critical argument would I feel the need to confess that I 
find it very difficult to write about Country of My Skull. Other critical essays help 
somewhat, but their arguments must fight another effect. 
I am shocked beyond words that anyone, kept naked for 10 days by her male 
captors, should feel the need to fight indignity by fashioning underwear out of a plastic 
shopping bag – a bag that had survived her body’s decomposition when it was exhumed 
(Krog SA128/US167-168). Or that some even thought to slam the dangling breasts of 
Ntombizanele Elsie Zingxodo in a desk’s drawers (SA113-114/US148-9), or to force 
people into tyres, douse them in petrol, and set them alight (SA34-5/US48-50). Or that 
white men drank beer and barbequed next to the fire on which they burned the bodies of 
black activists they had murdered (SA60-61/US 80).   
I understand that these stories are decontextualized, that they operate as violent 
puncta that overwhelm the countless banal ways in which Apartheid was perpetuated. 
They situate apartheid in a realm beyond my immediate grasp, outside my race and class 
privilege, away from the insidious normality my childhood conferred on black domestic 
workers and gardeners. I understand that such comparative banalities need to be 
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addressed with as much fervor and nuance. But when I read Country of My Skull, the 
horror of that other world is unavoidable.    
I do the best I can.  
I invoke Ndebele, Krog, Ruden, De Kock, Moss, Osinubi, Sanders, Watson, 
Harris, Attridge, Derrida, Barthes, Hughes, Scarry and so forth and so on but I write 
against myself or just fail to write at all or fixate on single sentences or lie in my dim 
bedroom watching romantic comedies to escape the clamor in my skull that I’m too lazy 
too stupid too selfish or indulgent too rational too hysterical too white too guilty too 
calloused too far away too close too whatever reason I can find to justify my uselessness.  
I understand differently now Adorno’s injunction after the Holocaust, and Krog’s 
in Country: “No poetry should come forth from this. May my hands fall off if I write this. 
// So I sit around. Naturally and unnaturally without words. Stunned by the knowledge of 
the price people have paid for their words. If I write this, I exploit and betray. If I don’t, I 
die.” (SA49/US66). I struggle not because all words fail in the face of actual brutality and 
in so doing betray its survivors. I don’t believe they fail, or choose not to because that 
would be too dark altogether. But words do very, very little, and always too late. 
And so I do my damndest to do that which I can do right, but it is difficult and 
disallow myself even the briefest swells of delight at success because they, rather than the 
undertaking itself, feel like a betrayal.  
* * * 
Professor Kondlo, himself an academic, invokes academics abstractly: “the 
academics say that…”. This explicit invocation is at once a claim to the expertise of an 
academic and, in its formulation, something of a distantiation. Arguably, this 
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ambivalence is, or should be, a sustaining hallmark of academic practice. Theoretical and 
methodological innovation demands awareness and transgression of disciplinary 
parameters, just as the infant must see herself, that is recognize the outward limits of her 
body, in order to distinguish herself from the hitherto undifferentiated organism within 
which she was a mere function. Language, a shared system of meaning, is necessitated 
only by virtue of subjective division. Professor Kondlo, as Krog writes him, is stunned by 
a break in that shared system, at once represented by Nomonde Calata’s embodied cry, 
and his own ellipsis-inflected attempt to invoke it: “that sound…that sound…it will haunt 
me for ever and ever.” His invocation of “the academics,” then, reflects his desire to 
bring order to the chaos of the event. Implicitly, he recognizes their function as 
significatory: the memory of trauma must be “captured in words” so “control” can be 
taken. And yet, despite this desire for a “practical” outcome, Professor Kondlo does not 
dispel the “haunting” of “that sound.”  
The bifurcated nature of Professor Kondlo’s iteration – the simultaneous claim to 
and distantiation from the status “academic” – marks nothing so much as the recognition 
that the synthesis and order “academics” strive towards will perpetually war with the 
volatility of subjective experience – exigencies that pertain as much to academics as they 
do to the remediations of experiences they attempt to understand. “Finding words for that 
cry,” then, suggests the non-eschatological archeological undertaking of the bricoleur.   
 “The academics say” is a phrase that functions as an infrequent motif in Country 
of My Skull. At least, it occurred frequently enough that I found myself noticing it, often 
because I found myself wondering precisely who these academics were. Deployed un-
reflexively, this strategy stands the risk of homogenizing academics and academic 
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endeavor (as suggested by the definite article that precedes their invocation). 
Additionally, the effect of the motif is to summon the “status” of academic endeavor. 
Academic thinking and language, in this regard, serves to bring abstraction to what 
otherwise is immediate and stultifying – hence, professor Kondlo remediates Nomonde 
Calata’s testimony through a graphic mode that serves, also, as a critical interrogation of 
its themes and motifs, subjecting it to cultural, gender, economic, historiographical, 
literary and psychological concepts. While never explicitly stated, the graphic element of 
the undertaking situates it as much as an accessible pedagogical undertaking as an 
evocatively artistic one. Academic remediation, in other words, serves to elucidate and 
nuance experience. Inevitably associated with the stratification of the academic 
institution, this pedagogical remediation claims a heightened authority. In addition, 
perhaps even oppositionally, Krog’s “the academics say” motif – and its deployment 
within the context of a personal conversation between two people processing the event of 
witnessing – in effect blurs the differential status of academic endeavor. It thus begs the 
questions, what, particularly is academic thought?    
Krog seems well aware that the manner of this deployment risks perpetrating 
pedagogical paternalism and, more dangerously, the displacement of immanent 
experience. This is explicitly her worry in a later chapter in which she analyses two 
testimonies given by applicants to the amnesty committee, a novelistic re-imagining, and 
a media report about the 1987 murders of Richard Mutase, a Bophuthatswana policeman, 
and his wife, Irene Mutase. Richard Mutase had put in claims against both a white 
“superior” who had burst his eardrum in an altercation, and  the Minister of Law and 
Order. In response to these various accounts, Krog’s narrator (an unspecified figuration 
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of Krog) asks herself, “what is narrative?” She quotes Barthes: “Narrative does not show, 
does not intimate…[Its] function is not to represent, it is to constitute a spectacle.” And 
asks, “Does this mean that the narratives about the Mutase killings are not true but simply 
spectacles for an occasion? And the occasion happens to be amnesty?” (SA82/US103).  
She intersperses the various narratives with her own account of a fire that swept through 
the journalist facilities and documents room of the municipal building in which the 
hearings were being held, ultimately deferring back to “the stories….How they 
correspond. How they differ. The stylistic traits of oral narrative…” (SA87/US110).  
She draws her comparative methodology from “the academics:” “Oral narratives, 
the academics say, are driven by remembered core phrases and images that carry the 
distillation of the entire story. From these cores the action, the characters, the conclusions 
all unfold. And though the narratives may differ in the information they bear, the core 
elements stay the same. They overlap” (SA88/US111). Noting and detailing how the 
accounts by amnesty applicants Joe Mamasela and Jacques Hechter vary, with particular 
reference to the way the Mutase’s bed pillows feature in each, she settles on the 
realization that the versions differ “on the question of accountability.” She breaks 
suddenly in her undertaking, explicitly invoking the ambivalence towards the status of 
academic practice that remains largely implicit in Professor Nkondlo’s bifurcated 
iteration: 
‘Hang on a second,’ a disparaging voice pipes up in my head. 
‘What is the point of all this “textual reading”? You’re just neutralizing 
the story of the death of Richard and Irene Mutase. You’re wrenching the 
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heart out of the horror. You can live comfortably with the details, once 
they’ve acquired no more than academic relevance.’   
But I argue back. ‘The things revealed by such a reading aren’t 
academic at all. What’s “”academic” about the attempt by everyone 
involved to avoid responsibility?’ 
‘Take this thing about the pillow, then. “Here’s the motif, class.” 
It’s just a literary trick.’ 
“But doesn’t it bring something important to the surface? The 
image of the Mutases, butchered under soft pillows and fluffy blankets, 
says so much about the brutality of the crime. And at the same time it 
explodes a whole series of clichés – like the white fear of being killed in 
your bed, or the idea of living with your head in the clouds – under a 
sweetly scented pillow.’ (SA88-89/US112) 
From this internal monologue, Krog shifts to the second person, qualifying “The Truth” 
that she suggests must be taken out of these “versions of truth.” This direct address of the 
reader interpolates them as perceiving subjects who, like Hechter and Mamasela, 
potentially render “truths” that are convenient rather than factual: “If you believe in your 
own version, your own lie – because as narrators we all give ourselves permission to 
believe our own versions – how can it be said that you are being misleading? To what 
extent can you bring yourself not to know what you know? Eventually, it is not the lie 
that matters, but that mechanism in yourself that allows you to accept distortions” 
(SA89/US112). 
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The distinction between “the lie” and “the mechanism” is crucial. If the former 
suggests a reified or sedimented version of events (akin, in this regard, to the transcribed 
oral testimonies she examines), then the latter, the mechanism, suggests a perpetually 
functioning  epistemological machine (at once implicit to and constitutive of the subject), 
replete with moving parts, changeable, by which such “lies” are filtered, reconstituted, 
falsified and/or deemed acceptable. It is at once an interpretive and iterative machine. In 
this regard the bifurcation between the “the academic” and, say, “the empathetic,” 
invoked by Krog through her own ambivalence and that of Professor Kondlo, suggests 
nothing so much as two differential settings of that internal technology.     
Indeed, I would contend that the formal (or formless) construction of Country of 
My Skull, which Ruden lambasts as shapeless, unfinished, and un-synthesized, functions 
to agitate the reader’s internal mechanism. This is not only evident in the various generic 
conventions of which the text is constituted (remember Moss’s suggestion that it is 
difficult to pin Country down as mémoire, reportage, historiographic metafiction, 
autobiography, biofiction, or historical document) (Moss 92), each of which requires a 
different interpretive and iterative lens. It is also modeled by Krog through her various 
versions of herself – a formal practice that destabilizes the author figure to the point that 
she cannot be interpolated as a stable guarantor of the text’s significance. She is “Antjie 
Samuels” (her married name) the journalist, “Antjie Krog” (her maiden name, also 
evocative of her Afrikaner heritage) the poet, a generic “Antjie” who is both and neither 
(as suggested by the extramarital affair she fictionalizes within the text, and through 
which she engages questions of guilt, shame, and complicity), and she is interpolated as 
Antjie Somers by a piece of hate mail: 
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Ou Antjie Somers, 
Geniet jy nog die aanklagte en Swartsmeerdery van die 
Afrikaners? Is jy nog by jou man of het jy nou ‘n hotnot, ‘n mede 
wapendraer in jou stryd teen die Nasionale Party waarvan jou pa so ‘n 
getroue ondersteuner is/was? 
       K.K.K  
[Old Antjie Somers, 
Are you still enjoying the accusations and besmirching37 of the 
Afrikaners? Are you still with your husband or have you found yourself a 
Hottentot, a weapon-bearer in your struggle against the National Party of 
which your father is/was such a loyal supporter?     
      K.K.K.] (Krog SA164/US217-218)  
Antjie Somers is an “androgynous figure in Afrikaans folklore who catches naughty 
children” (SA296/US389), suggesting that “Antjie” is a bogey-woman, a betrayer of her 
own ethnicity and culture (Moss 92). 
 These figurations suggest different, often opposing, but perpetually interwoven 
ethnic, epistemological, ethical, aesthetic and linguistic dispositions. This is explicitly 
suggested by Krog in her 1999 interview with Gillian Anstey:  
I want to be Samuel at times . . . just someone’s wife....As a reporter I am 
supposed to speak in correct Afrikaans. But I don’t. I speak a lekker38 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 A literal translation would render the word “Swartsmeerdery” as “Blackening” or “Black-smearing.” 
 
38 “Lekker” is a catch-all Afrikaans adjective meaning “nice” and / or “delicious.” The word is so 
pervasive that it can hardly be called slang. Nevertheless it suggests colloquialism. A U.S. analog, 
particularly as it is deployed by the younger set, is “awesome,” although the implications of “lekker” 
are more muted.   
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Anglicised Afrikaans and I can’t report in that. So my reporting is un-me, 
un-Krog, un-poetic. I see Samuel as the obedient surname that obeys the 
codes of the SABC and of language, the rules of the game. Krog is the 
disobedient surname [. . .]. But the older I get, the more difficulty I have in 
keeping the two apart. (Anstey, quoted in Moss 91-2) 
Within Country, the interplay of figurations is instructive. Tellingly, the hate mail 
that associates Krog with Somers is situated in Country after an account of a gathering at 
the Stellenbosch Theological Seminary in which representatives of the Nederlandse 
Gereformeerde Kerk [Dutch Reformed Church] (NGK) were challenged regarding the 
Church’s “subdued” engagement with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process: 
“the body language of most dominees shows they want nothing to do with the 
Commission. Why? They’re afraid of a witch hunt…they’re afraid the truth Commission 
will increase the desire for revenge. They think the findings will not be objective and they 
say: ‘Confession and forgiveness is a religious act, how can it be done in a secular 
way?’” (Krog SA 64/US216-217). Their resistance is especially resonant because of the 
undeniable influence of the NGK in the establishment and sustaining of white Calvinist-
inspired Christian Nationalism, as well as the provision and sanction of theological 
underpinnings for segregationist policy.   
 Krog’s inclusion of the hate mail invokes the paternalistic influence of this 
Christian Nationalism. The suggestion of infidelity, and worse, an interracial affair, is 
directly associated with its betrayal. She is Antjie Somers, the bogey-woman. In the 
South African edition39, Krog follows the inclusion with a fictionalized account of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The U.S. edition also, inevitably, excludes Krog’s later justification of the fictional affair, which 
falls, for her, under the quilting methodology: “I had to bring a relationship into the story so I could 
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marital infidelity: an episode of lustful indulgence following an argument with a fellow 
journalist. It is a violent encounter – “My teeth chattering with an unnamed lust to rip 
open, to tear apart, to destroy, to plunder” (SA165) – suggesting its broader implications. 
It is not just an affair – it is a suggestion of profound subjective instability, caught up in 
the broader stakes of warring cultural, ethical, and moral complexes. The affair functions 
as a metaphor for that simultaneously painful and desirable break with conceptions and 
principles that calcify the moving parts of that “mechanism in yourself.” In its most 
benign abstract formulation, the various settings of the mechanism facilitate nothing more 
than code-switching. In Country, however, they endanger the subject, not to mention the 
integrity of the body.       
* * * 
I read chapter three of the US edition on an Amtrak bus heading North on the I-5 
between Eugene and Portland. The chapter’s title, “Stretched Thinner and Thinner over 
Pitches of Grief” (US37-66), is one I curiously like more than that of the South African 
edition’s “Bereaved and Dumb, The High Southern Air Succumbs” (SA26-49). My 
preference is contingent. It reminds me of Gerard Manley Hopkins’s Terrible Sonnet, 
“No Worst, There is none, pitched past pitch of grief” (Hopkins 167).  I remember that I 
first read Country (the South African edition) at Rhodes University while leading an 
introductory poetry discussion group that focused on Hopkins’s sonnets, from his precise 
and innovative evocation of the minute particulars of English landscapes, to the dark 
crises of faith and perceived absence of love that harrowed him. 
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verbalize certain personal reactions to the hearing. I had to create a new character who could not only 
bring in new information but also express the psychological underpinning of the Commission” (SA 
171). The exclusion of the extramarital affair in the U.S. Edition is telling with regard to its posturing 
as an historiographical or critical document. Again, for a detailed account of the differences between 
the two editions and their implications, read Moss.   
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This is the chapter that contains Professor Kondlo’s ruminations on Nomonde 
Calata’s testimony, but also other heavily edited survivor accounts, including a quilted 
together sequence that refers Sicelo Mhlauli’s request before the HRVH, “This inside 
me…fights my tongue. It is…unshareable. It destroys…words. Before he was blown up, 
they cut off his hands so he could not be fingerprinted…So how do I say this? – this 
terrible…I want his hands back” (SA27/US39). This is not how people speak, I think. It’s 
too perfect, poetic, economic. “How quickly our language changes,” Krog writes, 
“‘fantastic testimony,’ ‘sexy subject,’ ‘nice audible crying’” (SA32/US45).  
I look up from Country and am physically startled to see an Oregon landscape. I 
was expecting, without knowing I was home, that blue sky above aloes and rusted 
koppies. I remember the metallic clank and scrape of a Karoo windpomp’s blades, and 
knotted grass roots, reaching like decrepit fingers over stones, scraping at thin topsoil.  
Unheimlichkeidt. More worryingly, nostalgia. Is this the kind of language that 
invokes home for me? 
* * * 
The body and language, on the broadest level, constitute defining motifs of 
Country. Most obviously, it deals with bodies and languages as staging taxonomies of 
identity: Black and White and Indian and Coloured and isiZulu and isiXhosa and English 
and Afrikaans. More complicatedly, Country of My Skull interpenetrates bodies and 
language. It rummages through and around what Frederic Jameson has called “the 
[Modernist] metaphysics of the inside and outside, the wordless pain within the monad 
and the moment in which, often cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and 
externalized, as gesture or cry, as desperate communication and the outward 
120!
!
dramatization of inward feeling” (Jameson 11)40. Crucially, however, Country 
complicates the metaphysicality with which Jameson qualifies the inside / outside 
hermeneutic. Because her text hosts stories of human rights abuses, of battered, burnt and 
exploded bodies, it is the physicality of iteration – of reading and writing and speaking 
and listening – that is invoked. Country of My Skull is not content to identify the 
“authenticity” or “truth” that lies beneath the proverbial surface. Its prose focuses not 
merely inwardly, but innardly: “to seeing, speaking is added and the eye plunges into the 
mouth. Present at the birth of this country’s language itself” (SA29/US 42). 
 Karli Coetzee points out regarding Krog’s title,  
The fact that she refers to the country of her skull, suggests that this 
country is one that is internally created, a country perhaps of the 
imagination or of memory. The text bears this out. One of the recurring 
themes is the author’s sense of alienation from what she regards as her 
country, the country of her childhood and of her father and brothers. The 
narrative returns again and again to her apprehension that she may not be 
invited into the new country of her imagination, that which is often 
popularly called ‘The New South Africa.’ (Karli Coetzee 685) 
In Coetzee’s subsequent discussion of the text’s cover photograph by George Hallet of an 
un-peopled vista, she argues that this landscape, the landscape of the author’s 
imagination, cannot be lumped in with the un-embodied landscapes of much prior white 
writing, which “fails…to imagine a relationship with South Africa’s indigenous 
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40 My italics. 
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inhabitants” (686)41. Coetzee argues that the unpeopled landscape of the cover suggests 
nothing so much as the author’s unstable relationship with it: she is absent from it even as 
she encompasses it in her imagination; it is the site of childhood nostalgia, the stage of 
her race’s shameful complicity, and the space into which she wants to be invited by black 
South Africans: “you whom I have wronged, please / take me // with you” (Krog SA 279, 
US 365). The landscape thus stages memory, guilt, and desire, and many other internal 
aspects.      
 To Coetzee’s otherwise astute interpretation a new level may be added, for her 
reading of the title elides its most compelling element. The title is far from conventional 
in signaling the lyrical quality (the text’s staging of internal conflicts) that Coetzee infers. 
Despite the critic’s italicization of “skull” she fails to deal with it specifically in her 
analysis. Indeed, her reading of the title would have been equally valid had Krog relied 
on traditional tropes: the text might have been named “Country of my Heart”, or 
“Country of my Soul,” or “Country of my Mind.” But Krog refuses these conventional 
tropes for the jarring image of the head bone, seamed together, eye sockets agape, sinuses 
bared, grinning impassively. The skull does not stand in clichéd metonymic relation as 
the heart does to emotions, the soul to spirituality, and the mind to the intellect. In fact, 
even as the skull contains, in its biological aspect, the organ that facilitates our capacity 
to abstract, the word “skull” displaces the impulse to reduce the text to psychological, 
theological, and philosophical abstractions by foregrounding subcutaneous viscera. In 
other words, the skull operates in synecdochal relation to the body, living or dead, in its 
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41 Here, Coetzee draws on her namesake’s text, J.M. Coetzee’s White Writing: On the Culture of 
Letters in South Africa. “Official historiography long told a tale of how, until the nineteenth century of 
the Christian era the interior of what we now call South Africa was unpeopled. The poetry of empty 
space may one day be accused of furthering the same fiction” (Coetzee, J.M. 1988. 11). 
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biological or animal aspect. The skull thus implies at once the body’s disarticulation and 
its material presence. Overlaying the empty landscape of the cover photograph, skull in a 
profound sense suggests a viscerally embodied presence.42  
 In Krog’s conception, the body’s immanent presence within the landscape is 
closely allied to the body’s relationship with the stories brought before the TRC, with 
language. Landscape is the stage for subjective iteration. Of the Free State countryside of 
her youth, Krog writes, “This is my landscape. The marrow of my bones….This I love. 
This is what I’m made of….The land belongs to the voices of those that live in it. My 
own bleak voice among them….landscape lies at the feet at last of the stories of saffron 
and amber, angel hair and barbs, dew and hay and hurt” (Krog SA210/US277). 
Landscape is a pervasive metaphor for the scope of atrocities and their recounting: 
“Week after week, voice after voice, account after account. It is not so much the deaths, 
and the names of the dead, but the web of infinite sorrow woven around them. It keeps on 
coming and coming. A wide, barren disconsolate landscape where the horizon keeps on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 The effect of the title’s “skull” on the cover of the 1998 South African edition is drawn into stark 
relief when compared to the cover of the edition published a year later in the United States 
(notwithstanding other editorial alterations that will be discussed shortly). Most obviously, the latter 
edition modifies “Country of My Skull” with the scholastically conventional post-colon qualification, 
“Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa.” Revealing the hand of the 
marketer rather than that of the poet, the qualification has the effect of undoing precisely that which the 
“skull” opens up. The visceral embodiment suggested by the South African title is reduced to a set of 
abstractions.  Additionally, the US edition’s cover displaces the author’s name, which dominates the 
South African cover in large yellow letters above the title, reducing it in size and placing it against the 
backdrop of a light green field below the modified title. This gesture, it is arguable, radically alters the 
reader’s expectation of the text. Patently, “Antjie Krog,” largely unknown among American readers, 
has no real cache outside South Africa. “She” will not sell the book: the subject matter, on the other 
hand, might. In terms of name recognition, the US publication places the South African Nobel 
Laureate Nadine Gordimer’s review excerpt above the title. In relatively tiny black letters, Gordimer is 
quoted to have written “Extraordinary reportage…Antjie Krog breaks all the rules of dispassionate 
recounts”. The excerpt signals, in moderate terms, that US readers can anticipate the text to have 
literary qualities, implicit in the formal innovations, or broken rules, by which Krog brings her 
emotional experience to established (un)literary historiographic praxis. Additionally, the US edition 
advertises an introduction by Charlayne Hunter-Gault, who, as an American journalist on National 
Public Radio and its chief correspondent in Africa,  who has “a similar signature for US readers and 
viewers to Krog’s or South African readers and listeners” (Coetzee, Karli, 688). 
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dropping away” (SA32/US45). Just as landscape works immanently upon and within the 
body, so does the language of the TRC. In this way landscape, in its relationship with the 
body, becomes associated with the immanent materiality of language.  
 Krog invokes this materiality variously in Country, be it through her close 
observations of the ways mouths forms Afrikaans words, as is the case with security 
policeman Paul van Vuuren’s “delabialized vowels and thick, arrogant rhythms” 
(SA90/US113-114), Captain Jacques Hechter’s “relish in gutturals and occlusive 
consonants” (SA94/US119), or in the synaesthetic succor she takes from singing the 
national anthem, Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika [God Bless Africa], at the conclusion of an 
HRVH. Recognizing that here language, Afrikaans, “carries violence as a voice,” she 
stumbles through the Sesotho parts of the anthem: “It is fragrant inside the song, and 
among the keynotes of sorrow and suffering there are soft silences where we who belong 
to the landscape, all of us, come to rest” (SA216-217/US286). She invokes it through the 
physical effects on the body and mind of sustained exposure to survivor testimonies: 
“reporting on the Truth Commission…leaves most of us physically exhausted and 
mentally frayed. // Because of language.” (SA37/US50). She calls it to mind in its 
biological aspect, “My hair is falling out. I have rashes” (SA49/US65), suggesting, also, 
later, at a psychologist’s prompting, that Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s prostate cancer is a 
symptom of repressed anger brought about by apartheid and the hearings 
(SA170/US224).  
 Most compellingly, however, she invokes the embodied effect of language on the 
interpreters/translators of TRC testimony. Catherine Cole outlines the duties and 
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implications of interpreters at Hearings in Performing South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission: 
The translators were trained to be neutral, but deciding whose idea of 
‘neutral’ would be honored, their employers or their own, was difficult. 
Their jobs required minute-by-minute choices about words, syntax, tone, 
emotional expression, and narrative completeness….the very fact that they 
were interpreters rather than translators made neutrality impossible: they 
were being asked to provide a reduced truth and functional rendering of 
content….The interpreters were trained to see emotion and affect as 
nonessential dimensions of testimony, to produce interpretations that 
filtered out affect. And yet emotional truth was often central to the 
witnesses’ perception of value. Interpreters performed testimony in their 
glass booths, in their bodies; in the cadence of their voices; in their choice 
of words, grammar, syntax and style; and in other choices they were 
forced to make. (Cole 76-77)  
Cole’s observations are borne out in Country of My Skull. Lebohang Matibele, the 
interpreter of the shepherd’s testimony (the rendering of which caused Ruden great 
Ruden took such offense) is quoted as saying: 
You are aware that you are becoming an actor, but you know people will 
say afterwards, ‘Lebohang, you were really smoking – what was going 
on?’ And you didn’t even realize you were acting – you know, you are just 
looking at the victim as he is speaking and unconsciously you end up 
throwing up your hands as he throws his, you end up nodding your head 
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when he nods…But it very difficult when they are crying, then they speak 
in installments. He says something, then he keeps quiet and he starts 
again…you have to bring the pieces together. (Krog SA220/US290)  
Inevitably, such performances take their toll on the subject, who, as the account of a 
“young Tswana interpreter” suggests, are drawn into the narratives at the moment of 
remediation: “‘It is difficult to interpret victim hearings,’ he says, ‘because you use the 
first person all the time. I have no distance when I say “I”…it runs through me with I’.” 
(SA129/US169).  
 The immediacy of the interpreter’s engagement with the testimonies is also, in 
this formulation, a fragmentation of the self, or, at least, the incorporation into the subject 
of another’s “I”. The interpreter, inevitably, begins to manifest symptoms of the trauma 
he remediates: “After the first three months of the hearings, my wife and baby left me 
because of my violent outbursts. The Truth Commission provided counseling and I was 
advised to stop. But I don’t want to. This is my history, and I want to be a part of it – 
until the end.” At the forefront of the remediation process, tasked with interpreting for a 
broader audience the subjective trauma of survivors, the interpreter’s body becomes a 
repository of their affect. Neutrality, objectivity, literal translation, in this regard, is an 
archivist’s fantasy. In the body of the interpreter, the language of others becomes deeply 
and immanently personal.   
 Such processes go to the heart of Country’s conception of the relationship among 
individual, collective and/or national(ist) iterations. Critics, as we have seen, frequently 
accuse Krog of subsuming the trauma of others into her “hysterical” personal reactions 
and then generalizing those personal truths into national truths. Ashley Harris astutely 
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defines this pivotal tension in Country as a battle between two conceptions of the author 
as a “self-expressive poet” and a “poet-as-witness,” arguing that the conflation of these 
two modes by Krog “allows her to avoid any rigorous contemplation of [the] ethical 
obligations” implicit to responding, reflecting, and representing “history” as aesthetic 
form. She invokes De Cock’s “seam” (“differently applied, but just as provisional, 
paradoxical and contestable”) as a metaphor for the point of contact and differentiation 
between poetry and history, suggesting that Krog’s textual practice erases this scar.  
 Her analysis (which responds also to the plagiarism scandal that engulfed Country 
and Krog in 2006 – and which will be addressed in the addendum) addresses the poetic 
coda that concludes the text. As a lead-in to this coda, Krog writes about the failures and 
triumphs of the TRC, concluding that, “I want to put it more simply. I want this hand of 
mine to write it. For us all; all voices, all victims:” (Krog SA278/US364). Harris argues 
that this “suggests that the poetic voice seeks to bring the varying and multiple threads of 
the narrative together – and that in its metaphoric and metonymic function the poem 
makes meaning cohere” (Harris 27). Recognizing that this claim is at odds with the 
“fractured and multiple nature of the text,” she argues that taking note of Krog’s 
“repetition throughout the text of the metaphor of quilting, one begins to discern her urge 
to bring the nation’s fragmented and fractured voices together.” This “urge towards 
coherence,” she suggests, is evidenced by Krog’s “urge to write ‘it’…in stark 
contradiction to [her] earlier statement, ‘May my hands fall of if I write this’.” The poetic 
coda itself, especially in its being written “for us all; all voices, all victims,” manifests 
what she calls a “slippage between the first-person singular to the first-person plural,” 
and in so doing suggests that “there is a continuum between the wrongdoings of the 
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perpetrators called to account by the TRC and Krog, as a white Afrikaner, herself” but 
that this continuum is “presented in a general and vague manner that obscures rather than 
bears witness to, the traumatic past”. Harris’s reading, in other words, situates its critique 
at the other end of the spectrum to Ruden’s – Krog’s text, she argues, too flagrantly 
“synthesizes” or “shapes” the events of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Krog’s 
quilting, she suggests, overlays the site of irresolveable difference, or the “seam.”  
  And indeed, the frame of the poetic coda does implicate it in a slippage between 
the singular and plural first-person. The poem thus draws (white) readers into a 
conception of collective responsibility or guilt. However, I would argue that if the 
function of the coda is to “cohere” the text’s various strands and tenors, then it fails. 
Situated at the end of a fragmented text, the poem enacts nothing so much as the 
irresolvable tension between the urge towards coherence (which, counter to Harris’s 
argument that it is hidden, I suggest Krog explicitly claims and problematizes throughout 
Country) and its impossibility.  
 Crucially, the poet’s body is the site of the TRC’s effect, which is invoked 
through the familiar conflation of landscape and language. The TRC is personified and 
directly addressed in the past tense.       
   because of you  
   this country no longer lies 
   between us but within 
   it breathes becalmed 
   after being wounded 
   in its wondrous throat 
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   in the cradle of my skull 
   it sings, it ignites 
   my tongue, my inner ear, the cavity of heart 
   shudders towards the outline 
       new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals 
    
   of my soul the retina learns to expand 
   daily because of the thousand stories 
   I was scorched  
 
a new skin 
   I am changed for ever, I want to say: 
       forgive me 
       forgive me 
       forgive me 
 
   You whom I have wronged, please 
   take me 
 
   with you.    (Krog SA278-279/US364-365) 
Unarguably, the poem does address a history past. It does, in this regard, situate itself in 
metonymic relation to the events more broadly – detailing, metaphorically, the traumatic 
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effects on the body of the stories told before the TRC, suggesting catharsis that comes 
with hindsight. But the tense of the poem shifts: “I was scorched // a new skin / I am 
changed forever”. This change in tense also marks a distinct shift in focus from an insular 
awareness of the body’s responses, to the necessity of externalization. “I want to say,” 
followed by the repeated plea for forgiveness, is also, in this regard, a recognition of the 
other as other. The differentiation of the “I” and “you” becomes the stage for iteration: 
only by its virtue is language necessitated. The distance between “I” and the “you whom I 
have wronged” is not, crucially, reconciled by the poem. If anything, it is invoked both 
thematically and, by the caesura between the last two lines of the poem, typographically.    
 The closing image of Country of My Skull, then, does not resolve its tensions. The 
poem does effect a collective voice, but it also invokes the monad pleading for contact 
across the chasm of history. Krog thus “concludes” Country, not with an easy “closure,” 
but with an image of the speaking subject, immanently embodied, painfully and 
resiliently alone, riddled by the stories of others and personal experiences, yearning for a 
new and more productive encounter with the people who share her living space, but who 
remain, perpetually distant. This is Literariness.   
 Understood as an attempted “closure,” it is arguable that the coda does ultimately 
subsume the ethical obligations of the poet-as-witness by deferring to a merely self-
expressive mode. In this regard, the coda ultimately undermines the complex of 
fragmented narratives, genres, stories, and languages the preceding text has wrought upon 
the reader. But the coda does not alleviate the embodied process of witnessing, 
interpreting, remediating – if anything, it suggests its continued necessity.   
* * * 
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I sit in the faculty lounge of the Rhodes English Department. The new head of the 
Department has just read a paper in which he argues the necessity of what he calls a “new 
humanism.” A young black hire from journalism responds with the suggestion that it is 
not up to white academics to define the direction of an African academy. The room is 
silenced. I don’t know what to do.    
An Addendum: Subsequent Language 
 
All that said, Antjie Krog is a plagiarist. The mechanism in myself that allows me 
to accept this is also the one that pores over the archive, that insists on the exactness of 
my citations, that worries if my summations of the arguments of others are properly 
signposted as arguments made by others. This textual practice is exacting in its standards, 
insistent on careful attribution, and in so doing, protects the property of those enlightened 
subjects who, brought into the conversation by the enormous archive they produce, stake 
and squabble over their claims. This is mine. This is yours.  
The careful syntax and grammar of academic discourse (with its endlessly 
deferring parentheses) is, in this regard, nothing so much as the regulatory logic of a 
game of “Broken Telephone” (or “Gossip,”  or, insidiously, “Chinese Whisper”) in which 
the original iteration must, at all costs, be preserved in all its integrity. At a children’s 
party the opposite is true: the pleasure derives from the muddled sentence uttered at the 
other end of the line, which bears the imprint of every little body through which it passed 
– whispers misheard by ears, or mispronounced by mouths just coming into language. In 
academic discourse, such embodied fluctuations are impermissible. By its logic, the text 
does not pass through bodies but resides within an archive, alphabetized by authors’ 
names. Each author has a sovereign right to the form and content of the archival object 
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they produce: the currency by which they are paid for their contribution is correct and 
assiduous citation by all who draw from their work. This is how the author’s brainchild 
becomes his lineage.  
Undeniably, Antjie Krog fails to abide by this logic – as Stephen Watson points 
out in his essay, “The Annals of Plagiarism: Antjie Krog and the Bleek and Lloyd 
Collection” published in New Contrast in early 2006. And yet, this is hardly surprising, 
considering the manner in which Country of My Skull enacts, through the fragmented 
body of the author-figure, the disjuncture between various interpretive and iterative 
modes. There are other mechanisms at play than the archive-obsessed citational logic of 
the academy. Indeed, as I have argued, Krog’s figuration of Prof. Kondlo, and “the 
academics,” as well as her own ambivalence towards conventional critical interpretive 
methods, suggests that the mechanisms within ourselves by which we justify our critical 
endeavors need to be answerable, also, to alternative epistemological modes. This is not a 
defense of Krog. I do not believe that, and cannot know if, there was intent behind her 
unattributed appropriation of, as our prime example, Ted Hughes’s work. At best, the 
lack of attribution was an oversight. At worst (and Krog did herself no favors with the 
petulance of her public denials) it comes across as dissimulating and disingenuous.   
However, I want to complicate this dynamic by suggesting that the academic 
community that responded to Watson’s essay by entering into an extended internecine 
squabble, betrayed nothing so much as a singular unwillingness to confront the ways in 
which Country of My Skull directly challenges the idea of individual ownership of ideas 
and stories through its insistent highlighting of language in its immanent, embodied, 
iterative, and interpretive aspect. The charge of plagiarism, in other words, is as much a 
132!
!
symptom of the critics’ deflection of the text’s destabilizing effects and a kneejerk 
deferral to the comfort of the archive, as it is a justifiable outcome of the impropriety of 
Krog’s practices. Given the occasion to put academic discourse, and its privileging of the 
sovereign author-figure, under a potentially productive duress (in much the same way 
that the events of the TRC tore a deep welt into the comfortable veneer of middle-class 
civility), a shrill and vocal literary set doubled down and laagered up.  
Watson’s piece is born of a personal vendetta. He accuses Krog of “‘concept’ 
theft” (49) because the stars say ‘tsau,’ Krog’s 2004 volume of poetic adaptations of 
nineteenth century /Xam narrative transcriptions, seems to Watson to resemble his own 
1991 collection Return of the Moon: Versions from the /Xam. Notwithstanding a series of 
stylistic critiques and ad hominem invectives, Watson claims that Krog’s adaptation 
represents nothing so much as a “blatant act of appropriation and…personal 
opportunism” (60) and that hers is a collection that “belongs not to the history of 
contemporary poetry in this country, but to the baleful annals of South African 
plagiarism” (61).  
Of greater interest here is that Watson drags Country of My Skull into the muck as 
a “precedent for this sort of thing in her previous career as a writer.” According to 
Watson, Country contains unattributed excerpts from Ted Hughes’s essay “Myth and 
Education.” He juxtaposes the relevant passages. First, he quotes Krog: 
A myth is a unit of imagination which makes it possible for a human 
being to accommodate two worlds. It reconciles the contradictions of 
these two worlds in a workable fashion and holds open the way 
between them. The two worlds are the inner and outer world. Myth makes 
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it possible to live with what you cannot endure. And if the myth has been 
learnt well it becomes a word – a single word that switches on the 
whole system of comforting delusions.  
(Watson 59-60, Krog SA190/US250)43 
Second, noting that the British poet used the terms “story” and “myth” interchangeably, 
Watson quotes Ted Hughes’s essay:  
A child takes possession of a story as what might be called a unit of 
imagination. A story which engages, say, earth and the underworld is A 
[sic.] unit correspondingly flexible […] it reconciles their contradictions 
in a workable fashion and holds open the way between them […] If 
the story is learned well, so that all its parts can be seen at a glance, as if 
we looked through a window into it, then the story has become like the 
complicated hinterland of a single word. It has become a word. Any 
fragment of the story serves as the ‘word’ by which the whole story’s 
electrical circuit is switched into consciousness, and all its light and power 
brought to bear. (Watson 60, Hughes 138-139) 
Notwithstanding the legalistic merit of Watson’s charges against Krog (and there can be 
little doubt that there are remarkable similarities between Krog’s and Hughes’s writing on 
myths/stories)44, he decontextualizes both passages to the extent that their fundamental 
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43 Watson’s emboldened text has been maintained. This dissertation chapter has carefully maintained 
Krog’s paragraph divisions, which often reflect her poetic instincts. Watson does not extend her this 
courtesy. As I am primarily interested in his charges, I have followed his example here.  
 
44 Even Krog’s own publisher, Random House, prevaricates on the matter, conceding in one breath that 
the similarities in phrasing are “striking,” and in the next that they are considering a libel suit on 
Krog’s behalf (Eva Gray, quoted in “Antjie Krog Denies Plagiarism Claims”). 
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differences are belied. Watson deflects this context by editing the two to three pages of 
Krog’s engagement down to a paragraph equatable in length to Hughes’s.  
Hughes’s essay, originally published in 1976, invokes the uncomplicated 
confidence of a British man of letters who, echoing Plato’s The Republic, argues in 
broadly universalist terms for the value of myth as part of “imagination” training in 
childhood education. It is difficult not to infer, especially from Hughes’s suggestion of 
myth’s “light and power,” Matthew Arnold’s ideologically disastrous justification of 
culture’s claims to “perfection” as the antidote to anarchic desires to do as one wills.  
Country of My Skull’s deployment of “myth”, however, is wholly more 
ambivalent. Indeed, Krog’s echoing of “Myth and Education,” whether intentional or not, 
appropriates Hughes’s words to a critique of universalizing humanism. If, for Hughes, 
the reconciliation of contradictions opens up the learner to the power and light of history 
and the imagination, then to Krog it is an easily manipulable site of dangerous 
falsehoods. Reconciliation of contradictions is, to her, ideological manipulation that 
fosters “comforting delusion,” such as those that sustained myths of white superiority. 
Her discussion of myth is situated in a passage in which the narrator visits (white) friends 
and ends up discussing with their child the living conditions of the family’s domestic 
worker. According to the child, the worker doesn’t miss her children because “Maids 
don’t feel like other people about their children. They like to be rid of them. Anyway, 
Alina likes me now” (Krog SA190/US250). The worker does not need a heater in her 
quarters because “Maids don’t get cold like white people.” The words around which the 
myths constellate in Krog’s account, are epithets. The Afrikaans word for “maid,” meid, 
and the South African equivalent of “nigger,” kaffer, invariably connote inferiority: 
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“kafferbees – low quality cattle; kafferwaatlemoen – tasteless melon; kafferkombers – 
cheap kind of blanket. There are also words like kaffersleg and kafferlui, indicating the 
intensive form. Very useless is kaffersleg. Very lazy is kafferlui. / Like the word 
kaffermeid.”  
Krog thus particularizes Hughes’ generalizations and, in so doing, implicitly 
undermines his argument. As much as a white child might deny it under a “maid” rubric, 
Alina feels the distance between herself and her children. And she feels the cold in her 
body. Thus, whereas for Hughes, myths are essential to importing “sharpness, clarity and 
scope of the mental eye” (Hughes 143)45, for Krog myth closes people up until they see 
all things through the narrow chinks of their caverns: “The function of a myth is to 
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45 So as not to present Hughes as a straw man, it should be noted that he does not limit his 
understanding to the “mental eye.” Indeed, his argument precisely engages the imagination as a faculty 
that negotiates between the outer world and the body: “the outer world is only one of the worlds we 
live in. For better or for worse we have another, and that is the inner world of our bodies and 
everything pertaining….why can’t this inner world be thought of as an extension of the outer world – 
in other words why isn’t the sharp, clear, objective eye of the mind as adequate for this world as it is 
for the other more obviously outer world?” (Hughes 143-4). Indeed, Hughes is often persuasive and 
writes beautifully about the negotiation:  
We solve the problem by never looking inward. We identify ourselves and all that is 
wakeful and intelligent with our objective eye, saying, ‘Let’s be objective’. That’s 
really no more than saying ‘Let’s be happy’. But we sit, closely cramped in the 
cockpit behind the eyes, steering through the brilliantly crowded landscape beyond 
the lenses, focused on details and distinctions. In the end, since all our attention from 
birth has been narrowed into the outward beam, we come to regard our body as no 
more than a somewhat stupid vehicle. All the urgent information coming towards us 
from that inner world sounds to us like a blank, or at best the occasional grunt, or a 
twinge. The body, with its spirits, is the antennae of all perceptions, the receiving 
aerial for all wavelengths. But we are disconnected. The exclusiveness of our 
objective eye, the very strength and brilliance of our objective intelligence, suddenly 
turns into stupidity – of the most rigid and suicidal kind. (145-6)  
 Remarkable, however, is the tone of Hughes’s argument. His insistence on addressing an 
audience he feels no need to define with the collective pronoun “we,” suggests the universalizing gaze 
he assumes, which, in its lack of particularity, all but elides the writing and/or reading body or the 
body being written about. And when he does particularize his experience, as when he illustrates a point 
with a memory of a magazine spread in which a photographer captured images of (rather than helping) 
a woman being mauled by a tiger, he subsumes that experience and memory to the broader argument. 
It might as well have been hypothetical. In point of fact, then, the form of the literary essay in which 
Hughes makes his argument is at odds with the argument itself. Krog, on the other hand, is very careful 
to place her abstract ruminations on myth within a material and embodied context. The disjuncture 
between generalization and particularity, it can be argued, goes to the very heart of her transformation 
of Hughes’s words (or words like Hughes’s). 
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provide a logical model capable of overcoming contradiction. The myth proves that 
things have always been like this, that things will never change” (Krog SA190/US250).  
It is arguable, then, that Krog deploys Hughes against Hughes and in this regard 
fulfills what Stephen Watson himself argues (via Malcolm Gladwell) is the one 
justification for the appropriation of another author’s text: “‘borrowing that is 
transformative [rather than] borrowing that is merely derivative.’ Here T.S. Eliot is 
exemplary” (Watson 58). Watson suggests that Krog possesses neither Eliot’s sensibility, 
“let alone his intelligence” (59). This comparison is at once odious and rendered in bad 
faith when there can be little doubt that Watson wants to see plagiarism in Country of My 
Skull. He deploys the figuration of Eliot, a writer whose work, in the Barthesian sense, 
falls into the category of the classic text, as the canonical counterpoint to the 
presumptuous woman writer who dares to stir the proverbial pot of conventional 
patrilineal citation practice.  
When “The Annals of Plagiarism: Antjie Krog and the Bleek and Lloyd 
Collection” was first published, it loosed a firestorm of disagreement in South African 
literary circles. A lot of the discussion was hosted by an online forum, Litnet: from Colin 
Bower’s impassioned defense of private ownership for the sake of the publishing industry 
(Bower), itself a response to Barbara Adair’s questioning of the very possibility of 
uniqueness in an age of pastiche and intertextuality (Adair); to Helen Moffet’s bewailing 
the tension the debate had caused in the “tiny” Cape Town literary scene (Moffet) and 
refusal to take sides, a response to Mike Stevenson’s claim that Litnet was biased against 
Watson because it had traditionally privileged Afrikaner literature (Stevenson) and site 
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convener Ettiene van Heerden’s subsequent insistence on the site’s impartiality (van 
Heerden).  
Inevitably, the discussion found its way from the relatively specialized confines of 
literary magazines and online forums to the national print media. For example, The Mail 
and Guardian, a left-leaning national weekly, carried pieces by Shaun de Waal and Colin 
Bower. The latter extrapolated on Watson’s charges:  
Kondlo is quoted as saying: ‘Unlike the stories of the men where 
boundaries are set, these stories undermine boundaries: men turn into 
women and vice versa, animals become people, women fall in love with 
animals, people eat each other, dreams and hallucinations are played 
out.’…. 
In We Spend our Years as a Story that is Told, published 11 years 
earlier, Hofmeyr writes that stories told by women in the African oral 
tradition can be understood as "subversive and unsettling accounts in 
which all known social categories and boundaries are upset. Men become 
women; animals become human; women fall in love with animals; people 
eat one another. The stories are also characterised by hallucination, vision 
and illusion." (Bower)  
The following week, two letters to the editor were published. The first from Sarah Ruden 
reeks of smug vindication. She reiterates her stance from her 1999 review, and summarily 
dismisses Krog’s defenders: “The book has many fans who, if you question them, appear 
not to have read it or to have reflected on what it contains. It's not hard to see why. 
Fashionable, feel-good, sloppy books about the new South Africa help the powerful 
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ignore huge problems” (Ruden “Watson Deserves an Answer”). The second letter comes 
from Grahamstown-based poet Chris Mann, whose more sympathetic tone cannot 
disguise the cursoriness of his reading of Country implicit in his lack of awareness of its 
metatextuality:  
What also disturbed me is her attribution to a Professor Kondlo of a string 
of descriptive concepts that had appeared previously in a book by the Wits 
scholar Isabel Hofmeyr.  
Colin Bower's article (March 3) quotes Krog as writing, "my friend 
Professor Kondlo, the Xhosa intellectual from Grahamstown". Who is 
Professor Kondlo? Such a person is unknown to me, to academics who 
have lived in Grahamstown for decades and to others in the field who live 
elsewhere. Perhaps there has been an error. I hope so. (Mann)  
As I have suggested in the chapter proper, Professor Kondlo can be read as a composite 
character, a figuration of “the academics” whose voices partake in the web of infinite 
sorrow, rather than function as arbiters of ultimate truth. He is a textual device by which 
the primacy and authority of academic utterances are purposefully undercut. Professor 
Kondlo does not reflect mistaken attribution, nor need he exist in order to counter the 
plagiarism charges.  
Naturally, Krog herself felt compelled to answer the charges on Litnet. Her 
prevarication, especially with regard to the Hughes passage, is difficult to negotiate, a 
reality that at once suggests her guilt and the irresolvable complexity of the Country’s 
discursive configuration. Why for example, should she feel compelled in her first 
response, “Stephen Watson and the Annals of Plagiarism,” to argue that her use of 
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Hughes is transformative, even as she disclaims any influence by the Hughes essay? “It is 
ludicrous,” she writes, “to label a similarity in idiom (or even conceptualisation) as 
‘plagiarism’, particularly with the myriad discussions on the nature of myth – thousands 
of these on the internet alone.” (Krog “Stephen Watson”). More petulantly, in her second 
Litnet post, she claims to be “a Sylvia Plath groupie and have always been, shall we say, 
unsympathetic to the poetry of Ted Hughes. Country of My Skull was written under great 
pressure during three months’ negotiated leave from the SABC. There was no way, with 
so many experts around, that I would have turned to Hughes’s prose essays for 
information on myth” (Krog “Last Time, This Time”). 
Nevertheless, she also renders a more substantive response in her first post which 
reiterates her understanding of Country as caught up in and enacting a process of coming 
into language through the practice of quilting. 
Country of My Skull is my own, highly personalised version of 
experiences at the TRC. Country of My Skull is NOT a journalistic or 
factual report of the Truth Commission. In fact, the problem of truth, the 
ethical questions around the “making” of truth, the use of other people’s 
truths, the relation between power and truth, and other factors at play in 
the execution of truth, all form part of the text itself.  
For me, we were forging a new vocabulary in an open and 
democratic society where finally the past had been made known. 
Everybody was a textmaker. Everyone’s input was equal. Words like 
reconciliation, retributive justice, transitional justice, post-traumatic 
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stress symptoms, etc, which have since become neatly defined and 
packaged, were still new and open and often unknown.  
My desire to respect this equality of input would have been 
undermined by a bibliography, as it would have foregrounded certain texts 
as “established truth” while perhaps implicitly relegating the testimonies 
of victims to something ‘less.’  
She lists alternative sources on myth (Ian Buruma’s Het Loon van de Schuld, editor 
Herbert Morris’s Guilt and Shame, Johan Degenaar’s Imagination, Fiction, Myth, and 
Carl Jung’s After the Catastrophe) claiming to have cited them (Krog SA 237/US311) as 
well as Isabel Hofmeyr: “The text’s grow next to one another in the vapour of freshly 
mown language. Nomonde Calata…Isabel Hofmeyer…Elaine Scarry…” (SA47/US63).46 
She also claims to “know Professor Kondlo well,” while conceding in a footnote that it is 
not his real name. The footnote, in this regard, preserves the agitation effect of Professor 
Kondlo as a literary device: he is a generic figuration, a type who is nevertheless based in 
the real.    
Krog thus parlayed the discursive heft of “what the academics say,” a heft 
academics expect, and chisel into the contours of the edifice they collectively build and 
defend, into the infinite web of language, experiences, and affects that constituted, by her 
characterization, the TRC. This strategy, she ultimately claims, renders Country a generic 
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46  Ashleigh Harris broadened the charges against Krog by arguing that she appropriated the “academic 
registers of… Elaine Scarry[’s The Body and Pain]” (Harris 47). In a footnote, Harris quotes Jacqui 
Starkey-Melck’s unpublished MA Dissertation, “Reclaiming Her Body, Remembering Her Voice: The 
Quest for the Unheard Voice in Zoe Wicomb’s David’s Story and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull,” 
which juxtaposes the following two passages as, one presumes, pithy evidence: Krog writes that “[t]he 
academics say pain destroys language and this brings about an immediate reversion to a pre-linguistic 
state” (SA42/US57); Scarry writes that “[t]o witness the moment when pain causes a reversion to the 
pre-language of cries and groans is to witness the destruction of language (Scarry 1985: 6)” (Starkey-
Melck 17) (Harris 47n).  
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outlier. In “Last Time, This Time” she suggests that she finds herself “in the bizarre 
position of being called to account why a fork is not a spoon. Put differently: Why was a 
non-fiction text not written like a factual report?” She concludes her response by re-
invoking the formulation. “What is happening now is more like saying this fork is not a 
spoon, therefore the fork is a terrible spoon.” 
Perhaps the most substantive critical response is that of Ashleigh Harris, 
published six months later in Journal of Literary Studies.47 Harris argues that Krog's 
plagiarism in Country of My Skull is more deeply ingrained in the text than even Watson 
sees, and that it is also implicit to her use of TRC testimonies. The result is a more 
fruitful engagement with the questions at hand, one that nevertheless broadly ignores the 
potential for a self-reflexive engagement suggested by Krog’s figuration of the 
academics. 
 Situating her claims within the context of the debate Watson kickstarted, she 
argues the weakness of the distinction between derivative and transformative 
appropriations of critical texts: it “hinges on aesthetic opinion: the extent to which the 
borrowing transforms the original into something new and, hence, poetic. It is unlikely 
that there can ever be aesthetic agreement” (Harris 47). For her, then, the issue is not only 
one of aesthetics. Indeed, she happily concedes that Krog transforms the “ideas, though 
barely the words themselves, into a new genre” (48). Instead, she claims that the problem 
with Krog’s borrowings is that they are not sufficiently signposted as borrowings. The 
problem is an unethical “erasure of the original” which becomes all the more ethically 
suspect when it is applied to the historically silenced voices of victim testimonies. She 
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47 Read also Michael Titlestad and Mike Kissack’s “Hospitality in Karel Schoeman’s  Promised Land 
and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull.” 
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concedes that Krog’s strongest counter to this claim is that such erasure was genre-
appropriate, quoting the poet’s own defense. 
Indeed, Krog’s attribution of “equality” to all the voices of the TRC would seem 
to confirm Harris’s understanding that she all too easily blurs the text’s origin – be it 
Hughes’s, Hofmeyr’s, Scarry’s, Mhlauli’s, Calata’s, or Hechter’s – and in so doing 
overlays the “seam” that marks and joins the heterogeneous fragments by which South 
Africa’s histories, politics, cultures, and subjects are constituted. This blurring, she 
argues, is counter to the text’s avowed fragmentary nature, which is contrary to the urge 
towards coherence that she identifies as disingenuously implicit to Krog’s text. My own 
argument is that this urge is an explicit aspect of Country’s workings, and that the 
dialectical tension between the text’s fragmentation and blurring agitates the mechanism 
by which readers allow themselves to accept distortions. Country’s citation practice is 
nothing if not inconsistent. Certain passages and concepts are directly attributed, others 
are grouped. Whether this inconsistency was intentional – there are instances that evince 
intent, and, dialectically, others that do not – is a matter of conjecture that situates us in 
precarious proximity to an ethical reading that relies ultimately on mere intentionalism.  
We can be thankful for the substantive nuance Harris and others brought to the 
discussion. Watson, and few of the immediate respondents, even thought to address the 
implication of the text’s citation practices for witnesses and perpetrators, seemingly 
circling the wagons in defense of academic practice. However, these later interventions 
came after Watson’s spectacularly vituperative and wanton invective. The scandal 
spiraled outward from a specialist forum to the national press, besmirching a text that, 
flawed though it arguably is, also has few equals as a self-conscious and visceral 
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enactment of literary process in the face of real trauma. That the debate nuanced itself, 
like the TRC Hearings in relation to its Report, situates Country on the receiving end of a 
bifurcated event situated between the intensity of the initial public scandal, and the staid 
and relatively inaccessible nature of its subsequent playing out. The latter cannot compete 
with the former for effect.    
Hence, I entered into this discussion begrudgingly. It is contained in a mere 
addendum. Did Watson’s article not enact the very counter to what I want to believe the 
literary humanities can accomplish, I might not have included it at all. To respond to 
Stephen Watson’s charges is to validate and get caught up in the worst kind of 
“subsequent language,” as Barthes defines it; worst because Watson does not respond to 
the event of the writerly text, so much as subsume it with an inflexible agenda that pre-
exists it and pulls it along. The irony is not lost that I now incorporate his article and its 
fallout as an afterthought into an argument that serves an agenda of my own. It is not an 
approach I want to take. That said, under-qualified charges of plagiarism, as with 
“racism,” “homophobia,” “sexism,” and a whole slew of inherently complicated and all-
too-often uncritically deployed accusations, need to be addressed even if they deserve the 
periphery rather than the center of the debate.   
This approach of Watson’s is an egregious example of academic endeavor 
entrenched in an ethos of anti-Literariness. Indeed, Country of My Skull, and the difficult 
negotiations it enacts, hardly matters within the larger scheme of Watson’s argument. 
And yet the pall it casts over Krog’s text, which, as I have argued, potentially enacts a 
visceral and productive destabilization of the reading subject, cannot but hinder the 
tentatively curious approach of new readers. It just takes a passing remark, “Oh…she’s a 
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plagiarist,” for such a reader’s experience of the text to be irrevocably affected. Watson 
now matters to Country of My Skull, even if Country of My Skull does not matter to him. 
This is another reason his article cannot be ignored, even as engagement with his piece 
draws attention to it.   
In all this, I risk overstatement. Of course, Literariness can overcome the 
circumscriptions of disgruntled academics. Inevitably, the curious reading / writing / 
speaking / learning / teaching subject will incorporate them into the larger historical, 
social, cultural, political and ethical web, the negotiation with which the aesthetic 
experience of language facilitates. I do not mean to suggest Literariness’s mere fragility, 
or even its preciousness. And yet Watson’s destructive pedantry is dangerous precisely 
because it models incuriosity, stifles thought, and, should his argument take hold on those 
who design curricula, limits access. As a literary intellectual and a poet, presumably 
vested, and striving to be an exemplar of the work that literature does on those who 
immanently produce and consume it, Watson erred. As Eva Gray suggest in response to 
Watson on Litnet, “copyright fundamentalism…could serve to stifle creativity in a 
country that needs it badly” (Gray). Indeed, his article resembles less the work of the 
intellectual, than that of another prodigious reader and judge: the censor. 
Censorship is the subject of J.M. Coetzee’s Giving Offense. He characterizes the 
writer (who in Barthes’ formulation is analogous also to the reader, and who I extrapolate 
to include the speaker, teacher, and learner) as being engaged in an iterative process: “It 
is…a very private activity, so private that it constitutes the definition of privacy: how I 
am with myself” (Coetzee, Giving Offense 38). This process, he suggests, is 
simultaneously delicate and brutal: “Managing the inner selves, making them work for 
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one (making them productive) is a complex matter of pleasing and satisfying and 
challenging and extorting and wooing and feeding, and sometimes even putting to death.” 
This putting to death, he suggests in his chapter on the exiled Afrikaans poet Breyten 
Breytenbach, is the work of the esoteric censor, who is internal to the writing process:  
The esoteric account…is that the writer writes against and cannot write 
without a manifold of internalized resistances that are in essence no 
different from an internalized censor-twin, both cherished and hated. 
In intense moments, writing can throw up evidences of bloody or 
asphyxiating struggles against blockages or resistances: gagged words 
gagged out. The voice struggles to breathe in, to breathe out, against 
intimate persecutory figures. (232) 
If Krog did plagiarize, it was not for lack of esoteric censors. Country, if nothing else, is a 
text that directly and intimately confronts ethical and aesthetic remediation. The writer is 
fractured in the process. The same cannot be said of Stephen Watson’s invective, which 
is aimed at her public utterance from a position, indeed, in defense, of a supposedly 
unimpeachable academic authority and influence (Watson was, at the time, the Head of 
the University of Cape Town Department of English; Tom Eaton, an acolyte, was the 
editor of New Contrast). In this light, Watson resembles nothing so much as the exoteric 
censor, who is the “gag that stifles” a “voice struggling to utter itself.”  
 A literary academy in the service of Literariness simply cannot afford to situate 
itself so. It must, instead, adopt a mode that encourages the intensity, nuance, and 
aesthetic innovation driven by esoteric resistances. This does not preclude contradiction, 
disagreement, or even conflict, as aspects of the web of readers, writers, speakers, 
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learners and teachers accommodated by the literary academy. But the primary imperative 
of its work must be the proliferation rather than restriction of curiosity. This may require 
painful concessions. At the very least, it requires intellectual agility and limber self-
reflexivity, so that it does not superimpose itself and its agendas over the intimate 
workings of process.  
Crucially, this is not merely a matter methodological awareness. It is an aspect of 
performance, of affect and effect. J.M. Coetzee implicitly recognizes this in his 
characterization of censorship in the language of embodied courtship and violation: 
Working under censorship is like being intimate with someone who does 
not love you, with whom you want no intimacy, but who presses himself 
in upon you. The censor is the intrusive reader, a reader who forces his 
way into the intimacy of the writing transaction, forces out the figure of 
the loved or courted reader, reads your words in a disapproving and 
censorious fashion. (38) 
Such violence, both esoteric and exoteric, is to be resisted in the work of the 
literary academy, lest it comes to resemble and perpetuate within and through its students 
a panoptic nightmare. Apartheid censors, Coetzee remarks, outnumbered writers and 
artists by more than ten to one (Coetzee 34). The academics would do well not to treat 
this claim merely as historiographical fact, but also as a caution.     
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CHAPTER V 
“I’M STILL ME”:  
U.S. MILITARY VETERANS, PERFORMNG MEMORY,  
AND THE TELLING PROJECT 
In so far as I have a polemic it is this: trust in the inauthentic, 
the contingent, the practical as a way of arriving at meaning.  
- William Kentridge, “Director’s Note,” Ubu and 
the Truth Commission. 
 
Literariness, as it has been defined and enacted here, is haunted by theatricality. 
Like literariness, theatricality is the quality of form by which performances are evaluated 
and defined as theatrical. It is, of course, a principle and practice that would seem to be 
more directly and un-controversially associated with the immanence of performance. 
Theatricality, by most accounts, trades in effect and affect as immanent aspects of the 
audience / performer dialectic. And yet theatricality, like literariness, is also perceived as 
a regulatory principle. So, just as Diana Taylor resists the distinction between “writing” 
as artifact and writing as immanent process, so she polemically distinguishes “theatre” 
from “performance”: the former, she suggests, is “weighed down by centuries of colonial, 
evangelical and normalizing activity” (Taylor 15).  Performance, on the other hand,  
carries the possibility of challenge, even self-challenge, within it. As a term 
simultaneously connoting a process, a praxis, an episteme, a mode of transmission, an 
accomplishment, and a means of intervening in the world, it far exceeds the possibilities 
of these other words offered in its place. Moreover the problem of translatability, as I see 
it, as actually a positive one, a necessary stumbling block that reminds us that ‘we’ – 
whether in our various disciplines, or languages, or geographic locations… – do not 
simply and unproblematically understand each other.  
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While I subscribe to Taylor’s understanding of performance as principally, 
practically, and methodologically liberating (as evinced in the introduction), I am more 
reticent than she to consign “these other words,” literariness, theatricality, to monological 
ignonimity. In my conception, Literariness and Theatricality can be understood as 
performances – not merely weighed down by, or understood abstractly as, a set of 
historically determined conventions, but as staging, in their immanence, the subject’s 
potentially productive and self-reflexively alterable iterative and interpretive engagement 
with his or her world. To enact these possibilities, however, requires that both 
Literariness and Theatricality be deployed not merely as fixed and regulatory concepts, 
but as processes.  
 This chapter, largely anecdotal, offers an account of experiences working on The 
Telling Project – a collaborative project between civilian interviewers, playwrights, 
directors, and U.S. Military veterans that enact the tensions between immanence and 
abstraction, past and present, assumption and surprise, process and product.  The chapter 
begins en media res – much as I found myself partaking before I understood or even 
conceived of the relations between the Telling Project and my broader research project: 
truthfully, it was not my intention to incorporate my work on Telling into my dissertation. 
Many of the connective strands to the TRC and its ethics of remediation were happened 
upon after the fact – hence the inclusion of Anthony Kubiak, whose work engages what 
he conceives of as a definitionally American dynamic, into a first chapter that speaks of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this chapter it is the South 
African TRC and two of the plays it precipitated which irrupt onto an American stage.    
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The Problem 
Since 2007, I have worked alongside Jonathan Wei (Jon) as an interviewer, 
transcriber, playwright, and producer with The Telling Project, a non-partisan not-for-
profit endeavor that facilitates communication between U.S. military service personnel 
and their civilian communities through live theatre events. The Telling Project process is 
this: U.S. Military veterans volunteer to be interviewed; those interviews are then 
transcribed and shaped by civilian playwrights into a performance script, which the the 
veterans, after basic performance training, rehearsal, and editorial refinement, perform 
themselves.  
In that process, one intricate deliberation has become familiar: the translation of 
memories of deeply personal experiences into forms that approached art, an experience 
for the audience, something representational, mimetic, educational. Indeed, the successes 
and limitations of the Telling Project reside within the translational seam that both 
separates and draws together personal stories and their broader significance. This seam, I 
propose, is constituted by the dialogical tension between the affirmation and 
problematization of the “authenticity” of the veterans’ theatrical (re)iterations of their 
experiences.  
Within a larger critical context, the idea of “authenticity” is contentious. Post-
structuralism, for example, has pointed to its philosophical impoverishments and 
dangerous ideological machinations. Critical methodologies have parsed its constitutive 
elements and have rendered important critiques of identity claims grounded in claims of 
authenticity, be they based on race, religion, gender, or nationalism. However, though 
these schools have set the standard for discussion, some of their approaches tend to 
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engage authenticity as a mere idea, which is to say that it is conceived of in the abstract, 
as a generalizable, ahistorical, homogeneous concept. My experience working with the 
veterans has suggested that this “idea” of authenticity potentially enacts (rather than 
merely represents) crucial outcomes which broadly align with the Telling Project’s 
dialogical mandates. Affirming the authenticity of the veterans’ bodies in relation to the 
specific history they theatrically reactivate (they enact in immanent performance a 
reconciliation of the language of memory and their bodies’ histories), serves the 
“therapeutic mandate.” In addition, insofar as authenticity can be destabilized or 
problematized in the audiences’ understanding, and insofar as doing so agitates against 
the all-too-often blithe identification or antipathy of civilians towards veterans, 
authenticity serves the Telling Project’s “critical/educational” mandate. 
The necessity of the dialogical deployment of “authenticity” is suggested by the 
sense, felt by many of the veterans, that civilians tend to appropriate veterans’ stories to 
their own political and social ends. The veterans often identify this in phenomena ranging 
from cable punditry to insensitive civilian questions (“Did you kill anyone?”). The 
signifier “veteran,” its bearers feel, is interchangeably deployed across the political 
spectrum: they are heroes and victims; America’s finest and most dysfunctional; patriots 
and baby killers; protectors of freedom and human rights abusers; annoying beggars and 
a cause célèbre.48 For example, Joshua, a young marine, said in an interview and later in 
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48 The Telling Project has completed various productions across the United States, including in 
Starkville MS, Sacramento CA, and Baltimore MD. This discussion will engage the two productions  
in which I have had the most direct hand: predominantly, The Telling Project’s first production, 
Telling, Eugene, performed by University of Oregon student veterans, a navy recruit, and marine’s, 
with reference to its second, Telling, Portland OR, performed largely by Portland State University 
student veterans. Insofar as these first two productions took place in the Pacific Northwest, there can 
be no doubt that my experiences and the experiences the veterans described speak to regional attitudes 
as much as national ones. Jonathan Wei, the executive director of the Project, remarked to me on the 
phone after interviewing Mississippi veterans for the first time that if veterans in predominantly left-
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our first production, Telling, Eugene, directed by John Schmor,  
People drive around with that bumper sticker that says, ‘I don’t support 
the war, I support the troops.’….A bumper sticker doesn’t give us support. 
What that’s doing is actually supporting themselves. That’s supporting 
them in their social status….Because saying you don’t support the troops 
is like saying you don’t support children. What person looks good in 
society by saying, ‘Oh no, fuck the kids.  They don’t need education.’  No. 
So of course everybody says, ‘I love kids, the poor kids.’ And so who are 
the new children nowadays?  The troops. The yellow ribbons? That’s nice, 
but that doesn’t support us. (Telling, Eugene) 
I do not take Josh to be objecting to civilians holding or expressing opinions, so 
much as their self-serving appropriation of the idea of “troops” in homogenizing and 
patronizing terms. He also seems to take issue with the incuriosity he sees as implicit to 
civilians’ associations with veterans. The obviousness of the veterans’ plight suggests to 
him blitheness: uncritical, willful ignorance, devoid of particularity and safe in its 
assumptions. He continues,  
It just angers me, every time I see a bumper sticker, whether it’s pro-war, 
anti-war, whatever. The majority of these people have never seen combat, 
they’ve never seen war, they’ve never seen a day of boot camp, aside from 
what they see on CNN, Fox News and MSNBC – that’s all people know.  
They don’t want to know what we went through.  
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leaning western Oregon feel the weight of civilians’ political judgment,  then veterans in the red states 
feel burdened by expectations that they conform to standards of All-American militarized heroism. 
While such regional attitudes do emerge, they should not be perceived as true of all veterans in either, 
or any particular, context. 
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To Josh, the specificity of experience, his experience, falls prey to broader public 
discourses in which he, and people like him, are representations, types, figurations, 
subject to the abstract play of televised and op-ed talking points, endlessly re-circulated 
and then overheard by veterans in classrooms, corridors, coffee shops and bars.    
 The Telling Project’s therapeutic mandate serves to validate the veterans’ 
proprietorship over their stories. The performances, the telling of these stories before a 
receptive civilian audience, function as iterations of individual subjects, public identity 
claims, ritual reunions of anecdotes with the bodies that experienced them. Under the 
therapeutic mandate it is crucial that the relation between the story and the particular 
performer’s body is held to be sacrosanct, or authentic. “I’m the luckiest man alive,” said 
Brian, a marine who performed in Telling: Portland, and who survived two direct IED 
strikes in Iraq: “I’m still alive, I’m still intact, I’m still…me” (Telling, Portland). 
The second critical/educational mandate, which is always in dialogical tension 
with the first, serves to challenge civilian audience responses to veterans and the war, 
their kneejerk politicization, ill-informed associations, and homogenizing appropriation. 
However, this requires that audiences take stock of themselves. To contextualize this 
challenge in theatrical terms, I refer to Bertolt Brecht’s “Short Organum for the Theatre,” 
and the question by which he preempts objections to his theatre’s deployment of 
character. For Brecht, nothing was as counterproductive to the goal of producing a 
critical attitude in his audiences as the unthinking, trancelike state of popular realist 
theatre audiences.49 He describes them as detached from their bodies, motionless, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 In the “Popular and the Realistic,” Brecht makes a crucial distinction between popular realist modes 
of theatre and the critical realism to which his theatre for a scientific age aspires. In so doing, Brecht 
reclaims “realism” from the popular theatrical modes which reflect back to bourgeois audiences the 
visual, linguistic, and experiential conventions of the everyday. Staged drawing rooms look like “real” 
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“relieved of activity and like men to whom something is being done” (Brecht 509). 
Hence, Brecht’s famous V-effekt, his insistence on the audience’s critical and active 
engagement, facilitates the verfremdung of the audience from the spectacle with which 
they are confronted. Opposed, then, to popular realist theatre’s denial of the artificers’ 
hand, Brecht foregrounds theatrical fakery and “acting.”  His “theatre for the scientific 
age” insists on producing disbelief and incredulity as a prerequisite to its audience’s 
critical engagement.  
This disbelief depends on incredulity towards characters and the performances of 
actors. Brechtian theatre resists the effects of popular realist characters and their actors, 
who thrive on psychological ephemera – human essences as unknowable, unutterable 
lacunae into which the empathizing audience member can pour herself. In Brecht’s 
theatre characters are moved not from within, but without. They are moved by social 
forces rather than emotions, a structural conceit that dialectically enacts emotions as 
iterations of historical circumstance as much as ephemeral psychology. Characters are 
thus pointedly representative of contentious attitudes within the contemporary social 
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drawing rooms. Acted emotions look like “real” emotions. Performed language sounds like the 
linguistic utterances they hear performed daily. Popular realism, then, feeds a self-affirming loop 
whereby the imminently contestable truth claims that sustain the bourgeois “real” are left invisible and 
unquestioned.  
 Brecht’s realism, by way of distinction, necessitates ethical and epistemological curiosity 
facilitated by the immanent aesthetic encounter. 
Realist means: laying bare society’s causal network / showing up the dominant 
viewpoint of the dominators / writing the standpoint of the class which has prepared 
the broadest solutions for the pressing problems afflicting human society / 
emphasizing the dynamics of development / concrete and so as to encourage 
abstraction.  
Brecht’s definition of the realist, informed by his ardent dialecticism, is remarkable for its insistence 
on immanent process. “Realist,” in his conception, implies not the objectivist empiricist’s fantasy of a 
material reality that is what it appears to be. It is not an ontological claim. Brecht’s “real” has no 
permanent being. It is “concrete” only insofar as can be said to have existed (to echo post-positivist 
realism’s principle, it existed objectively enough to learn from it) prior to consequent and subsequent 
abstraction. Abstraction, in this regard, suggests the flux and play of representational forms by which 
to countermand the illusion that the signifier is grounded in an immoveable object. By Brecht’s 
account, then, aesthetic realism is only ever a version of reality.  
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milieu; they are obvious figurations, not stock characters so much as historically 
contingent and recognizable types. Here, then, the objection Brecht preempts: If all 
characters are representative, he asks, then “Where is the man himself, the living, 
unmistakable man, who is not quite identical with those identified with him?”50 This 
tension between the contingent particularity of the individual subject, and the habitual 
generalizing of critical enterprise – be it theatrical or scholarly – constitutes the object 
and form of the discussion that follows. 
The Process 
The Telling Project process was established by Jon in collaboration with the 
University of Oregon Veterans and Families Student Association (VFSA). From 2005 to 
2007, Jon served as a non-traditional student advisor and helped facilitate the 
establishment of the VFSA. The veterans’ organization undertook the task of educating 
their community (in this case, civilian students) about veteran experiences and issues. To 
this end they held “Veterans’ Panels,” one of which I attended in early 2007. Five 
veterans sat in a line before a large lecture theatre. The event was attended by an 
audience of maybe ten. A moderator, herself a veteran, asked a question. The panel 
answered one by one, passing a microphone stiffly along the line. Another question was 
asked, and the microphone was passed back, answers given in reverse order. After a few 
such exchanges, the audience was allowed to ask questions, which were few, tentative, 
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50 My use of Brecht here is admittedly thematic rather than critical. I do not mean to suggest that he 
was monological in his understanding of empathy as a countermand to critical engagement. In his later 
writing, there is a distinct softening in his stance. So Bela Kiralyfalvi argues that Brecht’s position on 
emotion and reason in a theatre performance is finally made clear in Der Messingkauf. In it, the Actor 
asks “Does getting rid of empathy mean getting rid of every emotional element?” The Philosopher, 
who Kiralyfalvi associates with Brecht, answers, “No, No. Neither the public nor the actor must be 
stopped from taking part emotionally; the representations of emotion must not be hampered, nor must 
the actors’ use of emotions be frustrated. Only one of many possible sources of emotion  needs to be 
left unused, or at least treated as a subsidiary source – empathy” (qtd. in Kiralyfalvi 1990, 27-28).  
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and anxiety-inducing for the panelists.  
The panels fell short of fulfilling the VFSA’s educational directive; not least 
because attendance was low despite campus-wide publicity. As Jon recounted to me, the 
veterans often suffered “talker’s remorse,” post-performance anxiety about having said 
too much or having left out crucial details. In addition, Jon, a fiction writer, spent 
extensive time with veterans in more comfortable surrounds and felt that their stories and 
the manner of their telling were lost in the panels. What was required was a formalization 
of the encounter, the provision of a way for veterans to rehearse their stories and to tell 
them as they wanted them told before a broader audience. With these ends in mind, Jon 
and the VFSA negotiated the process by which Telling, Eugene and Telling, Portland 
came to be performed between 2008 and 2010.51  
Accordingly, the method changed. Veterans (and sometimes their family 
members) now volunteered to be interviewed on camera. The interviews have ranged 
from 1 to 7 hours. The dictum is that we (civilian interviewers / playwrights) listen for as 
long as the veterans need to tell their stories the way they want to. That said, while Jon 
tends to let veterans speak freely, I tend to interrupt, admittedly with editorial intent, with 
a civilian point of view. So I might say, “You know that would sound extreme to your 
average civilian. What would you say to them about that?” We both interrupt for clarity’s 
sake – there is, for example, seemingly no end of acronyms to trip up even the most 
attentive of civilian brains: C.O., M.R.E., I.E.D., F.O.B., and M.O.S. We also interrupt to 
establish timelines – “Why did you join?” we ask. “How was basic training?” “Where did 
you go and what did you do?”  “What’s it like coming home?” These interviews are 
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51 Jon, at the time a fiction writer, invited me to partake in the collaboration in 2007 on the basis of my 
prior experience writing for the theatre. 
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transcribed and shaped into a script by Jon and I (an editorial role that goes to the ethical 
heart of this discussion).  
The veterans, after basic actor training, rehearsal and refinement of the script, 
perform it before an audience. The scripts are patterned roughly along the timelines we 
establish in the interviews. First “acts” (I use the term loosely) deal with reasons for 
joining and basic training, second “acts” with service or deployment, and third “acts” 
deal with the triumphs and / or difficulties of the veterans’ post-military lives. Within 
each “act” there is a rough division between ensemble pieces and monologues. Ensemble 
pieces speak to shared veteran experiences: from “being smoked” (painful and exhausting 
punitive exercise) in basic training, to the quality of the food, to bowel movements in the 
intimate company of friends, to the collective sorrow at the loss of friends. Monologues 
are performed only by the veterans whose embodied experiences they relate: from near 
mortar misses on the way to the chow hall, to sexual harassment by an officer, to waiting 
on a Blackhawk for what felt like a suicide mission, to dancing with a beautiful 
Australian woman in a bar in Hong Kong. 
From the earliest rehearsals of Telling, Eugene, the process was fraught. As 
playwrights we made decisions with veterans’ stories that made the veterans 
uncomfortable. One performer-veteran, a marine and an armorer named Shane, lost a 
much-loved First Sergeant to an I.E.D. in Iraq, and recalled in his interview cleaning the 
blood off the man’s side-arm. This, it seemed to Jon and me, went to the very heart of the 
Shane’s experience. This was what he carried with him, literally (it became his side-arm) 
and figuratively. It was written into his monologue. After reading it for the first time, he 
called us aside. He was worried about cheapening the story. He didn’t want to be (I think 
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I remember this phrase) “a performing monkey”: not with that story, not with the 
memory of that man. For Shane, then, theatre suggested artifice, acting, a kind of 
elaborate lie. At the very least, it suggested an undercutting or a commoditization of 
preciously held memory or deep emotion. What was negotiated, due in no small part to 
Schmor’s handling of the moment, was that Shane should feel no need to learn by rote 
words he had used in his interview now formalized by Jon and me into a script. Chatting 
online with Shane about this essay (he is deployed at the time of writing), he wrote “[It] 
kept the script alive. I never read word for word my monologue....if I just winged, I'd feel 
like it came from me I guess.”  
Accommodating the particular sensibilities of each veteran, keeping the script 
alive, meant that the broader structure of the performance could not privilege any one 
emotional arc (all too easily slipped into in accordance with the conventional theatrical 
form). We consciously did not want to suggest, as Aristotelian catharsis or a denouement 
might, a sense of closure following a rise in the action and a climax. Any such arc would 
disenfranchise those whose emotional narratives did not fit the formula – veterans whose 
experience had ended in basic training, like Patrice’s, or veterans for whom deployment 
had not involved combat trauma, like Justin, or veterans who found being “home” more 
difficult than being deployed, like Arturo, who felt “safer in Iraq than [he does] now….. I 
knew what to do….You get food, you get ammo, you get sleep. That’s all you really 
need. Over here you have to work your ass off just to barely squeak by and it’s pointless” 
(Telling, Portland).  
Sometimes, however, broader emotional arcs were unavoidable. It came as a 
surprise in the Eugene rehearsals that one of the performers, Jeremy, started angrily 
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delivering words he had spoken resignedly in his interview. Towards the performance’s 
conclusion, staged as a social gathering of the VFSA interrupted with direct addresses of 
the audience, Jeremy began to heighten the pitch of monologue as the performances drew 
closer. Addressing coverage of the war, he screamed these lines: “They make 
documentaries on what’s happening, they push their own agendas and they show dead 
Marines to do it. And not just their coffins, but their bodies. Those are my friends. 
They’re my brothers.” Such was the effect of Jeremy’s outburst that it potentially situated 
itself as a climax that threatened to overwhelm the contingent particularity of other 
veterans’ / performers’ experience, this despite attempts to work rebuttals into the script. 
I was uncomfortable with his outburst and asked him, after rehearsal, if he really was that 
angry – a question I regret. In line with the therapeutic mandate of The Telling Project, 
Jeremy’s anger should not have been challenged with a view to maintaining the formal 
(or formless) integrity of the play, nor the audience’s nor my own comfort.  
The Genre 
I often question the propriety of my involvement with The Telling Project. I am 
not a citizen of the United States. I have never served in the military: conscription laws 
that compelled young white men to serve two years in the apartheid-era South African 
National Defense Force were abandoned just before I matriculated. However, I was 
required by government mandate to march weekly on the soccer field in khaki shorts and 
shirts with the rest of the boys. Marching, then, is something to which I relate. My father 
served in the R.A.F for seven years in the sixties. I understand his reticence to talk about 
that time better now than before my involvement with the Telling Project. Even taking 
such tenuous connections to the military into account, I am a literary scholar, prone to a 
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sedentary existence, used to trading in archival texts, abstractions, and interpretations.  
Unsurprisingly, my impulse has been to make sense of The Telling Project’s 
process in terms of established genres: “verbatim theatre” being the most obvious insofar 
as practitioners interview subjects, transcribe those interviews “word-for word”, and 
shapes them into plays.52 That said, verbatim theatre is predominantly performed by 
actors rather than those whose stories it purports to (re)present. The result is that its 
debates tend to pivot rather abstractly around the binaries of “authenticity” and 
“theatricality.” To read one of its most high profile exponents espouse its virtue is to 
recognize the self-important posturing an uncritical investment in such binaries all too 
easily becomes. In an op-ed for the Guardian newspaper in 2005, David Hare writes, 
All revolutions in art, said someone, are a return to realism. Given that 
most art forms, particularly in the hands of metropolitan elites, tend to 
drift away from reality, what could be more bracing or healthy than 
occasionally to offer authentic news of overlooked thought and feeling? 
Isn't it the noblest function of democracy to give a voice to the voiceless? 
And where better than in a medium whose genius is for sustaining 
scrutiny? What a welcome corrective to the cosy art-for-art's-sake racket 
that theatre all too easily becomes. (Hare) 
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52 In the creative hands of such writers as David Hare (The Permanent Way), Robin Soans (Talking 
with Terrorists, The Arab-Israeli Cookbook), Gillian Slovo and Victoria Brittain (who collaborated on 
Guantanamo : Honor Bound to Defend Freedom), verbatim theatre has enjoyed something of a 
renaissance in the United Kingdom in recent years. In the United States, high profile examples include 
Moisés Kaufman’s and the Tectonic Theater Project’s The Laramie Project (which examines from 
multiple perspectives the small-town murder of gay Wyoming University student Matthew Shepard in 
1998). Anna Deavere Smith’s work serves as a precursor. Fires in the Mirror (1991) which engages 
New York City’s 1991 Crown Heights riots, and Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992 (1994) concerned with 
the Rodney King riots, are based on interviews with various participants. 
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Stephen Bottoms takes the bait in “Putting the Document into Documentary: An 
Unwelcome Corrective?” He astutely points out the tenuousness of Hare’s implicit 
definition of “realism,” and takes issue with his assumption that an unmediated encounter 
with the “real” is something that the theatre can facilitate, or that a mere word-for-word 
transcription is enough to guarantee such encounters. Hare’s formulation ignores the 
mediation of the documents upon which he bases his plays (strictly speaking, Hare writes 
“documentary theatre”), the contingencies of translation, the often politically motivated 
editing hand of the playwright, the interpretive hand of the director, and the mediation of 
language through actors’ bodies. I would add that Hare, counter-intuitively for a theatre 
practitioner, places too heavy an emphasis on language itself, as though it, kept 
sufficiently intact from the moment of its original utterance, is the bearer of authentic 
thought and feeling. Stephen Bottoms is by no means opposed to the idea of verbatim 
theatre, but insists on theatricality as its primary virtue. After detailing the ways in which 
Hare’s work, as well as Soans’s Talking With Terrorists (which more appropriately falls 
into the genre of verbatim theatre), insist on unmediated reality even as they evidence the 
particular contingency of their playwrights’ sensibilities, he advocates for the avant garde 
aesthetic of Moisés Kaufman’s work Gross Indecency: The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde. 
This piece, he suggests, as represents “the kind of theatrical self-referentiality [that] is 
precisely what is required of documentary [and verbatim] plays if they are to 
acknowledge their dual and thus ambiguous status as both ‘document’ [or transcriptions] 
and ‘play.’” Without such self-referentiality, he argues, verbatim “plays can too easily 
become disingenuous exercises in the presentation of ‘truth,’ failing (or refusing?) to 
acknowledge their own highly selective manipulation of opinion and rhetoric” (57-58). 
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Neither of these accounts, however, engages the implications of staging 
performances by the interviewees themselves. For me, then, an inevitable referent 
became the events and theatre of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), especially Alex Boraine’s invocation of the first Human Rights Violation 
Hearings (HRVH), which, already encountered in the first chapter, I re-quote here:  
This was the secret of the Commission – no stern-faced officials sitting in 
a private chamber, but a stage, a handful of black and white men and 
women listening to stories of horror, of deep sorrow, amazing fortitude, 
and heroism. The audience was there too, and a much wider audience 
watched and listened through television and radio. It was a ritual, deeply 
needed to cleanse a nation. It was a drama. The actors were in the main 
ordinary people with a powerful story. But this was no brilliantly written 
play; it was the unvarnished truth in all its starkness. (Boraine 99).  
As I also suggested earlier, the official record of the Commission, the TRC Report 
and transcripts, paled in the national imagination compared to the theatricalized spectacle 
of the HRVHs. Hence, Mark Sanders’s characterization of the fundamental disjuncture in 
the TRC’s reception: the event, “situated between the hearings and its report, between 
listening and watching, and reading is…bifurcated….[with a] resulting disequilibrium 
between official record and common memory” (Sanders 148). Just as the tension between 
contingent personal experience and generalizable abstraction bespeaks The Telling 
Project’s pervasive challenges, so the “so-called TRC plays” (Hutchison 63) leapt into 
this disequilibrium, engaging the problem of representing the events of the TRC. Two 
plays in particular, especially in their intersection, speak to these complicated 
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entanglements: The Khulumani Support Group’s The Story I Am About to Tell, which 
staged performances by TRC witnesses, and Jane Taylor’s and The Handspring Puppet 
Company’s Ubu and the Truth Commission, which used puppets to render verbatim 
transcriptions of TRC victim testimonies. 
For William Kentridge, the director of Ubu, the artificiality of the puppets is 
crucial a crucial expression of theatre’s self-reflexive artificiality: “Our theatre is a 
reflection on the debate rather than the debate itself. It tries to make sense of the memory 
rather than be the memory” (Kentridge ix). This explicit but complicated mimetic quality 
is borne out by the inter-textual conceit of the broader production. Playwright Jane Taylor 
creates a fictional apartheid perpetrator, Pa Ubu, confronted with the prospect of a Truth 
Commission. She refigures the protagonist of Alfred Jarry’s late nineteenth century 
marionette play Ubu Roi, with its, “grandiose and rapacious” central character: “Part of 
the satisfaction [of Ubu Roi for audiences] arises from [its] burlesque mode [in which] 
there is no place for consequences. While Ubu may be relentless in his political 
aspirations, and brutal in his personal relations, he has no measurable effect upon those 
who inhabit the farcical world he creates around himself” (Taylor iii). This farcical 
world, sustained by broad performances of “real” actors, is a suitable backdrop for the 
play’s examination of white privilege and the calloused indifference of government 
operatives to the suffering they inflict. It would, however, jar against verbatim 
testimonies of HRVH witnesses, even if performed by actors. The solution, at least for 
Ubu, was that testimonies would be performed by puppets, with speaking manipulators 
behind them:53  
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53 Kentridge concedes that the decision was as much a function of a preordained performance style as it 
was of ethical constraints (Kentridge xi). 
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There seemed to be an awkwardness in getting an actor to play the 
witnesses – the audience being caught halfway between having to believe 
in the actor for the sake of the story, and also not believe in the actor for 
the sake of the actual witnesses who are also out there but are not the 
actor. Using a puppet made this contradiction palpable. There is no 
attempt to make the audience think wooden puppet or its manipulator is 
the actual witness. The puppet becomes a medium through which the story 
can be heard. (Kentridge xi) 
For Kentridge, the palpable embrace of the inauthentic, of puppets, allows the audience to 
“hear” the stories without discomfort at the appropriative gesture implicit to restaging 
“real” words. Additionally, because the exquisitely carved puppet faces remain 
unaffected, I would argue that they allow audiences to “hear” without having their critical 
sensibilities subsumed by empathy.   
Kentridge recognizes other attempts to solve the problem of representing the 
events of the TRC, with specific reference to The Story I am About to Tell, which was 
conceived as educational theatre to spread awareness of the TRC (Kentridge xiii). In it, 
three HRVH witnesses, Catherine Mlangeni, Dumo Khumalo, and Thandi Shezi, 
performed their testimonies, re-contextualized as a conversation in a minibus taxi – a 
pervasive form of public transport in South Africa. The staging was minimalist, six chairs 
and an ax the only props. The survivors were accompanied by three actors responsible 
for sustaining scenes, comic relief, scripted debate and renderings of fictional 
perpetrators (Hutchison 65). During the survivors’ monologues, the actors left the stage 
in a moment that “replicated the TRC [insofar as] the witness tells his / her story alone 
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downstage center [and] made the audience intensely aware of their isolation and 
vulnerability” (64).  At the same time, the “juxtaposition of [the] stage and [the] 
TRC…highlights aspects of manipulation and performance, as well as the potential 
damage such reiteration of narratives of victimhood may do to the narrator, who is not an 
actor.”  
 For Kentridge, The Story’s use of real witnesses “is only a partial solution to the 
questions raised by the Commission” (Kentridge xiii), 
Because what the ‘real’ people give is not the evidence itself, but 
performances of the evidence….And these are not actors….their very 
awkwardness…makes their performances work. One is constantly thrown 
back…realizing that these are the actual people who underwent the terrible 
things they are describing. The most moving part for me was when one of 
the survivors…had a lapse of memory. How could he forget his own story 
– but of course he was in that moment a performer at a loss for his place in 
the script. I have no clear solution to the paradoxes this half testimony, 
half performance raised. (xiv) 
Critics too have had a hard time resolving the paradoxes presented by the 
theatrical re-contextualization of verbatim texts and “real” people. Shane Graham, a 
scholar invested in the narrative (re)construction of post-apartheid South African 
subjects, juxtaposes Ubu and The Story to each other. Lauding Ubu’s self-reflexivity, he 
nevertheless critiques the manner in which the “puppetry relegates the victims to the 
margins of the play, making them both literally and metaphorically puppets in Pa Ubu’s 
tortured fantasy world” and replicates  “however unintentionally, the traumatic exile of 
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blacks and political dissidents from Apartheid’s own fevered vision of a whites-only 
Africa” (Graham 20). The puppets, and their manipulation, in other words, signify for 
him the effacement of subjective agency by which apartheid oppressed the black 
majority. And yet, Graham argues, The Story does not solve the problem. He bases his 
critique on the survivor-performers’ affect, by which the “reality” of the survivors’ 
accounts is countermanded. The stories became “calcified in their rehearsed retelling” 
(14). So Catherine Mlangeni’s original TRC testimony had been “punctuated by sobs,” 
but “[b]y June 2000...she had told her story dozens if not hundreds of times…..her 
delivery felt rehearsed, yet halting. Mlangeni’s story has perhaps lost some of its force 
from being reduced to rote formula. Ironically, the literalness of the play’s contrived 
reenactments detracts from the ‘realness’ of the experiences the play tries so hard to 
convey” (15). Later, he argues that “The Story… asserts the survivors’ status as subjects 
capable of narrating their own stories, and simultaneously undermines that assertion by 
emphasizing their loss of subjectivity through trauma, and freezing their narratives into 
memorized formulae” (16). The story’s “uncritical privileging of ‘reality,’” he argue, 
belies the fact that the stories told are not necessarily True: “survivors of torture and 
violence might sometimes, of necessity, misremember or distort the untellable truth of 
their experience.”54  
From a critical perspective, I agree with Graham’s characterization of The Story’s 
entanglement of truth, “reality” and rote formulae. Yet, as a facilitator of the kind of 
theatre to which he refers, theatre in which veterans – survivors too – tell their own 
stories, I am conflicted. I want to believe Yvette Hutchison’s suggestion that The Story’s 
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54 Graham makes this point warily, recognizing that it potentially plays “into the hands of those who 
have a vested interest in discrediting the victims and denying their stories” (Graham 16). 
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process is palliative for the survivor-performers because learning and rehearsing of their 
TRC testimonies, both words and gestures, had the effect of “distancing [survivors] from 
themselves,” (Hutchison 65). The questions are not framed merely by the exigency of 
critical nuance nor juridical determination, but by what can rightfully and productively be 
demanded of the veterans in our collaboration. Undeniably, many of the stories we heard 
in Telling interviews were misremembered and distorted through trauma or disavowal. 
But the objective truth of the matter is hardly what is at stake. It would jar against the 
therapeutic aims and non-partisan character of the Telling Project if the memories of its 
participants were framed in term of their potential falsifiability. 
That said, Hutchison’s suggestion of the palliative effect of repetition is not 
merely a matter of “distancing [veterans] from themselves,” but also its opposite. It is 
about reconciling bodies, immanently, to the vicissitudes of memory. This reconciliation 
is the standard of “authenticity” to which the Project aspires and which I want to affirm. 
Indeed, while Graham’s somewhat ungenerous critique of the survivors’ affect (they are 
not theatre professionals), the idea of “calcification” is useful in defining a phenomenon 
the veterans themselves resisted – as was suggested by Shane’s discomfort and Schmor’s 
intervention. Resistance to calcification means that the sustainability of individual Telling 
productions is limited. Dozens if not hundreds of performances of the same script are 
unthinkable. Of course, some veterans are more willing than others to reengage and, if 
need be, alter their stories for and in subsequent public iteration. Facilitating Telling 
rehearsals and performances as perpetual processes rather than “calcified” repetitions of 
set play-scripts and choreography allows for longevity, even if it is limited.   
 A reiteration: the association of the TRC and Telling Project bespeaks the 
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contingent particularity of my own critical and experiential lens. I do not mean blithely to 
assert their analogical relation, or to elide vast differences in context, processes, and 
outcomes. Telling interviews are not a truth commission. Within The Project’s process, 
the veterans’ stories are not thought of as “testimonies” or “confessions.” It has neither 
interest in nor mechanisms by which to demand full disclosure. The Project is not, and 
cannot be, obsessed with the distinctions between perpetrators and victims, although the 
moral and psychological implications of both categories have thickened the air in 
interviews and performances. 
The Performance 
Telling, Eugene was first performed on February 8, 2008, in the dark hall of the 
Veterans Memorial Association. It began with the amplified voice of Lemuel Charley, a 
Navajo, paratrooper and heavy equipment engineer in the U.S. Army. He spoke into a 
microphone behind the ramshackle flats that served as wings on either side of creaky, 
borrowed rostra. The staging was minimalist. Stools served as the only props. We rented 
a rig of about 20 lights.  
Approximately 400 audience members – veterans of various generations, families, 
local theatre groups, students, and peace activists who handed out pamphlets before the 
performance – sat in the audience, a number facilitated by generous media coverage in 
the week leading up to the performance, especially, we thought, the cover story in the 
town’s alternative newspaper, the Eugene Weekly (Steffen, An Army Of Many).    
We didn’t think Charley would be performing at all (he was told he would be 
deployed that weekend) for the dates of the production. We found out very late in the 
process that he would be there, too late to choreograph him into the onstage presence of 9 
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student veterans and one military wife. And so he agreed to tell a story from backstage to 
begin the production. 
Charley told a story he had recounted for Jon and me, first over a cigarette and 
then again on camera in an interview.  “Let me tell you the story of how I learned that the 
barrel of a gun gets hot,” he began, with a raconteur’s prowess.  
There I was. I grew up on the rez in New Mexico during the Hopi/Navajo 
land dispute. At that time, the government was sayin’ that if you were 
Navajo and you lived on Hopi land, or if you were Hopi livin’ on Navajo 
land, you had to move. And my dad was one of those. We had to drive all 
the way across the Hopi land to get home. So we’d be drivin’ home at 
night sometimes and they’d start shootin’ at us. Totally dark, and you 
could hear the bullets comin’ for us. My dad, he’d grab me by the back of 
the neck and shove me down to the floorboards of the truck. And he’d 
shoot back. Then he’d hand me the gun and tell me to reload it. And let me 
tell you, that barrel got fucking hot.  
So when I first hit the ground in Kuwait, and we were takin’ fire 
for the first time, I thought to myself: ‘I know this.’ (Telling, Eugene) 
I enjoyed the self-reflexivity of Charley’s anecdote. It announced itself as a story, and 
used conventional story-telling tics to set the scene (“There I was”). It drew its listeners 
towards, and then disrupted, its moral. That the barrel of a recently fired weapon gets hot 
was not the message to which listeners were ultimately referred (a useful tip nonetheless). 
Instead, the story ends with a remarkable claim regarding the unheimlichkeit of the 
experience of war for a Native-American man born into a long history of violence. 
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When it seemed that Charley would not perform, we scrambled to find ways to 
include the story, including suggestions that we play an audio recording. Schmor argued 
this would have the benefit keying the audience into the act of listening, their primary 
contribution to the therapeutic mandate. But Charley’s story did more. It was, for 
example, at odds with the rhetoric by which the war had been justified (“We’re fighting 
them there, so we don’t have to fight them here”). It tore asunder the cloak of civility by 
which America elided its own history and present (about which more soon). The United 
States was not the Promised Land. It was not the “home” for which the military fought 
and to which they returned to convalesce.  By Charley’s account, veterans didn’t bring 
the violence they had suffered outside America home with them. America exported 
violence from within. “Home” was his training ground, the lens by which he understood 
the violence he encountered in the theatre of war. 
 I don’t know if Charley meant to suggest this historical irony. There is no reason 
to believe that he didn’t. Simply, the story worked as a formal and thematic frame. It thus 
became more than a reflection of Charley’s individual experience. In fact, when it 
became apparent that Charley would be in Eugene and willing to perform, the decision 
was made to “recast” Charley as “Charley.” Insofar as the short timeframe made it 
impossible to accommodate Charley’s physical presence in the broader performance, he 
became a cipher of sorts, an “absent presence,” the conspicuously empty chair left by a 
deployed friend about whom the performers spoke, whom they missed, and whose safety 
they worried about. In the third act, in an ensemble sequence, the gathered veterans 
received a phone call from the deployed “Charley.” He was offered care packages and 
told to come home alive. At the performance’s conclusion, he walked onstage from the 
170!
!
wings, introduced himself, and received the ovation with the rest of the performers.  
 In the Telling Project process, consisting at once of the script’s arrangement and 
the contingencies of rehearsal and performance, the significances of the experiences were 
unavoidably changed. There can be little doubt that civilian participants editorialized and 
re-contextualized the veterans’ experiences – with their collaboration, of course. This is 
at the heart of the principle of authenticity which I want at once to affirm and 
problematize. Claims about the simple authenticity of the veterans’ stories would deny 
the fact of their restaging, their performance, the recasting of their experience within a 
context that required the veterans to find and iterate new meanings that might otherwise 
not have occurred to them.  
Jon and I preempted this process in our scripting. In his interview, Shane had 
segued suddenly from the memory of his beloved first sergeant’s death. “But you carry 
on,” he said, shifting to a story about watching a massive sandstorm engulf three distant 
marines. “I see these three guys, Marines, way off down there just hoofin’ it to get some 
shelter. I’ve got my camera out, I’m looking, thinkin’ this is gonna make a good shot, 
following them along. All the sudden, “Whoof!” they just disappear. Gone. Swallowed 
up. Just like that. Disappeared.” Shane’s monologue became the point of departure for a 
recitation of Elyse Fenton’s poem “Planting: Hayhurst Farm”55 by Christina, Jeremy’s 
wife – an explicit shift from the purported authenticity of the monologue to a stylized set 
piece. Juxtaposing the experience of a medic “shoveling / human remains into a body bag 
// marked for home” to that of a military wife “planting peppers / on a farm in Oregon 
nowhere near // the war,” Fenton writes (and Christina recites),  
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55 We interviewed Fenton, then a recently graduated MFA student, whose husband, Peenesh Shah had 
served as a medic in Baghdad. The poem was subsequently published in her first collection, Clamor, 
which won the 2010 Dylan Thomas Prize.  
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   I don’t know 
if this is even meant as consolation 
 
but I want to tell you just how easy 
it became to plant the thin bodies 
 
in the ground, to mound up 
the dense soil and move on. (Fenton 19-20) 
During the recitation, the performers were cast in blue light as they ritually “gardened” 
behind Christina. Initially, in rehearsals, Shane pushed through his sandstorm story, 
shifting from grief at his loss into wonderment at the size and power of the sandstorm. It 
was a tone he maintained throughout, jarring against the quiet reflection of the recitation 
that followed his monologue. His recognition that the engulfment of the marines by the 
sandstorm “meant” something more within the scripted context, came to him suddenly. It 
was marked by a reflective pause between the “Just like that” and the final 
“Disappeared.” By shaping them into a broader structural framework, Jon, Schmor, and I 
broadened the intent behind the veterans’ words.  
 We did not take lightly the responsibility with which we had been entrusted when 
the veterans volunteered their stories. Ethical second-guessing was a perpetual process 
accompanying our choices. I cannot, for example, hold myself above the 
commodification of the veterans’ experiences or responses. I remember sitting in an 
interview with a young woman who was speaking with heartbroken eloquence about the 
trauma she underwent during her deployment in Iraq, turning my head to note the time on 
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the video recording, and thinking to myself, “This is gold.” We assiduously transcribed 
the interviews, and then sat on the many pages it produced, unsure how to begin shaping 
or even if we should. Jon and I debated at length how we should define ourselves in 
relation to the text. Were we authors? Writers? Playwrights? Excavators? When an 
excerpted version of Telling, Eugene was published in the Iowa Review, the moment I 
saw my name in print was accompanied by a twinge of discomfort at the  implied 
proprietorship of the stories and sentiments the piece expressed (from Telling).  
There was comfort in the fact that the veterans would re-assume control over their 
stories in rehearsal and performance, especially in light of Schmor’s wry de-sanctification 
of the script. For example, as a regular attendee of rehearsals, I was happy to be the brunt 
of Schmor’s humorous figuration of “writers” as pedantic egoists intent on maintaining 
the integrity of their creations. The undermining of my “authority” (such as it existed at 
all) implicitly loosened the script up to the veterans’ and director’s embodied innovation. 
That said, Jon and my differing approaches to reshaping the interviews meant that some 
veterans had more room to reclaim control than others. The monologues Jon shaped 
tended to be more impressionistic, which, given a looser structure, gave the performers 
more room to improvise. I was inclined to use more conventional narrative structures, 
which gave performers less freedom to play. In the end, the relationships between 
veterans and the script were as contingently particular as they were heterogeneous. Some 
were frustrated by formal imposition, others liberated by it.  
The Afterwords 
Constitutively, the Telling process, in its theatricality, necessitates an audience 
and is thus also directed towards it. The question becomes, what were we trying to do 
with the audience, and did it, can it, work in relationship to the therapeutic mandate of 
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The Telling Project? It is a question riven with difficult paradoxes, some of which are 
invoked by Suzi Steffen in her critical reflections on her experience watching Julie Marie 
Myatt’s Welcome Home, Jenny Sutter after watching Telling: Eugene. In Myatt’s play, a 
returning and traumatized veteran becomes “a catalyst for the healing of those wacky / 
poignant folk around her.” Steffen wonders if her displeasure at that appropriation 
resulted from her having been “spoiled by [her] immersion in [The Telling Project] story 
for other plays about the Iraq war.” She had “a visceral objection to the ways the 
playwright paralleled one vet's trauma with the mental illnesses and oddities of ‘freaks’ 
around her,” suggesting that it is “not only cheap but also rather insulting to veterans -- 
we'll take your service, your time, your energy, your blood, your limbs, possibly your 
life, and if you make it home, you can serve as a touchstone for the pain of others.” She 
concludes, “I wonder if the nonfictional strength of the veterans' stories in Telling 
trumped fiction so strongly that the fiction felt offensive. Or perhaps just this fiction” 
(Steffen, War Stories).  
Steffen is right that great care should be taken in the ways veterans’ experiences 
are recast as representative of broader social symptoms. That said, it is troublesome that 
she perceives Telling, Eugene as a “non-fictional” countermand to the “fictionalizing” 
Welcome Home, Jenny Sutter. It suggests an all-too-easy deference to the principle of 
“authenticity” in which I worry The Telling Project is complicit. There is a larger stake 
implicit in this deference. Anthony Kubiak’s Agitated States is a study of “the 
formulation of American Culture as theatre, and [U.S.] culture’s repudiation of that 
theatricality as the central fact of American history” (Kubiak 12). Kubiak argues that the 
“Realness” of American identity – claims to the authenticity of American ideals, from 
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manifest destiny to militarized masculinity – is theatrically constructed, and kept real / 
authentic by a simultaneous abhorrence and denial of the theatrical. In the process, a 
national history of violence falls prey to amnesis. History becomes a fantasy: “it appears 
as a hole around which sign systems revolve” (10). The Trail of Tears is belied by 
toddlers in turkey costumes at Thanksgiving matinees; equality is self-evident and 
inalienable (a foundational declaration of U.S. Democracy) even as one in nine black 
men between the ages of 20 and 34 is incarcerated; The American Dream is believed to 
be the rule rather than the exception; the State of the Union is always strong; the real 
Truth of America is militarism and an economy based on it.  In light of the artifice by 
which the Real America sustains itself and circumvents the pain and trauma of its history 
and present, Kubiak invokes the spirit of Brecht and Artaud, arguing for a theatrical 
tradition that “points to the wavering distance between theatre and the real, that 
consciously takes theatre as it object”. 
 The elision of violent history within U.S. borders is part of the struggle for 
returning veterans. They are often reticent to self-identify, feeling stigmatized by their 
association with violence in a culture whose theatrically constructed amnesis (and 
repudiation of theatricality) maintains the illusion that discomfort or trauma is the 
exception rather than the historical rule. As Jon wrote in answer to Steffen’s blog,  
One veteran related to me a sentiment common among folks who have 
served in Iraq – that you don't deploy to Iraq and come home to the US; 
you deploy to the US and come home to Iraq. [One reason] for this 
apparent inversion…is that wartime reality in this country is very, very far 
from the reality of war. Coming home is, for many veterans, confronting a 
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populace to whom they aren't entirely real any longer; where they have 
been, what they have done and in fact who they are is, in the public mind, 
'over there,' rather than here…. ‘Telling’ is trying to ameliorate this 
condition. (Wei, War Stories Comment) 
That amelioration is not merely a matter of revealing the “truth,” as Jon suggests later, so 
much as facilitating curiosity, incredulity, disbelief in the audience regarding the 
constructed-ness of their imagined relationship with their communities, nation, and the 
world. Revealing and destabilizing the theatricality by which the audience’s 
understanding is maintained, in other words, is crucial to what The Telling Project is 
trying to do.    
 But that is easier said than done, especially when participants in the creative act 
are the historical subjects to whom it refers. I don’t know that we succeeded, not least 
because it is difficult to see from an audience perspective. I am privileged and stymied by 
my participation. I know how the veterans’ accounts and sentiments were edited. I had a 
hand in their shaping. I took many of those decisions. I have access to the stories that 
were excluded and the reasons why. I know that stories were isolated, edited, re-
contextualized in keeping with the aesthetic requirements of theatre rather than merely in 
deference to the “truth” or “authenticity” of the original. I cannot un-see the artifice. 
 For what it’s worth, then, I am convinced that Telling, Eugene was theatrical, 
even self-reflexively so. There was no attempt at narrative coherence, barring a loose 
adherence to the broader structure of the interviews. It is a palimpsest, an imbricated set 
of stories, a series of sometimes parallel sometimes contradictory episodes. It moved 
between generalizable ensemble pieces and personal monologues, frequently blurring the 
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lines between. It included poetic and ritualized recitation.56 It shifted between diegetic 
passages and direct addresses of the audience.  Lighting changes were often stark. The 
performers moved the stage props around in full view of the audience. There was no 
attempt, in other words, to sustain aesthetic realism. Indeed, the obvious discomfort of 
many of the performers and the clumsiness of the mime (and evaluative judgments of 
skill are a moot point here) made very clear the artificiality of the medium. As Brecht 
recognizes in “The Short Organum,” if good acting makes the audience forget 
themselves, then “bad” acting does the opposite (Brecht 509-510). The veterans’ 
performances were certainly not honed into impeccable gests, but the effect was to 
disrupt easy naturalism. Arguably, even the venue and the scenario of the performances – 
the full diversity of Eugene crammed into the Memorial Association Hall – challenged 
audience members’ comfort and entitlement to unexamined subject positions. To some 
audience members, theatricality was apparent. “Bad acting. Too much cussing,” I 
overheard one young impromptu reviewer remark. “How much of it was real?” I was 
recently asked by an audience member. “Just enough to make you care, not enough to 
stop you asking questions,” I answered, with more certainty than I felt. 
 That uncertainty arises from the conflictive nature of the idea of authenticity as it 
is enacted in Telling, Eugene. A contrary interpretation of Telling’s staging can, and has, 
been suggested, one against which I have no argument, but which, in its opposition to my 
claims suggests the dialecticism implicit to the therapeutic and critical/educational 
mandates. In this latter interpretation, the movement of props in full view of the audience, 
the jarring of performance registers, and the clumsiness of the mime, do less to highlight 
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56 In Telling, Eugene, for example, the performers recited “The Pledge of Allegiance.” In Telling, 
Portland, cadence (“It dunno, but I’ve been told…”) was liberally used as a motif.  
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the theatricality of the veteran’s performances, than they do to undermine the very 
theatricality that seeks to estrange the audience from their naturalized understanding of 
civilian / veteran relations. The “badness” of the performance, in other words, serves to 
reify the authenticity of “real” veterans telling their “real” stories in sincere ways despite 
the explicit artifice of the forum. Theatricality, in this sense, does not invoke incredulity 
on the part of the audience, but becomes the contrapuntal “lie” by which the 
unquestionable “truth” or “realness” of the veterans is confirmed.57 
The sincerity of the veterans’ story-telling – and they have to be sincere in 
resisting the disingenuousness they feel they confront daily – draws the audience into an 
empathetic relation to them. In some instances, this empathetic response must come as a 
surprise. Schmor reported after Telling, Eugene’s initial performance hearing an audience 
member remark to a friend, “I didn’t need to know that.”58 In other instances the audience 
members’ identification with the veterans works at cross-purposes with the idea that they 
should examine their own critical lenses. Their attendance at Telling productions, in other 
words, assuages their discomforts with the disjuncture between the theatre of war and 
theatricalized America. They leave assured that they know what it is really like. They’ve 
done their bit to inform themselves. They’ve cared sufficiently. In so doing, they affirm 
rather than challenge their imaginary if naturalized relationship with their communities, 
nation, and world. “How can it be anything but pro-war?” I was asked by a senior 
colleague vested in anti-war politics. Another audience member, a concerned mother, 
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57 I want to thank Professor Linda Kintz for this and many other insights.  
 
58 His exclamation was especially resonant because this was a dreadlocked gentleman, “a hippie,” the 
very embodiment of the kinds of “Eugene locals” towards whom some of the veterans expressed 
antipathy, no doubt believing themselves to be doing so in equal measure to what they assumed was 
his antipathy towards them. Regardless, his “I didn’t need to know that,” which we interpreted with 
scant knowledge regarding the young man who had uttered the words, spoke to us about biases 
visibilized and simple antagonisms complicated.   
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asked me for a DVD of the production so she could show it to her son who, she said, had 
too idealistic a notion of the military. The performance served their purposes.     
At the conclusion of Telling, Eugene the veterans stepped downstage and 
introduced themselves. The house lights were raised. They cited their names and the 
branch of the military in which they serve(d) while looking directly at the audience that 
had been obscured by the stage lights in their eyes. There was a moment’s silence. And 
then the audience stood as one in ovation. The veterans embraced each other in relief. 
They stepped off the stage into the audience, many members of which stayed to talk to 
them.  
My critical misgivings are still subsumed by that moment. I stood, and applauded 
in full admiration. I was not uncomfortable with the catharsis of the moment (catharsis, 
despite our attempts to avoid it formally, seems to be unavoidable). Even with hindsight, 
I want it to be the unquestionably wonderful moment it seemed, then, to be. I want it to 
be beside the point that the performance might be interpreted as perpetuating naturalized 
accounts of militarized U.S. identity. Augusto Boal’s critique of Aristotelian empathy 
rings loudly. It is coercive and serves dominant ideologies (Boal 35). Loving the men and 
women on that stage, I want that ovation not to strike me as a false note within the 
broader context of perpetual global war. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghanis, 
combatants and civilians, have been displaced, injured, killed. Thousands of American 
lives have been ended and affected. This is an occasion for lamentation. War is 
detestable. I want it to be beside the point that we celebrated, in that moment, even with 
the best possible intentions, the network of civilian and military complicity. I want not to 
see it for what it possibly, insidiously, was: an ovation directed at heroic suffering (and 
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resilience) on the part of individuals acting on behalf of nation, with scant attention paid 
to the suffering of people “over there,” out of sight, far away. No applause should come 
from this.  
Then again, maybe that applause was not just a false note. Nobody was 
applauding a martial victory. It was not a triumphal denigration of those who also suffer 
but do so out of sight, far away – Jeremy had spoken too movingly of the suffering he 
saw in Iraq for that to be okay. Indeed, the recent celebration of Osama bin Laden’s 
extra-judicial killing, the dancing in the streets, is a distinct counterpoint. Rather, the 
ovation was a recognition of the local impact of a global war – perhaps too local, but such 
is geography, and such is immediacy, and such is theatre. It was an iteration, even if a 
momentary gesture, of responsibility towards the people on the stage, people with whom 
we live. It was a recognition of courage, not in battle, but in candor, of the struggle to 
find a new language for the kinds of embodied experiences that are stigmatized out of 
currency in order to sustain a civil veneer.  
What remains questionable is the measure to which the audience members were 
required to examine the ways in which their language engaged or distanced them from 
the immanence of violence, how it situated them between the body and the text, between 
memory and performance, authenticity and artifice.  
I cannot say that we have found equilibrium. I cannot provide an answer to the 
quandary at the heart of The Telling Project’s theatrical and this essay’s critical 
undertakings: is it possible ethically and aesthetically to negotiate between the 
authenticity of the subject’s experience and the wider social and global context into and 
about which it is spoken? If I have a polemic, then, it is this. It is worth trying. The 
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Telling Project remains in process. There will be need as long as there is a war 
somewhere away and a home somewhere else that fails to respond to it with the critical, 
aesthetic, ethical, political and embodied seriousness that something as hateful as war 
demands.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: RISKING LITERARINESS  
IN THE CLASSROOM 
For time flows on, and if it did not it would be a poor look-out for those 
who have no golden tables to sit at. Methods wear out, stimuli fail. 
New problems loom up and demand new techniques. Reality alters; to 
represent it the means of representation must alter too. Nothing arises 
from nothing; the new springs from the old, but that is just what makes 
it new.      
- Bertolt Brecht “The Popular and the Realistic”  
 In the introduction, I set out to reconcile my scholarly identity with the world in 
which I have my immanent being. This, I suggested, was necessitated by the recognition 
that the national, social, cultural, aesthetic and ethical upheavals of apartheid’s end and 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had largely bypassed my undergraduate and 
early post-graduate scholarship. In the broadest sense, this reconciliation of scholarly 
identity and worldly immanence has been progressively enacted through this 
dissertation’s implicit narrative arc. It began in the South Africa, travelled through 
various reading, writing and teaching scenarios in South Africa and the United States, 
through my involvement with the Telling Project, and brings me here, sitting, as I often 
have done, in a coffee shop with a glass of water and a cup of coffee and books, hardly 
looking at the keyboard of my laptop.   
 Despite where I am sitting, the world is in no less a state of upheaval, even if 
the lines are blurred by the sheer scope and complexity of the issues. In the time I have 
been away from home, the scourge of HIV/AIDS has hardly abated. Dangerous economic 
disparities persist, as government service delivery to the underprivileged is stunted by 
incompetence, corruption and lack of will. Women, children and men endure an epidemic 
of sexual violence. Property crimes in South Africa are pathologically violent. The 
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bowdlerization of Rainbow rhetoric fuels xenophobic hatred that continues to seethe in 
townships and inner cities alike. As in the U.S. (facilitated in part by U.S. private 
contractors) a prison industrial complex implicates the government in the perpetuation 
criminalized identities, rather than socially-conscious rehabilitation. This, in all its 
ugliness and difficulty, as well as its beauty, resilience, honesty, and confrontationalism, 
is my country.  
 All around and inside South Africa and the United States, violence and injustice 
refuse to comply with the cathartic arc we are asked all-too-blithely to prefer. Syria 
burns. So does Yemen, and Bahrain, and Tunisia, and Somalia, and Pakistan, and Sierra 
Leone, and Palestine, and Israel. And Afghanistan. And Iraq. And Libya. The more 
benevolent and considerate face of the current administration sanitizes perceptions of a 
U.S. military industrial complex, which continues unabated, shifting its focus to different 
economic interests compelled, as ever, by corporate stake holders. American 
exceptionalism continues to justify its international actions. The specter of triumphalism, 
the dancing in the streets at the news of Osama bin Laden’s extra-judicial killing, is a 
sobering reminder that the U.S’s often bellicose foreign policy is popularly sustained by 
amounts to self-righteous bloodlust. Within the United States, the “post-racial” era 
supposedly ushered in by the election of Barack Obama belies continuing systemic 
racism and classism. Prisons overflow, predominantly and disproportionately with young 
men of color. Farmers and immigrant farm-workers reenact historical scenarios that 
America, and its post-civil war, post-civil-rights-era dream of itself, would rather ignore 
than confront. This is no mere laundry list of ills. This is the world that enacts itself in my 
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body and the bodies of the people I encounter daily. This, in all its ugliness and difficulty, 
as well as its kindness, scope, diversity, and changeability, is the world in which I live.  
 Because this is also the world in which our students live, it demands of the literary 
academy a detailed and invested engagement with its pedagogical praxis in higher 
education. Unfortunately, critical engagements with pedagogy tailored to literature per se 
have tended, barring a few notable outliers, to be insipid. The social urgency, innovation, 
and impassioned polemics enacted in much contemporary criticism have not found their 
way into a sustained discussion of what it means to teach and learn about literature in a 
time of upheaval. It is arguable that the short shrift given to literary pedagogy in higher 
education is simply a reflection of a broader systemic imbalance. As Russell West-Pavlov 
writes, “[t]he practice of teaching as one of the central pillars of the academic profession, 
for many academics whether by choice or because of institutional factors the central 
aspect of their job, is consistently neglected by literary studies” (West-Pavlov 14).  
Indubitably, there are numerous reasons for this relative neglect. George Levine 
places the imbalance on the shoulders of disciplinary reward systems. In “Two Nations,” 
he points out that reward structures within the institutional framework of the literary 
academy overwhelmingly favor research over teaching:  
For as long as I have been in the profession, there has been an obviously 
internal division, often even in the work of individual faculty, between 
dedication to teaching (which may in some instances impede professional 
success) and dedication to research and criticism (which is the preliminary 
condition for stardom)….The point is not that faculty do not work at 
teaching or value it, but that the profession systematically divides the two 
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activities and rewards one half much more than it does the other, even 
when both activities are done by the same faculty member. (Levine 9)  
Levine also suggests the influence of broader economic factors to which literary studies 
programs and departments are institutionally subject. Within the literary academy, he 
argues, composition programs are the most directly engaged in the practice and 
theorizing of teaching. However, these programs operate not in the service of “the 
literary” (barring, of course, the economic benefits of their association with literature 
departments – primarily in terms of the graduate students they afford fellowships). 
Rather, they situate the “real” value of literary study, not in terms of a disciplinary 
integrity or output, but in its appurtenance to other, vocationally-based disciplines. Hence 
a bifurcation results between “the literary” and “the pedagogic”. While the “question of 
pedagogy gets attached, in most instances, to the teaching of writing…the institution as a 
whole remains doggedly loyal to the patterns of literary training” (10). Even as pedagogy 
remains, then, a crucial part of literary studies’ institutional survival, pedagogy in the 
service of the literary studies and the literary per se remains largely under-theorized.  
 What Levine characterizes as a “loyalty to patterns of literary training,” Mary 
Schmelzer characterizes as a more insidious symptom of disciplinary panoptic oversight. 
In her Foucauldian account of pedagogy within the English department she argues that 
“[t]eachers are most usually rewarded for method and style. The most successful have 
found new ways to do old things. Their very particularity announces pedagogic freedom 
that remains unchallenged only if what they do participates in the economy of the system, 
only if it preserves its truth claims” (Schmelzer 131). The classroom, then, is not a site of 
disciplinary innovation, rather, the institution sanctions advances in pedagogical practice 
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only if they do not challenge the (purported) integrity of “literary studies.” According to 
her account, then, the free-wheeling unpredictability of classroom transactions is a threat 
to “the discipline.”  
 For George Levine, this “threat” would seem to be a boon. The classroom is 
pivotal precisely because it “requires scholarly and critical sophistication, but it also 
requires a clear idea of what literature is, of what is entailed in reading and criticizing it. 
It requires, in fact, some very self-conscious theorizing” (Levine 14). I want to take from 
Levine’s stance the necessity of self-conscious theorizing as it is occasioned by 
pedagogical endeavor, and will elaborate on it in due course. However, I want also to 
problematize the “clarity” which Levine, and as we shall come to see, Elaine Showalter, 
perceive to be prerequisite to effective literary pedagogy. “Clarity” regarding “what 
literature is,” as I understand Levine’s idea, is the outcome or the product of the process 
of self-conscious theorizing. Clarity, as an end in itself, means that the messy immanence 
of the process is belied by subsequent language. Clarity defers, recalling Barthes, to 
Ideology, Genus and System and thus girds up, rather than perpetually challenges and 
redefines disciplinary bounds.  
 Elaine Showalter holds the idea of “clarity” regarding disciplinary bounds in 
such high regard, that she goes so far as to disclaim “self-conscious theorizing.”  Her 
2003 publication, Teaching Literature, was a high profile publication. Indeed, the journal 
Pedagogy dedicated a largely laudatory roundtable review of Teaching Literature to its 
release. Martin Brickman heralds it as “a coming-of-age for literature pedagogy” 
(Brickman 141) in part because of the esteem in which its author is held (suggesting, for 
him, the de-marginalization of pedagogy within the literary academy), and in part 
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because it champions the need, in Showalter’s words, to “reconceive our pedagogy to 
make it as intellectually challenging as our research” (Showalter 11). As laudatory as this 
aim is in principle, however, Showalter remains unconvincing. Indeed, her rigid 
adherence to disciplinary parameters, supposedly with a view to pedagogical pragmatism, 
would seem to contradict the audaciousness of her theoretical work, evidenced especially 
in her groundbreaking feminist critical approaches. So, in her direct response to Levine’s 
“Two Nations,”  she disagrees that self-conscious theorizing is necessitated by 
pedagogical challenges because it “usually means entering into a long dark tunnel from 
which very few teachers, let alone clear ideas about literature, emerge” (21).  
 Instead, Showalter asserts clear disciplinary boundaries by restricting her 
purview to established genre. Even as she concedes that literary studies, as a (post-
)discipline, includes a variety of different media, she assiduously clarifies, or restricts, the 
terms of her discussion, arguing that while English professors legitimately teach “film, 
television, and all kinds of cultural materials that fall outside [traditional] literary 
rubrics…for those areas there are already special manuals of teaching and analysis” (22). 
So, “for [her] purposes…teaching literature means teaching fictions, poems, plays, or 
critical essays.”  
 “Our objective in teaching literature,” she later argues, “is to train students to 
think, read, analyze, and write like literary scholars, to approach literary problems as 
trained specialists in the field do, to learn a literary methodology, in short, to ‘do’ 
literature as scientists ‘do’ science” (25)59. Mantra-like in this sentence, “literature” “the 
literary,” and implicitly “literary studies” are characterized as obvious quantities, with 
pedagogy as its mere organ, a proverbial ministry of its propaganda. Implicit to 
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59 My italics. 
187!
!
Showalter’s formulation is the suggestion that research (literary science) is pedagogy’s 
superior and determining antecedent. In this sense, literary pedagogy is doomed to play 
catch-up to literary research. Vice versa, the discipline’s abstract wing is fated to lead its 
“most practical aspect” (Spivak 299) by the nose. 
 Showalter’s primary investment in restrictive disciplinarity renders her 
awareness of the complicated dynamics that constitute heterogeneous classroom 
scenarios as merely token. In her contribution to the Pedagogy round table review, Beth 
Kalikoff ascribes a “fairy-tale patina” to Showalter’s pedagogical musings: “Teaching 
Literature is… situated in a disorienting professional landscape inhabited largely by 
faculty at elite public and private research institutions. There is little acknowledgement of 
the political, historical, and fiscal challenges that inflect contemporary teaching and 
learning at less-privileged sites” (Kalikoff 152).  
 I would add that Showalter is cavalierly cursory in the way she deals with 
experience that falls outside the comfortable purview of the elite literary academy’s 
pervasively middle class constituency. Chapter 9, “Teaching Dangerous Subjects” begins 
with a paragraph and a half on the subject of race, a discussion she dismisses with the 
claim that “the awareness literature teachers bring to representations of race, dialect and 
ethnicity, does not usually extend to the many other difficult subjects literature presents, 
and sometimes romanticizes” (126). A brief list of such subjects is followed by two 
discussions worthy of subheadings: “Suicide” and “Explicit Sexual Language”. Chapter 
10 is “Teaching Literature in Dark Times.” It raises the specter of personal, communal 
and national trauma as needing to be dealt with in the literature classroom “as a way to 
remind us that our role and subject are not cleanly detached from the world, but messily 
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entangled with it” (140). These two chapters constitute a token fifteen pages (125-140) of 
“discomfort,” cathartically laid to rest by a conclusion entitled “The Joy of Teaching 
Literature” (141-143). Mere reminders of literary studies’ entanglement with the “world,” 
Teaching Literature suggests, are enough. Certainly, in keeping with Showalter’s earlier 
assertion regarding the vice of self-conscious theorizing, the intractable messiness of this 
entanglement should preclude any attempt to engage its definitional implications for the 
discipline.   
 I am not satisfied with Showalter’s implicit claim that “reminders” of our 
discipline’s and pedagogy’s messy entanglement with my world are sufficient. That, 
disciplinarily and pedagogically, we need “reminding” is an indictment. It suggests the 
illusory conflict-free normalcy with which the discipline and its classrooms are 
pathologically imbued. Frankly, I find this adherence as offensive as Michael Hames-
Garcia does “the injunction to not teach ‘politically’ and to leave questions of identity 
and power outside the classroom….The university remains a site of struggle and 
controversy in part because it remains reflective of the struggles and controversies 
surrounding identity, power, oppression, and resistance characteristic of the nation and its 
history” (Hames-Garcia 20). Neither the long dark tunnel of self-conscious theorizing 
where Showalter’s much-feared madness lies nor our messy entanglement with the 
dangerous world outside is anathema to literary disciplines. They should be constitutive 
thereof.  
 To Levine’s, Schmelzer’s, and West-Pavlov’s diagnoses of the relative neglect 
of pedagogy within literary disciplines – diagnoses which hinge broadly on institutional 
reward systems and economic imperatives – I would add an epistemological determinant. 
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Literary pedagogy remains under-theorized and under-utilized because the classroom 
refuses to bend to the discipline’s archival comfort zone. The immanent dynamism of the 
classroom does not comply with disciplinary methodologies directed at stable textual 
objects. Rather, students and teachers bring their worldly repertoires into the classroom, 
repertoires that endanger the primacy of literary archival objects disciplinary curricula 
center. The comfort of stable forms, be they textual or methodological, are challenged by 
the irruptive present which endangers any attempt at overarching abstract structuring. The 
best laid plans do not guarantee outcomes. The comfort of generic conventions – 
traceable narrative, character development, catharsis, resolution, denouement – are rarely 
allowed us when we stand in front of or sit among our students. Classrooms are 
inherently unstable organisms to which the literary scholar, comfortable lording over 
definable and stable objects, is uncomfortably subjected.  
 Such discomfort is not to be avoided, either within the classroom or our 
research endeavor. Indeed, understanding literary encounters as scenarios – and here the 
literature classroom is our primary example – discomfort is a symptom of constitutive 
tensions that Literariness, as I have defined it throughout this dissertation, accommodates 
in ways that mere textuality cannot.  
 Literariness is the hinge, the dynamic sensibility that enacts the relationship 
between the embodied repertoire and the literary object. Through Literariness, reading / 
speaking / writing / learning / teaching subjects situate themselves in immanent relation 
to language in its aesthetic (and thus historical and ethical) aspect. In so doing, they also 
implicitly (and in ways literary pedagogy should seek to make explicit) enact the version 
of the world to which they ascribe. Embodied responses to literary texts and dynamics – 
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which may at first take the ostensibly simple form of pleasure, or pain, or resistance, or 
agreement, or empathy, or antipathy – are thus also implicit identity claims. These 
responses enact biases patterned into us by history, embodied and abstract, interpersonal 
and familial, racial, gendered, classed, local, regional, national, global. Understanding the 
workings of text upon the body and the body upon text within the literary scenario allows 
us to visibilize, parse, and hold to critical and historical account biases which might 
otherwise remain naturalized and entrenched.  
 Crucially, this requires a perpetual shifting of the objects and outcomes of 
literary pedagogy. The archival text is not the sole source of evidence. Nor, for that 
matter, is the embodied history of the subject. Both ways mere solipsism lies. The 
ultimate site of analysis is the intersection of the body and literary language, their 
immanent encounter. Foregrounding this immanence as the point of departure for 
analysis, however, requires a willingness to trade, not just in ideas, interpretations, and 
theories, but also, crucially, in affect. What is required, in other words, is a willingness to 
risk the self-reflexive performance of literary pedagogy.   
 I do not use the term “performance” thematically. Showalter does so in 
Teaching Literature. For her “Performance anxiety” is a way to understand the nerves 
that accompany the academic’s classroom endeavors (Showalter 13-17). Performance is a 
set of pragmatic skills – “Speaking skills can be learned” (34). Or, it is a pedagogical 
methodology.  “Performance teaching” is a student-centered approach prompted by the 
imperative to “teach drama” (79-87). Rather, I contend that performance constitutes 
literary pedagogy.  
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 Simply understanding the classroom as a scenario, as Diana Taylor defines the 
term, makes this clear. The literature class, to claim its ontology, is a performance event. 
It has a regimented starting time and end time. The classroom is its stage, arranged in 
keeping with the conventional embodied attitudes enacted in pedagogy, be that the circle 
of a de-centered classroom, or the forward facing, tiered arrangement of top-down 
pedagogy. The participants, in all their diversity, bring to it repertoires of their own, 
which butt up against the strictures imposed or freedoms allowed by the space.   
 Seeing the event of literary pedagogy as performance, the literary pedagogue 
enacts his or her epistemological lens. It is to recognize the repertoire of pedagogical 
practices at play within and in relation to the space. Importantly however, it is also to 
appreciate the plural that constitutes the classroom transaction, and the willingness to risk 
shifting within the repertoire as the dynamic demands it. No single pedagogical 
methodology can accommodate the heterogeneity of dynamics inherent to the event of 
literary pedagogy. If literary pedagogy in higher education is to entangle its means and 
ends with the world beyond disciplinary parameters, then it is necessary that it allows 
itself to be a reactive rather than a merely prescriptive or prescribed praxis.  
 I am reticent, in this regard, to superimpose established schools of pedagogical 
practice on the literature class. My own experience, teaching in South Africa, and then at 
the University of Oregon, suggests to me that such a superimposition is problematic not 
just across national lines, but even within any given pedagogical event. In a South 
African classroom, for example, the imbalance of privilege and educational resources 
meant that classroom discussions were a particularly difficult to negotiate. My impulse, 
on the one hand, was to elicit the voices of students whose experiences had been 
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excluded from the discussion in higher education. Dissipating my authority (the utility of 
which was first suggested by the older student’s irruption of my lecture on Apartheid 
drama, anecdotalized in the introduction), had the effect, on the other hand, of simply 
reactivating problematic historical social dynamics. Given the opportunity to speak, 
privileged students who had never had that right systemically challenged, occupied the 
floor to the detriment of historically silenced subjects. I did not, at the time, have the 
courage to take control of the scenario, fearfully convicted, as I freshly was, that to do so 
would be to re-impose my own historical privilege.  
 At the University of Oregon, teaching was an entirely different affair. So used 
were students to de-centered pedagogical modes that their silence, it began to seem to me 
over time, was rarely an expression of their historical marginalization but an all-too-
frequent enactment of obdurate entitlement. The implicit assumption was that others 
would fill the silence. To such students, speaking up was to risk laying themselves bare to 
counter-claims, to confront the possibility that they were mislead, through their 
interpretations of the literary texts, in the versions of the world they ascribed to. This 
conflicts they neatly circumvented by immunizing themselves in relativistic 
individualism.  
I have grown more combative in my classrooms. If I initially avoided calling on 
students in an effort to maintain their comforts, it has gradually become a risk I am 
willing to take. I am increasingly aware of the pedagogical value of a well-timed 
interpolation of a student, as well as the willingness to engage in qualified if emphatic 
disagreement with their claims. Their responses to this affective use of language, as I 
understand and visibilize them, are pivotal points of departure for self-reflexive critiques. 
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Of course, the same effect can be elicited when students disagree with each other, which 
requires a more de-centered approach. Regardless, whether I agitate my students, or they 
agitate each other, the resultant responses – discomfort, hurt, anger, acquiescence, 
identification, antipathy – are not ends in themselves, but iterations of identities (the 
subject in relation to their world) in immanent process. Emotional responses are “what 
we all (students and faculty alike) go through whenever we learn something worthwhile” 
(Hames-Garcia 32). 
 I am reticent to suggest particular pedagogical methodology because to do so 
would be to fix the classroom transactions in ideology, genus, criticism. The propriety of 
a literary pedagogical methodology depends on the scenario of its enactment. The 
pedagogues historical “Authority,” the bugaboo of critical pedagogies that seek to de-
center it, is not necessarily by dint of its past, undesirable. The insistence on recitation 
that characterized early classical education, as Graff describes it in the first chapter of 
Professing Literature, is not without any pedagogical value. A New Critical close formal 
reading is not rendered necessarily unethical because it has been used in the past to 
immune a white male academy from historical developments and embodied responses 
that threatened the rational order of things. Nor should we discard pedagogical 
methodologies that seek to reconcile students to their own voices simply because they 
seem to enact an atmosphere of blithe relativism. Seemingly uncritical responses to 
literary texts that center the student’s “feelings” or historical contexts to the detriment of 
textual focus are not in and of themselves a failure. Such (un)critical and (failed) 
pedagogical modes are dangerous only when any one becomes naturalized to the point 
that it invisibilizes others as alternatives, when we fail to appreciate “the plural that 
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constitutes” the pedagogical scenario. The expansion and contraction of the classroom 
around the pedagogue’s or students’ authorities is crucial if literary pedagogy is to 
agitate, rather than still the “mechanism in yourself that allows you to accept distortions.” 
* * * 
 The quarter in which I complete this dissertation and write this conclusion, 
coincides with my teaching of a class on militarized masculinity. I want to describe a 
moment that, for all I know, was a moment of abject pedagogical failure. I hope it wasn’t. 
But I don’t. This is the risk I take. 
In the third week, having defined our preliminary theoretical terms – 
“militarization,” the “military industrial complex,” and “hegemonic masculinity” – and 
subjected them to examination through a close reading of Othello, we moved on to five 
Wilfred Owen poems, mostly written in France while he was recovering from trench 
fever.  
Especially “Dulce et Decorum Est” struck a chord with the class. I read it out 
loud. Not so secretly, I fancy myself somewhat as a performer of poetry, certainly more 
than most of my students. I often grimace inwardly when they flatten carefully wrought 
meter and disabuse poems of their potential intonations in the effort to keep up with 
complex sentence structures. I read to them, aware that I risk centering my own voice and 
the implicit arrogance of the gesture, in order to invoke, as well as I can, poetry’s affect.    
In “Dulce,” First World War soldiers have turned their backs on the battle and are 
trudging, “Bent double, like old beggars under sacks / Knock-kneed, coughing like 
hags....towards [their] distant rest,” when, “Gas! Gas! Quick, boys! – An ecstasy of 
fumbling…” (Owen 55).  
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Owen’s command of visceral immanence was not lost on the students. They 
noted, with attention to detail, the effectiveness of Owen’s irruption of the soldier’s slow 
tortuous progress towards safety. I point out formal structures that enact this sudden shift, 
the spondaic direct address and flurry of unstressed sibilants. We hone in on the horror 
that follows:    
  Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time; 
  But someone still was yelling out and stumbling 
  And flound'ring like a man in fire or lime... 
  Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light, 
  As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.  
A caesura marks a shift in temporality. Owen’s speaker is no longer in the moment, but 
confronts, after the fact, its terrible embodied residue: “In all my dreams, before my 
helpless sight, / He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.” In the final stanza, 
Owen situates the traumatic event and its residue as a jarring countermand to prevalent 
nationalist discourses which glorify military service. Had you been there, he tells an 
unseen respondent,  
  My friend, you would not tell with such high zest  
  To children ardent for some desperate glory  
  The old Lie – Dulce et Decorum Est   
  Pro Patria Mori.”60  
A student raised her hand. I called on her. She spoke carefully. “I think that what 
he’s saying is that we can’t understand, I mean, those of us who aren’t there, you know?”  
 I ask her to elaborate.  
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60 It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country. 
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 “Like my brother. He was in Iraq.” The silence in the room thickened. “He’s not 
the same as he was. He’s been diagnosed with PTSD. And I think it’s really difficult for 
him because he always says that nobody understands what it was like and nobody gets it 
so he just keeps to himself.” 
 I thank her for bringing the poem, written nearly a century ago and a continent 
away, home to this classroom, today, through her and her brother’s experience. But my 
thanks belie my feelings regarding her claims. I’m resistant. And, again, I’m unprepared. 
Resistant to what? Her claims and her brother’s claims aren’t falsifiable. I know enough 
veterans to know that his sense of isolation is not unusual. What then? Do I risk talking it 
out? This matters to her. This is not merely an exercise in abstract thought. She will go 
home with my response. I risk something real when I speak. Frame the risk, I tell myself, 
as other students raise their hands.  
 “Hold on just a second,” I say “I want to talk some more about what Sarah61 just 
said. Again, Sarah, thank you. And please don’t take what I am going to say as 
disapproval of your understanding or of how your brother understands his experiences. 
This stuff is very difficult to talk about because it’s so very personal and it affects us so 
deeply…but then, that’s exactly the reason to think about it carefully, right? Is it okay 
with you if I talk through what you just said?”  
She assures me with a nod that it is okay. I choose to believe her, and continue, “I 
find myself very uncomfortable when people say things like you can’t understand 
because you weren’t there and didn’t experience it. There’s something so final about all 
those negatives. And I resist that. Not because I believe I do understand. I’ve never been 
to war. I’ve never seen what your brother has or Owen’s speaker. But that’s also not 
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61 For reasons of my own, I have not used her real name in this anecdote.  
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really what’s at stake, is it? Do precise details matter in our ability to understand someone 
else’s experience? Does our experience have to be objectively and precisely the same for 
us to claim to understand trauma, or suffering, or happiness, or love for that matter? 
Because if that’s the criteria, what hope do we ever have of any kind of understanding of 
other people? Am I still making sense?”  
I direct this question more broadly at the class, who, by and large, assent.  
“There’s a very fine line here, I think. On the one hand, we hold the experiences 
that define us to ourselves, because they are ours, and we have a right to them for that 
very reason. On the other hand, and this is what I worry about, I wonder how often we 
hold them to ourselves simply because it feels safer to do so. Claiming sole authority, 
saying nobody else can understand us, is a way to avoid the process of making ourselves 
understood, with all of confrontation, and failure, and concession that that process 
requires of us. Does that make sense?” I’m always very conscious that this verbal tic, this 
need for affirmation, may be infuriating to students. Still, by the quizzical expressions on 
the students’ faces, it did not make sense.  
“It’s like…mmm…” I scrambled. I looked down at the page I held in my hand. 
“It’s like this. Is Owen’s speaker…screw it, Owen. Is Owen saying that people who 
spread the Lie that it is glorious to fight and die for one’s country cannot possibly 
understand what it’s like to actually watch someone actually die of gas inhalation?” 
No, they agreed.  
“Exactly. Otherwise, why write the poem at all, right? Why put yourself through 
that? Why remember out loud. Why recall the nightmare, and fuss over just the right 
words to make sense of it for yourself and for others? There’s an act of faith at the heart 
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of this poem, right in the moment of its writing. Owen believed, he must have believed, 
that someone, somewhere, sometime, would take the time to read it, to pay careful 
attention, to allow the details of the moment, details that hurt him to recall, to affect them. 
Because that’s what his experience has taught him. It’s the best way, maybe the only way 
he knows to counter the Lie, the language by which the horrendous death of young 
soldiers was being justified.” 
I worried that I’d lost them. I’d spoken for a long time. Was I proselytizing? I was 
conscious that the room had contracted around my authority in a way that was potentially 
detrimental rather than useful.  
“Sarah, your brother may have a number of reasons not to speak about what 
happened to him. Maybe it’s too soon. Maybe it hurts too much. And maybe that is how 
it has to be for now. But I can’t accept the idea that we, in this class, or in our familial 
relationships, or in society at large for that matter, can’t understand each other. I mean 
maybe we can’t. But we have a responsibility to try. We have an ethical responsibility to 
try, if for no other reason than to justify the leap of faith that people make when they try 
to speak to us – or write for us, or whatever. Because blindly accepting that we can’t 
understand, that just too easily becomes an excuse for incuriosity, a reason to stay 
unchanged or unchallenged by the way other people see the world. To close them out. To 
shut them up. And then what?” 
 I felt red in the face. I was embarrassed by my own un-ironic sincerity. I meant 
that. Now I felt insufferable, like I’d spoken at them. I took it on faith that the deep and 
thick silence in the room meant something worthwhile had been achieved.  
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 And that left me stranded with twenty minutes still to fill. There was so much 
else and nothing left to say. I could confront them further. There was deep history of 
injustice to talk about: the illusion of the trauma-less American home front, the solipsism 
implicit to America’s de-theatricalized theatrical versions of the nation, the evolution of 
psychological “disorders” brought to an avowedly “ordered” home by American soldiers, 
and the ways in which they were and continue to be stigmatized. This was the safer 
ground of abstract ideas of masculinity and nationalism and textuality.  
 I didn’t want to dissipate the moment but had nowhere to go. “‘Anthem for a 
Doomed Youth’” I said after a moment’s silence, “is a poem about civilian funereal rites 
and the ways in which they make us comfortable with the idea of death.” I began to read,  
  What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?  
  Only the monstrous anger of the guns.  
  Only the stuttering rifles' rapid rattle  
  Can patter out their hasty orisons. (44)  
* * * 
 That pedagogy is constitutively a performance is important because it allows us 
to bracket off from the everyday events that surround it. This is not only a matter of the 
institution’s regimentation of time. The self-reflexive confrontationalism enacted within 
the event of and by Literariness is not perpetually sustainable. In “The Art of the Contact 
Zone,” Mary-Louise Pratt writes about an experimental class in which she sought to 
theorize and enact (literally and literarily) trans-cultural encounters in a way that 
accommodated confrontations that accompany such events. The outcomes, as she 
describes them, were admirable. 
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All the students in the class had the experience, for example, of hearing 
their culture discussed and objectified in ways that horrified them; all the 
students saw their roots traced back to legacies of both glory and shame; 
all the students experienced face-to-face the ignorance and 
incomprehension, and occasionally the hostility, of others….Virtually 
every student was having the experience of seeing the world described 
with him or her in it. Along with rage, incomprehension, and pain there 
were exhilarating moments of wonder and revelation, mutual 
understanding, and new wisdom – the joys of the contact zone. The 
sufferings and revelations were, at different moments to be sure, 
experienced by every student. No one was excluded, and no one was safe.  
     (Pratt 40)      (Pratt 38) 
Implicit to the experience of learning and teaching, in this formulation, is risk. It is risky 
to allow yourself to confront the spectral vision of yourself that others hold. It is difficult 
to have your authority challenged, especially with regard to your own version of the 
world. The immanent and intensive negotiations between self and other (be that between 
the body and the text, between pedagogue and student, or student and student) that 
constitute the best kind of literary pedagogy, are difficult to sustain. The period ends. We 
close the covers of our books. We stop writing. We keep still. We step away. Pratt 
describes the necessity of the performance’s bracketing:  
The fact that no one was safe made all of us involved in the course 
appreciate the importance of what we came to call “safe houses.” We used 
the term to refer to social and intellectual spaces where groups can 
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constitute themselves as horizontal, homogeneous, sovereign communities 
with high degrees of trust, shared understandings, temporary protection 
from legacies of oppression….Where there are legacies of subordination, 
groups need places for healing and mutual recognition, safe houses in 
which to construct shared understandings, knowledges, claims on the 
world that they can then bring into the contact zone. 
 It is, as I have argued, inevitable that students bring their biases, their versions of 
the world into our classrooms. It is as inevitable that they return to the worlds that inspire 
those versions after class and after their degrees, whether they major in literature or not. 
Whatever the extent of their exposure to literary studies in their higher education, 
however, we should strive to make it count. By enacting Literariness in our classrooms, 
the hope is that they return to and subject their worlds to more nuanced understandings, 
that they are sensitized to the affect and effect of the language that sustains them and their 
worlds, and that they are wary of the circumscriptions that still rather than agitate their 
aesthetic (and thus also ethical) curiosities. The hope is that, should they feel their worlds 
need changing, they ethically enact the wills and means to affect that change. 
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